Opinion
No. 1040 C.D. 2014
01-08-2015
Ellen M. Zeo, Petitioner v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER
Ellen M. Zeo (Claimant), pro se, petitions for review of an Order of the Unemployment Compensation (UC) Board of Review (Board) finding Claimant ineligible for benefits pursuant to Section 402(e) of the UC Law (Law). Claimant argues that the Board's findings are not supported by substantial evidence and that her conduct did not constitute willful misconduct. Discerning no error, we affirm the Board's Order.
Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 802(e).
Claimant filed for UC benefits after she was terminated on November 11, 2013 by Nazareth Hospital (Employer) for falsifying a medical record. (Board Decision, Findings of Fact (FOF) ¶¶ 1, 7.) On December 10, 2013, the Erie UC Service Center (Service Center) issued a determination granting Claimant benefits. (Notice of Determination, R. Item 5.) Employer appealed and a hearing was held before a UC Referee (Referee) at which Claimant and two witnesses for Employer testified.
Employer's Human Resources Director testified that Claimant's Supervisor received a complaint regarding Claimant from a patient on November 8, 2013. (Hr'g Tr. at 6, R. Item 9.) Supervisor investigated the complaint and called Claimant into her office. (Hr'g Tr. at 7.) Supervisor testified that she asked Claimant if it was true that, contrary to the documentation in the medical records, Claimant did not assess the patient on November 8, 2013. (Hr'g Tr. at 7.) According to Supervisor, Claimant admitted in that meeting to falsifying the patient's medical records. (Hr'g Tr. at 7.) Human Resources Director also testified that Claimant admitted to her that Claimant falsified the record at the meeting where Claimant was discharged. (Hr'g Tr. at 6.) Both witnesses testified that Claimant knew that falsifying a medical record was grounds for termination under Employer's policies. (Hr'g Tr. at 6, 8.) Claimant testified that she did assess the patient on November 8, 2013, she did not falsify any records, and she did not admit to Human Resources Director and Supervisor that she had done so. (Hr'g Tr. at 8-9.)
On March 3, 2014, the Referee issued a decision reversing the Service Center's determination and finding that Claimant's conduct constituted willful misconduct; therefore, Claimant was barred from receiving UC benefits pursuant to Section 402(e) of the Law. Claimant appealed to the Board. Based on the evidence presented, the Board made the following findings of fact:
1. The claimant was last employed as a registered nurse by Nazareth Hospital from January of 1997, at a final rate of $41.94 and her last day of work was November 11, 2013.(FOF ¶¶ 1-7.)
2. The employer's policy, of which the claimant was aware, prohibited falsification of records; violations of this policy was subject to termination of employment.
3. The employer received a complaint alleging that the claimant had not assessed a patient.
4. The employer initiated an investigation and questioned the claimant regarding whether she had assessed the patient.
5. The claimant documented on a November 8, 2013, medical record that she had assessed the patient.
6. The claimant admitted that she did not assess the patient on November 8, 2013.
7. The employer discharged the claimant for falsifying a medical record.
The Board resolved the conflicts in the testimony in favor of Employer, found Employer's witnesses credible, and discredited Claimant's testimony. (Board Decision at 2.) Accordingly, the Board determined that Claimant was ineligible for benefits pursuant to Section 402(e) of the Law because her conduct constituted willful misconduct. (Board Decision at 2-3.) Claimant now petitions this Court for review.
This Court's scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether an error of law was committed, or whether necessary findings of facts are supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 704; Johns v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 87 A.3d 1006, 1009 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth.), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 97 A.3d 746 (Pa. 2014). --------
On appeal to this Court, Claimant argues that: (1) the Board's findings are not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) because she did not knowingly violate Employer's policies, her actions did not constitute willful misconduct under Section 402(e) of the Law.
We first address Claimant's argument that there is not substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's findings. "It is now axiomatic in an unemployment compensation case, that the findings of fact made by the Board, or by the referee as the case may be, are conclusive on appeal so long as the record, taken as a whole, contains substantial evidence to support those findings." Taylor v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 378 A.2d 829, 831 (Pa. 1977). Substantial evidence is defined as "relevant evidence upon which a reasonable mind could base a conclusion." Johnson v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 502 A.2d 738, 740 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986).
Here, Claimant specifically challenges the Board's findings 3, 6, and 7. Our review of the record reveals that each of these findings is supported by credible witness testimony.
In regards to the finding that Employer received a complaint alleging that Claimant had not assessed a patient, Supervisor testified that she received a complaint from a patient related to Claimant. (Hr'g Tr. at 7.) Although the specific content of the complaint is unknown, the Board could logically infer that the complaint received by Supervisor alleged that Claimant had not assessed the patient by the surrounding circumstances and Claimant's recantation of the events that led to her termination. (Hr'g Tr. at 9-13.)
The Board's findings that Claimant admitted that she did not assess the patient on November 8, 2013 and was terminated for falsifying records are also supported by the testimonies of Supervisor and Human Resources Director. Although Claimant claims she assessed the patient and never admitted otherwise, Human Resources Director testified that she was present when Claimant "admitted to the offense." (Hr'g Tr. at 6.) Further, Supervisor also testified that Claimant admitted when confronted with the allegations "that she had not assessed the patient." (Hr'g Tr. at 7.) Notwithstanding Claimant's contention in her brief that Employer terminated her due to disagreements with Supervisor, and that she was targeted by Supervisor, both witnesses testified that Claimant was terminated for falsifying records. (Hr'g Tr. at 5, 7-8.) Claimant also testified that she was told that her termination was a result of her falsifying medical records. (Hr'g Tr. at 9.)
