We affirm. "Where, as here, a municipality has enacted a prior written notice statute, it may not be subject to liability for personal injuries caused by a defective street . . . condition unless it has received prior written notice of the defect, or an exception to the written notice requirement applies" (Zielinski v City of Mount Vernon, 115 AD3d 946, 947 [2d Dept 2014]; see Hawley v Town of Ovid, 108 AD3d 1034, 1034-1035 [4th Dept 2013]). Here, defendant "met its initial burden by establishing that it did not receive the requisite written notice of the allegedly defective [street] condition as required by section 21-2 of the [Charter of the City of Buffalo (City Charter)]" (Davison v City of Buffalo, 96 AD3d 1516, 1518 [4th Dept 2012]).

The Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of the City's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it. The City established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that it did not receive prior written notice of the snow and ice condition which caused the plaintiff's accident, as required by section 24-11 of the Charter of the City of Yonkers (see Maya v Town of Hempstead, 127 AD3d 1146; Lopez-Calderone v Lang-Viscogliosi, 127 AD3d 1143; Johnson v Braun, 120 AD3d 765, 765-766). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to any exception to the prior written notice requirement, namely, whether the City affirmatively created the alleged defect, or whether the defect was created by the City's special use of the property ( see Gonzalez v Town of Hempstead, 124 AD3d 719, 721; Zielinski v City of Mount Vernon, 115 AD3d 946, 947). The City's alleged failure to remove the snow and ice from the sidewalk, or to warn of a dangerous condition, were acts of omission, and not affirmative acts of negligence ( see Alfano v City of New Rochelle, 259 AD2d 645; Grant v Incorporated Vil. of Lloyd Harbor, 180 AD2d 716; Buccellato v County of Nassau, 158 AD2d 440, 442). There is no allegation that the City made a special use of the sidewalk.

Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of the City's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it. The City established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that it did not receive prior written notice of the snow and ice condition which caused the plaintiff's accident, as required by section 24–11 of the Charter of the City of Yonkers (see Maya v. Town of Hempstead, 127 A.D.3d 1146, 8 N.Y.S.3d 372 ; Lopez–Calderone v. Lang–Viscogliosi, 127 A.D.3d 1143, 7 N.Y.S.3d 506 ; Johnson v. Braun, 120 A.D.3d 765, 765–766, 991 N.Y.S.2d 351 ). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to any exception to the prior written notice requirement, namely, whether the City affirmatively created the alleged defect, or whether the defect was created by the City's special use of the property (see Gonzalez v. Town of Hempstead, 124 A.D.3d 719, 721, 2 N.Y.S.3d 527 ; Zielinski v. City of Mount Vernon, 115 A.D.3d 946, 947, 982 N.Y.S.2d 531 ). The City's alleged failure to remove the snow and ice from the sidewalk, or to warn of a dangerous condition, were acts of omission, and not affirmative acts of negligence (see Alfano v. City of New Rochelle, 259 A.D.2d 645, 686 N.Y.S.2d 813 ; Grant v. Incorporated Vil. of Lloyd Harbor, 180 A.D.2d 716, 579 N.Y.S.2d 746 ; Buccellato v. County of Nassau, 158 A.D.2d 440, 442, 550 N.Y.S.2d 906 ).

In opposition to that showing, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether prior written notice had been given to the Village. The only two recognized exceptions to a prior written notice requirement are a municipality's affirmative creation of a defect, or where the defect is created by the municipality's special use of the property (see Gonzalez v. Town of Hempstead, 124 A.D.3d 719, 2 N.Y.S.3d 527 ; Zielinski v. City of Mount Vernon, 115 A.D.3d 946, 982 N.Y.S.2d 531 ). The prima facie showing that the Village was obligated to make on its motion for summary judgment was governed by the allegations of liability made by the plaintiffs in the pleadings and bill of particulars (see Steins v. Incorporated Vil. of Garden City, 127 A.D.3d 957, 958, 7 N.Y.S.3d 419 ; Foster v. Herbert Slepoy Corp., 76 A.D.3d 210, 214, 905 N.Y.S.2d 226 ).

