Opinion
2014-05-28
Jeff ZELLNER, respondent, v. ODYL, LLC, appellant.
Vedder Price, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Lyle S. Zuckerman and Michelle D. Velasquez of counsel), for appellant. Abdul K. Hassan, Queens Village, N.Y., for respondent.
Vedder Price, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Lyle S. Zuckerman and Michelle D. Velasquez of counsel), for appellant. Abdul K. Hassan, Queens Village, N.Y., for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., PLUMMER E. LOTT, ROBERT J. MILLER, and COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract and violations of Labor Law §§ 191 and 215, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bunyan, J.), dated January 13, 2013, as denied its motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) to dismiss the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
In determining a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), “the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law [, the] motion for dismissal will fail” ( Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 268, 275, 401 N.Y.S.2d 182, 372 N.E.2d 17;see Wilner v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 A.D.3d 155, 159, 893 N.Y.S.2d 208). The complaint must be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all allegations must be accepted as true ( see Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87–88, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511). “Whether the complaint will later survive a motion for summary judgment, or whether the plaintiff will ultimately be able to prove its claims, of course, plays no part in the determination of a prediscovery CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss” ( Shaya B. Pac., LLC v. Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, 38 A.D.3d 34, 38, 827 N.Y.S.2d 231;see EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 N.Y.3d 11, 19, 799 N.Y.S.2d 170, 832 N.E.2d 26;Alan B. Greenfield, M.D., P.C. v. Long Beach Imaging Holdings, LLC, 114 A.D.3d 888, 981 N.Y.S.2d 135). A motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) may be granted only if the documentary evidence submitted by the defendant utterly refutes the factual allegations of the complaint, conclusively establishing a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law ( see Goshen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 N.Y.2d 314, 326, 746 N.Y.S.2d 858, 774 N.E.2d 1190;Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d at 88, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511).
Applying these principles, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) to dismiss the complaint. The factual allegations set forth in the complaint state cognizable causes of action to recover damages for breach of contact, as well as violations of, inter alia, Labor Law §§ 191 and 215. Furthermore, the email messages submitted by the defendant did not constitute “documentary evidence” for the purposes of CPLR 3211(a)(1) ( see Rodolico v. Rubin & Licatesi, P.C., 114 A.D.3d 923, 981 N.Y.S.2d 144;United States Fire Ins. Co. v. North Shore Risk Mgt., 114 A.D.3d 408, 980 N.Y.S.2d 35;Cives Corp. v. George A. Fuller Co., Inc., 97 A.D.3d 713, 714, 948 N.Y.S.2d 658;Fontanetta v. John Doe 1, 73 A.D.3d 78, 83–84, 898 N.Y.S.2d 569). Even if it had constituted documentary evidence, it failed to utterly refute the plaintiff's allegations or conclusively establish a defense as a matter of law ( seeCPLR 3211[a][1]; Louzoun v. Kroll Moss & Kroll, LLP, 113 A.D.3d 600, 979 N.Y.S.2d 94;Granada Condominium III Assn. v. Palomino, 78 A.D.3d 996, 997, 913 N.Y.S.2d 668).