Opinion
Case Number 99-CV-10175-BC.
November 6, 2001.
OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner, Joseph Ziegler, a state inmate presently confined at the Riverside Correctional Facility in Ionia, Michigan ("Riverside"), has filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging that he has unlawfully been deprived of disciplinary credit, i.e., "good time," in violation of his constitutional rights. The amended petition was signed on May 17, 2000. On March 14, 2001, Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder issued his report and recommendation that petitioner's amended petition for habeas corpus be denied. Petitioner filed his objections on April 2, 2001. Because the petitioner has not demonstrated that the disciplinary hearing of which he complains was contrary to clearly established federal law or involved an unreasonable application of federal law, the Court will dismiss his petition for habeas corpus.
I.
On May 23, 1996, while incarcerated at the Standish Maximum Correctional Facility ("SMF") in Standish, Michigan, petitioner was found guilty following a major misconduct hearing of the offense of "threatening behavior," and was sentenced to fourteen days of detention. On May 31, 1996, petitioner was notified that because of his misconduct conviction, Warden Tessmer had ordered thirty-five days of disciplinary credits forfeited. In September of 1996, while petitioner was housed at the Marquette Branch Prison, he was found guilty of another major misconduct violation, this time assault and battery of an officer. He received thirty days' loss of privileges, and on September 20 was notified that Warden Hawley had ordered the forfeiture of fifteen days of disciplinary credits.
The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with Marquette County, Michigan Circuit Court on October 24, 1996. He alleged that Warden Hawley had "adversely affected his sentence" by improperly forfeiting good time credits which, as an habitual offender, he had in fact never earned. Circuit Judge Edward Quinnell granted summary disposition to defendant Hawley, explaining that while disciplinary credits did not apply to minimum sentences, they still at least theoretically accrue and could be relevant to the maximum sentence an offender could serve. Petitioner appealed the circuit court's determination to the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court, both of which denied review.
The petitioner now seeks a writ of habeas corpus restoring the good time credits that were forfeited. Petitioner claims that Wardens Tessmer and Hawley "unlawfully forfeited" his "Good Time never `earned'" in violation of Michigan Department of Corrections [MDOC] policies as well as state and federal law, "since petitioner was sentenced as a habitual offender and does not "earn' good-time until he has served his mandatory minimum sentence, and has now been subjected to MDOC defendants improperly `stacking' (computing) his maximum consecutive sentences." Am. Pet., dkt #71 at ¶ 8.
Respondent asserts that the petition should be denied because prisoners have no constitutional right to good time credits and because petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state courts' disposition of this matter resulted in a decision that was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law.
II.
The petitioner did not object to the Magistrate Judge's finding that his claim was governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). This revised statutory scheme provides as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This section of the statute was discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). A state court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent "if the state arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law," or "if the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent" and arrives at a different result. Id. at 412-13. A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court precedent "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case" or if the state court either unreasonably extends or unreasonably refuses to extend a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new context. Id. at 413. The state court's application of the law is viewed under a standard of objective reasonableness. Id. at 409-410.
The Magistrate Judge correctly found that the petitioner exhausted his claim in state courts concerning Warden Hawley's forfeiture of good time credits, but did not exhaust his remedies with regard to his claim against Warden Tessmer. Accordingly, only Warden Hawley's forfeiture is properly before the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
As to the merits of the petition, the magistrate judge correctly found that, even if petitioner is assumed to have a liberty interest in his good time credits, he did not demonstrate any denial of due process of law in the disciplinary proceeding that resulted in Warden Hawley's revocation of petitioner's credits. For a prison disciplinary hearing, due process requires only that the prisoner receive (1) advance written notice of the charges against him; (2) the right to call witnesses and present evidence in his own defense if doing so does not jeopardize institutional safety or correctional goals; and (3) a written statement indicating the evidence relied on and the reasons supporting the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974). A finding of guilty at a prison disciplinary proceeding need only be supported by "some evidence" in the record. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Williams v. Bass, 63 F.3d 483, 485-86 (6th Cir. 1995).
Here, the Magistrate Judge found that the petitioner received the process to which he is constitutionally due. He received advanced written notice of the charges more than 24 hours in advance via a Major Misconduct Report, and signed a form indicating that he had read the charges. Petitioner prepared a written statement of witnesses he wished to have questioned and questions they were to be asked. Petitioner testified in his defense at the hearing and the witnesses' responses to petitioner's questions were read. Testimony from the victim of the assault gave "some evidence" to support the hearing officer's written finding that petitioner committed the infraction with which he was charged.
The petitioner objects to this finding, claiming that the MDOC process is corrupt and that any finding its officers make is unreliable. He offers no proof of this contention, and the objection is not pertinent to the Magistrate Judge's findings. Moreover, the Court's role is not to evaluate the overall fitness of the prison disciplinary system, but only to determine if there is "some evidence" supporting the hearing officer's determination. The petitioner's assertions that the hearing officer "automatically" took the word of prison staff over his and relied on statistics rather than evidence to find him guilty might be notable if this Court were conducting de novo review of his conviction. Once the Court finds "some evidence" in the record, however, supporting the hearing officer's decision, this Court's role is at an end. As noted alone, the record supports the hearing officer's determination.
III.
On November 2, 2001, the petitioner filed motions seeking to present additional evidence, claiming that he has recently exhausted identical claims regarding additional hearings he has attended since the filing of this motion. Petitioner pleads no facts, much less any evidence, supporting his conclusory allegations that these hearings violated his "clearly established" rights. At this late date, the Court is unwilling to permit the petitioner to expand upon claims that seem to rest upon the same insufficient legal bases as those already pleaded. See Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmt'y v. Mich., 11 F.3d 1341, 1348 (6th Cir. 1993) (futile amendments need not be granted).
IV.
Because petitioner received the process to which he is constitutionally due, the MDOC did not render a decision that was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as established by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that petitioner's amended petition for writ of habeas corpus [dkt #71] is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that petitioner's Motion to Compel Discovery [dkt #81] is DENIED AS MOOT.
It is further ORDERED that petitioner's motion to extend time to further answer the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge [dkt #83] is DENIED AS MOOT.
It is further ORDERED that petitioner's Motion for Immediate Injunctive Order and/or Certified Cost to Replace/Copy Entire Court File [dkt #86] is DENIED AS MOOT.
It is further ORDERED that petitioner's motions to file additional evidence on pending claims [dkt ## 86, 87] is DENIED.
JUDGMENT
This matter having come before the Court on a Petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus, In accordance with the Order dismissing the Habeas Corpus Petition, It is ORDERED that judgment enter in favor of respondent and against petitioner.