A number of our sister circuits have deferred to the BIA's interpretation of § 601(a). See, e.g., Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 1001 (7th Cir.2006); Huang v. Ashcroft, 113 Fed.Appx. 695, 700 (6th Cir.2004) (unpublished opinion); He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 604 (9th Cir.2003); Li v. Ashcroft, 82 Fed. Appx. 357, 358 (5th Cir.2003) (unpublished per curiam opinion). While the Third Circuit had questioned the BIA's reading of the plain language of the amendment, stating that "[i]t takes some effort to reconcile [the BIA's] interpretation with the language of the 1996 amendment, since the phrase `a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization' is most naturally read as referring only to a person who has personally undergone one of those procedures," Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 226 (3d Cir.2004) (Alito, J.), a divided panel of the Third Circuit recently validated the BIA's interpretation of § 601(a) over a vigorous dissent.

We have interpreted the language of the amendment as affording protection to spouses in cases "[w]here a traditional marriage ceremony has taken place, but is not recognized by the Chinese government because of the age restrictions in the population control measures." See Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 999 (7th Cir.2006). Zhu cannot claim this protection for himself, however, because he and Dong engaged in no marriage ceremony; they were simply boyfriend and girlfriend. There was not even a suggestion that they had planned to wed.

Nor can the IJ depend on country reports suggesting that China does not generally force women to abort their pregnancies to refute Zhou's consistent testimony of undergoing a forced abortion, especially when those reports do not rule out the possibility that forced abortions occur. We rejected this very reasoning in Dong, 421 F.3d at 578; see also Kllokoqi v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 336, 343 (7th Cir. 2005); Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 1000 (7th Cir. 2006); Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2004); Bace, 352 F.3d at 1139 (noting that it "would be improper to find that a witness's testimony about specific events could be `contradicted' by a generalized State Department report broadly discussing conditions in the applicant's country of origin"). The country report for 2003 does state that a social compensation fee is the official punishment for a single woman who bears a child out of wedlock, but that same report acknowledges that "intense pressure to meet birth limitation targets set by government regulations has resulted in instances of local birth planning officials reportedly using physical coercion to meet government goals."

"[T]he spouse of a woman who has been forced to undergo an abortion or sterilization procedure can thereby establish past persecution." In re C-Y-Z, 21 I. N. Dec. 915, 918 (B.I.A. 1997); see also Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 1001 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing In re C-Y-Z); Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir. 2004). At oral argument, Huang asserted that his intention was to bring his family over from China after he had obtained asylum.

The IJ also based her skepticism of Qu's documents on a passage in a country report stating that fabrication of official Chinese documents is common. Although an IJ may compare specific information in a country report with the alien's version of events, see Huang, 453 F.3d at 947, she may not rely on general statements to disprove an alien's particular experience, see Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 1000 (7th Cir. 2006); Dong v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 573, 578 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, the IJ improperly based her conclusions about the authenticity of Qu's particular documents on a generalization about some types of Chinese documents.

As alluded to above, the court has ruled on numerous challenges CDK has made against Dr. Israel's expert reports. (See generally Daubert Op. and Summ. J. Op.) These prior rulings are law of the case and will not be reconsidered here “absent exceptional circumstances such as a change in the law, new evidence, or compelling circumstances.” Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 998 (7th Cir. 2006). For this reason, the current review of Dr. Israel's reports can be more narrowly focused on whether he offers a reliable method to try the Vendors' case on a classwide basis.

Yang asks whether other documentation reasonably would have been available. Although we agree that the IJ and the Board inappropriately faulted Yang for not providing evidence of any forced abortions, see San Kai Kwok v. Gonzales , 455 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 2006) ; Zhang v. Gonzales , 434 F.3d 993, 999–1000 (7th Cir. 2006), the IJ was entitled to expect corroboration of other medical treatment that his wife and son received. When asked whether the hospital had records pertaining to his son, Yang replied that it did, and even acknowledged that he would have been given them had he asked, but he simply didn't think to do so.

”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (“An Immigration Judge may upon his or her own motion at any time ... reopen or reconsider any case in which he or she has made a decision, unless jurisdiction is vested with the Board.”). Indeed, we are aware of only one circuit that has held that the law of the case doctrine applies to immigration proceedings. See Zhang v. Gonzales , 434 F.3d 993, 998 (7th Cir. 2006) (interpreting the law of the case doctrine as forbidding a new IJ from reconsidering a petitioner's credibility where that issue exceeded the scope of the BIA's instructions on remand). For the purposes of this appeal, however, we need not decide whether the law of the case doctrine applies in the immigration context, because even assuming it does, the doctrine provides no help to Silva. For the law of the case doctrine to bar reconsideration of an issue, “the issue in question must have been decided explicitly or by necessary implication in the previous disposition.”

But as this rationale suggests, it does not prohibit a court from revisiting an issue when there is a legitimate reason to do so, whether it be a change in circumstances, new evidence, or something the court overlooked earlier. See Zhang v. Gonzales , 434 F.3d 993, 998 (7th Cir. 2006) ; Best , 107 F.3d at 547. In this case, as a court which is much more familiar than our sister circuit with history of both the Irish litigation and the instant lawsuit, we believe we are better situated to evaluate counsel's course of conduct, including in particular the decision to file this suit in another forum.

The answer, we conclude, is yes. Under the circumstances, Sibanda could not be expected to furnish a supporting “letter or affidavit” from her own family or tribe. Her brothers and the local chief both have sided with Major Sibanda, and so they have no reason to help her elude him through asylum. See Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 999 (7th Cir.2006) (holding that an affidavit from an applicant's wife was unavailable where the applicant credibly testified that his wife was hostile to him). Letters from Sibanda's two sons recounting past attacks were also not reasonably available.