"In determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the Board's findings, we . . . examine the testimony in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below, giving that party the benefit of any inference which can be drawn logically and reasonably from the evidence." Johnson, 502 A.2d at 740. In addition, "[t]he Board is the ultimate fact finder and is, therefore, entitled to make its own determinations as to witness credibility and evidentiary weight." Walsh v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 943 A.2d 363, 368 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).
When viewing the evidence presented in this matter in the light most favorable to Employer, we conclude that the Board's findings of fact rested on substantial evidence. The Board reconciled the conflicting evidence by finding the Employer's witnesses credible and chose to not credit Claimant's testimony. Claimant's contention that the Board erred because she did assess the patient and never admitted to falsifying records is essentially an argument that we reweigh the evidence in her favor, which we cannot do. The evidence credited by the Board is sufficient to lead a reasonable mind to conclude that Claimant did not assess the patient on November 8, 2013, falsified the patient's medical records to reflect that she assessed the patient, and that Claimant was terminated for falsifying medical records.
Next, we address whether the Board erred by concluding that Claimant's conduct constituted willful misconduct. While the Board is the ultimate fact finder, whether an employee's conduct, as described by the facts credited by the Board, constitutes "willful misconduct is a matter of law subject to this [C]ourt's review." Id. Section 402(e) of the Law provides, "an employe shall be ineligible for compensation for any week . . . [i]n which h[er] unemployment is due to h[er] discharge or temporary suspension from work for willful misconduct connected with h[er] work." 43 P.S. § 802(e). The Law does not define willful misconduct; however, numerous decisions of this Court have defined the term as:
(1) the wanton and willful disregard of the employer's interest, (2) the deliberate violation of rules, (3) the disregard of standards of behavior which an employer can rightfully expect from his employee, or (4) negligence which manifests culpability, wrongful intent, evil design, or intentional and substantial disregard for the employer's interests or the employer's duties and obligations.Allen v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 638 A.2d 448, 450 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). Because an employer has a right to expect that its employees follow standards of behavior established by an employee code of conduct or other rules, a violation of work rules or employers' policies may constitute willful misconduct. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 654 A.2d 199, 201 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995).
An "employer bears the burden of establishing both the existence of the reasonable work rule and its violation." Derry v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 693 A.2d 622, 625 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). A reasonable work rule is one which is fair and just under the circumstances "and appropriate to accomplish a legitimate interest of the employer." Id. Once an employer presents evidence that "establishes a prima facie case of willful misconduct, the burden shifts to the claimant to prove that h[er] actions were justified or reasonable under the circumstances." Frazier v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 833 A.2d 1181, 1183 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
Human Resources Director testified that, according to Employer's policies, a first offense of falsifying records is grounds for termination. (Hr'g Tr. at 5.) She stated that the policy is "included in our code of conduct and it's also included in a policy that we have that's titled the Colleague Responsibility Policy." (Hr'g Tr. at 6.) Human Resources Director testified that Claimant would know of the policy because "[t]he code of conduct is annually in-serviced with all employees, and both the code of conduct and the Colleague Responsibility [P]olicy are reviewed" annually in performance evaluations. (Hr'g Tr. at 6.) Supervisor also testified that Claimant knew that falsification of a record could lead to a discharge. (Hr'g Tr. at 8.) When asked whether she was aware of Employer's policy, Claimant testified, "I don't know. I don't believe I ever thought about it." (Hr'g Tr. at 9.)
Although Claimant does not challenge the existence or reasonableness of Employer's policies, the testimony of Human Resources Director and Supervisor satisfies Employer's burden to prove that it had a reasonable rule against falsifying medical records. Medical records are essential in the health care industry and routinely relied upon by patients, insurers, and health care providers. It is not hyperbolic to say that the accuracy of medical records is often the difference between a patient's life and death. The testimony of Human Resources Director and Supervisor also supports the Board's finding that Claimant was aware of Employer's policy prohibiting the falsification of records. Accordingly, we conclude that Employer established a prima facie case of willful misconduct.
We now turn to the question of whether Claimant had good cause for her actions. Rather than providing justification for her actions, Claimant contends that she did not knowingly violate the policy and that she performed to the best of her ability. Claimant's contention is, once again, an argument for us to reweigh the evidence of this case. The Board, relying on substantial evidence, did not find Claimant's version of the facts credible and found that Claimant falsified a medical record in contravention of Employer's policy.
Because Employer met its burden to show a violation of a reasonable rule and Claimant failed to provide good cause for her actions, we conclude that the Board did not err by concluding that Claimant was discharged for willful misconduct and is, therefore, ineligible for UC benefits pursuant to Section 402(e) of the Law.
Accordingly, the Order of the Board is affirmed.
/s/ _________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge ORDER
NOW, January 8, 2015, the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, entered in the above-captioned matter, is AFFIRMED.
/s/ _________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge