In reviewing the agency's findings of fact, we do not make independent findings of fact or substitute our judgment for that of the agency, but we determine only whether the agency reasonably determined the facts and conclusions from the weight of the entire evidence. Zimmerman v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp. Dir., 543 N.W.2d 479, 481 (N.D. 1996). As we further explained in Zimmerman, id.: "Resolving disputes over the underlying facts and circumstances supporting an officer's reasonable and articulable suspicion is the exclusive province of the hearing officer, as is determining the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony."
" Id. The severity of an observed legal violation is not relevant, and even common and minor violations "constitute prohibited conduct which provide officers with requisite suspicion for conducting investigatory stops." Zimmerman v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp. , 543 N.W.2d 479, 482 (N.D. 1996). The determination of whether the facts in a case support a reasonable suspicion is a question of law which is fully reviewable on appeal. City of Dickinson v. Hewson , 2011 ND 187, ¶ 6, 803 N.W.2d 814.
Thus, we previously have determined that a driver's crossing the center line gave the officer probable cause to stop the vehicle for purposes of investigation. Kahl, 1997 ND 147, ¶ 14, 567 N.W.2d 197; see also Zimmerman v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp. Dir., 543 N.W.2d 479, 482 (N.D. 1996) (upholding an investigatory vehicle stop when an officer observed the traffic violation of crossing the center line once). [¶ 8] At the suppression hearing, Loh disputed the officer's observations.
[¶ 9] "It is well settled, traffic violations, even if considered common or minor, constitute prohibited conduct which provide officers with requisite suspicion for conducting investigatory stops." Zimmerman v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 543 N.W.2d 479, 482 (N.D. 1996); see also City of Bismarck v. Glass, 1998 ND App 1, ¶ 12, 581 N.W.2d 474; Storbakken, 552 N.W.2d at 80 (citation omitted). Driving or weaving upon the wrong half of the roadway is a traffic violation under N.D.C.C. § 39-10-08(1).
Other courts have reached different conclusions. Compare State v. Tijerina, 61 Wash.App. 626, 811 P.2d 241 (1991); State v. Shivers, 827 So.2d 534 (La.Ct.App.2002); State v. Waters, 780 So.2d 1053 (La.2001); Zimmerman v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp. Director, 543 N.W.2d 479 (N.D.1996); State v. Battleson, 567 N.W.2d 69 (Minn.App.1997); Tyler v. State, 161 S.W.3d 745 (Tex.Ct.App.2005); State v. Hodge, 147 Ohio App.3d 550, 771 N.E.2d 331 (2002); United States v. Martinez, 354 F.3d 932 (8th Cir.2004). The majority does not address these cases.
In Zimmerman v. North Dakota Department of Transportation, we held a reasoning mind could have concluded that the driver committed a traffic violation by crossing the center line. 543 N.W.2d 479, 482 (N.D. 1996). In State v. VandeHoven, we concluded weaving provided a sufficient basis to create an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the driver was violating the law. 388 N.W.2d 857, 859 (N.D. 1986)
“ ‘It is well settled, traffic violations, even if considered common or minor, constitute prohibited conduct which provide officers with requisite suspicion for conducting investigatory stops.’ Zimmerman v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 543 N.W.2d 479, 482 (N.D.1996); see also City of Bismarck v. Glass, 1998 ND APP 1, ¶ 12, 581 N.W.2d 474; Storbakken, 552 N.W.2d at 80 (citation omitted). Driving or weaving upon the wrong half of the roadway is a traffic violation under N.D.C.C. § 39–10–08(1).
The deputy testified at the preliminary hearing that he stopped Ballard for the sole reason of performing a probation search and that he did not have any “reasonable articulabl[e] suspicion” of any drug-related or criminal activity when he made the stop. [¶ 78] In Zimmerman v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 543 N.W.2d 479 (N.D.1996), we upheld the validity of the stop where the deputy testified his reason for the stop was a basis that was inadequate but his testimony established another basis which would justify the stop. As we stated in that case:
[¶ 8] Law enforcement officers may legally stop a moving vehicle for investigation if the officers have reasonable and articulable suspicion the driver has violated or is violating the law. See, e.g., Bartch v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 2007 ND 201, ¶ 7, 743 N.W.2d 109; Zimmerman v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp. Dir., 543 N.W.2d 479, 481 (N.D.1996). Ostby's argument about the pretextual nature of the traffic stop is misplaced because the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that its “cases foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.”
The officer took care to record all of these observations, and we remain mindful that an officer's subjective basis for action does not vitiate objective reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Zimmerman v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 543 N.W.2d 479, 482–83 (N.D.1996). [¶ 12] The totality of the circumstances must be considered in deciding whether reasonable suspicion exists.