Ziatz v. People

23 Citing cases

  1. People v. Small

    631 P.2d 148 (Colo. 1981)   Cited 48 times
    Holding that the trial court properly entertained the defendant's Crim.P. 35 motion to vacate his sentence on speedy trial grounds even though the direct appeal of his conviction was pending because the speedy trial issue was specifically reserved for decision after trial

    In a weighing of these factors, the defendant has the burden of proving that his constitutional speedy trial right has been denied. Gelfand v. People, supra; Jaramillo v. District Court, 174 Colo. 561, 484 P.2d 1219 (1971); Ziatz v. People, 171 Colo. 58, 465 P.2d 406 (1970). Courts that engage in this "difficult and sensitive balancing process" [ Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 15 2193] are painfully aware that the idea of a "speedy trial" is "slippery" to grasp [ Id. at 522, 92 S.Ct. at 2188] and that, as a constitutional right, it is "a more vague concept than other procedural rights."

  2. Gelfand v. People

    196 Colo. 487 (Colo. 1978)   Cited 15 times
    In Gelfand v. People, 196 Colo. 487, 586 P.2d 1331 (1978), decided 2 months after a rehearing in Cole, the Colorado Supreme Court, without mentioning Cole, held that out-of-court statements made to a probation officer during plea bargaining negotiations cannot be used in a subsequent trial in the state's case-in-chief.

    The defendant, however, has the burden of proving that her constitutional speedy trial right has been denied. Ziatz v. People, 171 Colo. 58, 465 P.2d 406 (1970); Casias v. People, 160 Colo. 152, 415 P.2d 344 (1966). [3,4] The circumstances of each case must be examined to determine whether a speedy trial has been afforded.

  3. Doggett v. State

    530 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)   Cited 28 times

    " See and compare, McClanahan v. State, 394 S.W.2d 499 (Tex.Cr.App. 1965); see also, Briscoe v. United States, 336 F.2d 960 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Ziatz v. People, 171 Colo. 58, 465 P.2d 406 (1970); State v. Karathanos, 158 Mont. 461, 493 P.2d 326 (1972); State v. Conley, 32 Ohio App.2d 54, 288 N.E.2d 296 (1971); Williams v. State, 437 S.W.2d 82 (Mo. 1969); Hall v. State, 291 Ala. 397, 281 So.2d 662 (1973); cf. Lapp v. State, 519 S.W.2d 443 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975). Sec. 5.10 of the Controlled Substances Act provides, in part, as follows:

  4. People v. MacFarland

    189 Colo. 363 (Colo. 1975)   Cited 8 times

    Absent an abuse of such discretion, the ruling will not be disturbed on review. People v. Buckner, 180 Colo. 65, 504 P.2d 669 (1972); Ziatz v. People, 171 Colo. 58, 465 P.2d 406 (1970). [11] The record reflects that along with granting the prosecution's motion, the trial court also granted defendant's motion for a continuance.

  5. People v. Gomez

    189 Colo. 91 (Colo. 1975)   Cited 8 times

    [5] The inability of the prosecution to establish the twelve-point comparison used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation went to the weight to be given the fingerprint identification, but not to the admissibility of the evidence. See People v. Lowe, 184 Colo. 182, 519 P.2d 344 (1974); People v. King, 181 Colo. 439, 510 P.2d 333 (1973); People v. Mascarenas, 181 Colo. 268, 509 P.2d 303 (1973); Ziatz v. People, 171 Colo. 58, 465 P.2d 406 (1970). Moreover, counsel did not object to the experiments which were offered to show the time that the fingerprint was impressed on the liquor carton.

  6. People v. Meyers

    510 P.2d 430 (Colo. 1973)   Cited 11 times

    Johnson v. People, 33 Colo. 224, 80 P. 133 (1905). See also Ziatz v. People, 171 Colo. 58, 465 P.2d 406 (1970) and People v. Apostolos, 73 Colo. 71, 213 P. 331 (1923). [2] 1969 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 48-8-3(8) specifically states that any exemption set forth in this section is available as a "defense."

  7. People v. Drumright

    507 P.2d 1097 (Colo. 1973)   Cited 2 times

    The qualification of an expert witness is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on review unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. White v. People, 175 Colo. 119, 486 P.2d 4 (1971); Ziatz v. People, 171 Colo. 58, 465 P.2d 406 (1970); and Hampton v. People, 171 Colo. 153, 465 P.2d 394 (1970). We find no such abuse here.

  8. People v. Baca

    503 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1972)   Cited 1 times

    However, neither this nor the other so-called circumstances have the stature of circumstantial evidence which precludes any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. People v. Vigil, 180 Colo. 104, 502 P.2d 418 and Ziatz v. People, 171 Colo. 58, 465 P.2d 406 (1970). This rule of law is particularly significant and applicable here when we consider the defendant's testimony regarding the reason he fled the scene which is reasonably understandable and comports just as much with the innocence of the defendant as it might with his guilt.

  9. People v. Vigil

    502 P.2d 418 (Colo. 1972)   Cited 19 times

    In order to convict a person on circumstantial evidence alone, the facts and circumstances must be such as to be inconsistent upon any reasonable hypothesis with the innocence of the person charged. Ziatz v. People, 171 Colo. 58, 465 P.2d 406 (1970). See also Maynes v. People, 169 Colo. 186, 454 P.2d 797 (1969).

  10. People v. Florez

    498 P.2d 1162 (Colo. 1972)   Cited 1 times

    Davis v. People, 137 Colo. 113, 321 P.2d 1103 (1958). See also Ziatz v. People, 171 Colo. 58, 465 P.2d 406 (1970), Gonzales v. People, 128 Colo. 522, 264 P.2d 508 (1954), Conferti v. People, 79 Colo. 666, 247 P.2d 1065 (1926), LaConte v. United States, 330 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1964). "Defendant's unrebutted explanation that he was carrying the bottles from the side of the building after having purchased them from a youth establishes a 'reasonable hypothesis of innocence.