Opinion
FSTFA124022416S
06-29-2018
ZHE ZHENG v. FEIFEI XIA
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
HELLER, J.
The plaintiff Zhe Zheng and the defendant Feifei Xia were before the court on March 6, 2018 for a hearing on the defendant’s motion for modification, postjudgment (# 226.00), filed on June 29, 2017. Both of the parties represented themselves. The court heard testimony from the parties, reviewed the exhibits that were admitted into evidence, took judicial notice of the contents of the court file, and reserved decision at that time.
Following their March 6, 2018 appearance before this court, the parties were before the Honorable Wayne Keeney, Family Support Magistrate, on March 8, 2018. It appears that the plaintiff’s child support obligation was modified at that time (# 236.00); therefore, this court will not enter a new child support award. The additional claims for relief in the defendant’s motion for modification, postjudgment, are addressed below.
Private school tuition: The defendant seeks an order directing the plaintiff to contribute to the private school tuition and expenses for the parties’ son Brian, who is attending the Waterside School in Stamford, Connecticut. Brian will be seven years old in September. This court previously found the defendant in contempt for enrolling Brian in the Waterside School without conferring with the plaintiff in advance (see memorandum of decision # 238.00). The plaintiff objects to Brian’s attending private school and is unwilling to contribute to the cost.
Both of the parties are highly educated. They attended public schools in China, which, as each of them testified, were the best schools at that time. They received their undergraduate degrees from public universities in China before moving to the United States. The plaintiff has a master’s degree in financial mathematics from the University of Connecticut. The defendant has a master’s degree in educational psychology from Kent State University and a law degree from Cardozo Law School. The parties fully intend to send Brian to college.
The defendant contends that Brian should have the benefit of all that the Waterside School offers. The plaintiff maintains that Brian should attend the Stamford public schools. He pointed out at the hearing that his two school-age step-children are in public school in New Jersey. He is opposed to Brian’s attending the Waterside School.
In Hardisty v. Hardisty, 183 Conn. 253, 439 A.2d 307 (1981), our Supreme Court held that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to modify a child support award and require a father to pay a child’s expenses at a private secondary school particularly because the father opposed the child’s enrollment and believed it was unnecessary for the child to attend the school. According to the court, the "record shows a gifted child, eager to go to a private secondary school, and a noncustodial parent with sufficient financial means to pay for such education. What the record does not show is, however, equally revealing. There is no showing of this child’s special educational or psychological need for private schooling or of the inadequacy, in general or for this child, of the local public schools. There is no showing that, but for this divorce, this child would probably have attended a private school; in fact, the defendant’s family history indicates the opposite. There is no showing that the defendant ever agreed to private schooling for his son. To the contrary, the trial court has found, as a fact, that the defendant believes that his son’s enrollment at the Kent School is unnecessary and undesirable." Id. at 264-65. The court concluded that "[t]he right of the custodial parent to make educational choices is, however, an insufficient basis, absent a showing of special need or some other compelling justification, for increasing the support obligation of the noncustodial parent who genuinely doubts the value of the program that he is being asked to underwrite." Id. at 265.
Hardisty is controlling here. The court will not order the plaintiff to contribute to Brian’s private school education where there is no family tradition of attending private school, there is no evidence that the local Stamford schools are inadequate or unsuitable for Brian, the plaintiff’s step-children attend public school, the defendant enrolled Brian in the Waterside School without the plaintiff’s consent, and the plaintiff is opposed to Brian’s attending private school. Therefore, to the extent that the defendant seeks an order requiring the plaintiff to contribute to the cost of Brian’s private school education, her motion for modification, postjudgment (# 226.00) is denied.
Cost of extracurricular activities: Article IV, paragraph 4.1 of the parties’ separation agreement, dated July 18, 2013 and filed on July 23, 2013 (the July 2013 separation agreement) (# 161.00), provided that until the defendant obtained employment, the plaintiff would be responsible for 80 percent of the cost of Brian’s extracurricular activities, up to a total contribution of $1,200 per calendar year, and the defendant would be responsible for 20 percent. Brian was only twenty-one months old at the time. Nothing in the July 2013 separation agreement addressed how the cost of Brian’s extracurricular activities was to be divided after the defendant became employed.
The defendant is now employed. The plaintiff is paying 71 percent of the cost of Brian’s extracurricular activities, up to a cap of $200 per month. He testified that he derived the 71 percent figure from his obligation to pay the cost of work-related child care for Brian pursuant to the existing orders under the child support guidelines. The defendant seeks an order requiring the plaintiff to pay 100 percent of the cost of Brian’s extracurricular activities.
The court finds that there has been a substantial change in the financial circumstances of the parties since the orders allocating responsibility for the cost of Brian’s extracurricular activities were entered. Modification of the orders pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-86 is warranted, although not to the extent sought by the defendant. The court finds that it is in Brian’s best interest that both of the parties continue to contribute to the cost of his extracurricular activities.
Accordingly, the parties shall share the cost of Brian’s extracurricular activities, with the plaintiff paying 80 percent of the cost of agreed-upon extracurricular activities, and the defendant paying 20 percent of the cost. There is no cap on the amount that either party shall pay. Only an activity agreed upon by both parties shall be considered an approved activity for enforcement under this order, but neither party shall unreasonably withhold his or her consent. Brian may still engage in an activity not consented to as long as (i) it does not interfere with the parenting time of the other party and (ii) the cost of such activity is covered entirely by the party engaging Brian in such activity.
Therefore, to the extent that the defendant seeks an order requiring the plaintiff to pay 100 percent of the cost of Brian’s extracurricular activities, her motion for modification, postjudgment (# 226.00) is DENIED. The motion for modification, postjudgment is GRANTED, however, with respect to allocating the cost of Brian’s extracurricular activities between the parties, as set forth above.