The Supreme Court denied the motion. A municipality that has enacted a prior written notice statute may not be subjected to liability for injuries caused by a defective condition in a sidewalk unless it either has received written notice of the defect or an exception to the written notice requirement applies ( see Amabile v. City of Buffalo, 93 N.Y.2d 471, 693 N.Y.S.2d 77, 715 N.E.2d 104; Simon v. Incorporated Vil. of Lynbrook, 116 A.D.3d 692, 983 N.Y.S.2d 308; Zielinski v. City of Mount Vernon, 115 A.D.3d 946, 982 N.Y.S.2d 531). Recognized exceptions to the prior written notice requirement exist where the municipality has created the defect through its affirmative negligence, or where a special use of the property has conferred a special benefit upon the municipality ( see Amabile v. City of Buffalo, 93 N.Y.2d at 474, 693 N.Y.S.2d 77, 715 N.E.2d 104; Avellino v. City of New York, 107 A.D.3d 836, 968 N.Y.S.2d 114; Miller v. Village of E. Hampton, 98 A.D.3d 1007, 951 N.Y.S.2d 171). The affirmative negligence exception is limited to work done by a municipality that immediately results in the existence of a dangerous condition ( see Yarborough v. City of New York, 10 N.Y.3d 726, 853 N.Y.S.2d 261, 882 N.E.2d 873; Braver v. Village of Cedarhurst, 94 A.D.3d 933, 942 N.Y.S.2d 178; Pennamen v. Town of Babylon, 86 A.D.3d 599, 927 N.Y.S.2d 164; Hirasawa v. City of Long Beach, 57 A.D.3d 846, 870 N.Y.S.2d 96). Where, as here, the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the Village created a defect by an affirmative

Where, as here, the plaintiff expressly asserted in the complaint or a bill of particulars that the municipality created the defective condition by an affirmative act of negligence, the municipality, in order to make a prima facie showing in support of a motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate that it did not create the condition ( see Lipari v Town of Oyster Bay, 116 AD3d 927, 928). Here, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the claim that it created a defective or dangerous condition in the outdoor shower area at the Broadway Beach boardwalk though an affirmative act of negligence ( see Zielinski v City of Mount Vernon, 115 AD3d 946). Therefore, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition papers ( see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853).

"Where, as here, a municipality has enacted a prior written notice statute, it may not be subject to liability for personal injuries caused by a defective street or sidewalk condition unless it has received prior written notice of the defect, or an exception to the written notice requirement applies" (Zielinski v City of Mount Vernon, 115 A.D.3d 946, 947 [2d Dept 2014]; see Trinidad v City of Mount Vernon, 51 A.D.3d 661, 662 [2d Dept 2008]). "The only recognized exceptions to the prior written notice requirement involve situations in which either the municipality created the defect through an affirmative act of negligence, or a 'special use' confers a special benefit upon the municipality" (De La Reguera v City of Mount Vernon, 74 A.D.3d 1127, 1127 [2d Dept 2010]).

All of these factors compel me to conclude with a reasonable degree of engineering certainty that the depression was affirmatively created by Brookhaven when it created the manhole within the concrete Walkway. The Court in Zielinskiv City of Mount Vernon, 115 A.D.3d 946, 947 [2d Dept 2014], held

Plaintiff alleged that defendant created the alleged dangerous condition by improper installation or repair work done on the subject roadway. The Town defendants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether they affirmatively created the condition, as they merely submit evidence that they did not receive prior written notice of the alleged dangerous condition (see Zielinski v City of Mount Vernon, 115 AD3d 946, 982 NYS2d 531 [2d Dept 2014]; Carlucci v Village of Scarsdale, 104 AD3d 797, 961 NYS2d 318 [2d Dept 2013]). The Town defendants contend that there is no evidence that they affirmatively created the alleged defective condition.