Zenith Radio Corp. v. Village of Mt. Prospect

9 Citing cases

  1. Littlejohn v. City of North Chicago

    259 Ill. App. 3d 713 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 6 times

    (Emphasis in original.) 15 Ill.App.3d 587, 592, 304 N.E.2d 754; accord Devon Bank v. City of Chicago (1975), 25 Ill.App.3d 507, 511, 323 N.E.2d 566.         Related to the first factor, which considers the existing uses and zoning of nearby property (La Salle, 12 Ill.2d at 46, 145 N.E.2d 65), the trial court found it significant that the current zoning scheme had been compromised because the "property to the west has been zoned for residential use and there was no reason to conclude that extending residential zoning to plaintiff's property [would] have a severe effect."

  2. Harris Trust Savings Bk. v. Duggan

    105 Ill. App. 3d 839 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)   Cited 9 times
    In Harris Trust Savings Bank v Duggan, 105 Ill. App.3d 839; 435 N.E.2d 130 (1982), the trial court had invalidated an amendatory ordinance.

    While diminution in value alone does not suffice to invalidate an ordinance, it must be shown that the public welfare does not require the restrictions and resulting loss. ( Zenith Radio Corp. v. Village of Mount Prospect (1973), 15 Ill. App.3d 587, 304 N.E.2d 754.) Testimony as to public benefit was contradictory in the present case.

  3. Cleys v. Village of Palatine

    89 Ill. App. 3d 630 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 16 times
    In Cleys v. Village of Palatine (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 630, 635, it was stated that "where a general decision for the appellee contains a specific finding unfavorable to him and he fails to file a cross-appeal, the adverse finding is not properly before the reviewing court.

    These three instances should not be used to defeat the ordinance. As stated in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Village of Mt. Prospect (1973), 15 Ill. App.3d 587, 593, 304 N.E.2d 754, 759: "`The fact that non-permissive uses are carried on by others contrary to the ordinance neither fortifies not weakens the case of appellants, but each alleged violation of the ordinance is a complete case within itself and must stand or fall upon the facts and circumstances of that case alone.

  4. Scandroli v. City of Rockford

    408 N.E.2d 436 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 3 times

    • 6 In its memorandum of opinion the trial court also emphasized the fact that the subject property was bounded on three sides by paved streets which form a natural barrier between the existing R-1 use and all other zoning uses. It has been widely recognized that streets may form legitimate lines of demarcation between zoning classifications. Cosmopolitan National Bank v. City of Chicago (1961), 22 Ill.2d 367, 373; Zenith Radio Corp. v. Village of Mount Prospect (1973), 15 Ill. App.3d 587, 595. It is also well settled that where, as here, there is a conflict of opinion testimony regarding the pivotal factors involved in zoning cases the credibility of the witnesses is of great importance, and the trial judge is in a superior position to that of a reviewing court in such a situation.

  5. Amalgamated T. Sav. v. County of Cook

    82 Ill. App. 3d 370 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 25 times
    In Amalgamated Trust, the court indicated that the plaintiff must prove the property is unsalable, vacant, or undeveloped because of the zoning.

    ( Heller v. City of Chicago (1979), 69 Ill. App.3d 815, 387 N.E.2d 745.) As the court remarked in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Village of Mt. Prospect (1973), 15 Ill. App.3d 587, 595-96, 304 N.E.2d 754, 761, appeal denied (1974), 55 Ill.2d 604: "Moreover, as stated in Mid-West Emery Freight System Inc. v. City of Chicago, 120 Ill. App.2d 425, 439, 440, 257 N.E.2d 127:

  6. Jeisy v. City of Taylorville

    401 N.E.2d 627 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 8 times

    Appellee contends that the presently high volume of traffic contributes to the commercial nature of the area. Traffic intensity is not determinative in zoning cases ( Zenith Radio Corp. v. Village of Mount Prospect (1973), 15 Ill. App.3d 587, 594; Menolascino v. Village of Franklin Park (1969), 106 Ill. App.2d 472, 476, 246 N.E.2d 122), but it is a factor that must be considered. ( Northbrook Trust Savings Bank v. County of Cook (1977), 47 Ill. App.3d 879, 888, 365 N.E.2d 433, cert. denied sub nom. Village of Northbrook v. Northbrook Trust Savings Bank (1978), 434 U.S. 1069, 55 L.Ed.2d 771, 98 S.Ct. 1249; Briscoe v. City of Highland Park (1966), 74 Ill. App.2d 257, 261, 219 N.E.2d 390.) Traffic is a pertinent factor here because the subject area is not languid; Spresser is a major thoroughfare, formerly Route 48, and Cheney Street is heavily traveled by those crossing the city of Taylorville and those living in the southern part of town.

  7. Schmidt v. City of Darien

    333 N.E.2d 678 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)   Cited 3 times

    A zoning ordinance restricting the use of property to single-family residential is not invalid because there are commercial uses near or even adjoining the property. (See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Village of Mount Prospect (1973), 15 Ill. App.3d 587, 594.) An overwhelming amount of the adjacent property is residential in character, and the subject property is more properly characterized by the residential property than it is by the nonconforming commercial uses in the area.

  8. Du Page Trust Co. v. County of Du Page

    335 N.E.2d 61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)   Cited 13 times

    The plaintiff did not show that the planning of the neighborhood for residential use did not have a substantial relation to the public welfare. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Village of Mount Prospect, 15 Ill. App.3d 587, 596-97. As we recently concluded with respect to the property located at the northwest corner of the same intersection ( Gulf Oil Corp. v. County of Du Page, 24 Ill. App.3d 954, 959), we believe the most that can be said for the plaintiff's case is that it presents a debatable question as to the reasonableness of the zoning ordinance, and so the legislative judgment must prevail.

  9. O'Connor v. Village of Palos Park

    31 Ill. App. 3d 528 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)   Cited 10 times

    The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant municipality; this court upheld the ruling, concluding that the judgment of the trial court was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. ( 15 Ill. App.3d 587, 598.) Therefore, we conclude that in this case the evidence on which the trial court ruled in favor of O'Connor overcame the presumption that defendant's zoning classification of plaintiff's land was valid.