Opinion
No. 97 M.D. 2011
03-01-2012
Joseph J. Zellie, Petitioner v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Judge HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
This case was assigned to the opinion writer before January 7, 2012, when Judge Pellegrini became President Judge.
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER
Joseph J. Zellie, who is currently imprisoned at the State Correctional Institution at Laurel Highlands, petitions this Court in our original jurisdiction for an order directing the Department of Corrections (Department) to return $2,246.13 in funds taken from Zellie's inmate account and paid to Fayette County for court-ordered costs and restitution. Zellie has filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Motion) under our original jurisdiction following the Department's denial of his final appeal through the Department's internal inmate grievance system. Zellie argues that the Department exceeded its statutory authority under Section 9728 of the Sentencing Code (Act 84), 42 Pa. C.S. § 9728, to withdraw funds from an inmate's account to make restitution to the sentencing county because the sentencing courts deferred Zellie's obligation to pay his debts until he was released on parole. In response, the Department has filed a Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Cross-Motion).
In 2000, Zellie was sentenced on three different dates by three different judges of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County (trial court) for three different crimes. On March 2, 2000, Zellie received a sentence of 18 to 48 months (1½ to 4 years) after being convicted of theft by receiving stolen property. He was also ordered to pay the costs of prosecution in the amount of $165, a $500 fine, and $40 to the Victim's Compensation Fund. On May 18, 2000, Zellie was sentenced to 60 to 180 months (5 to 15 years) for burglary and ordered to pay $340.88 for the costs of prosecution, $40 to the Victim's Compensation Fund, a $500 fine, and $1,400 in restitution to the victim. Also, on June 8, 2000, Zellie had 12 to 24 months (1 to 2 years) added to his aggregate sentence for his conviction for theft by unlawful taking. He also had to pay $203.45 for the costs of prosecution, $40 to the Victim's Compensation Fund, a $200 fine, and $55 in restitution to the victim. In sum, Zellie received 90 to 252 months (7½ to 21 years) in state prison for his various crimes, with credit for time served before he was sentenced, and $3,484.33 in fines, costs, and restitution. As part of the sentencing orders, each of the three judges included a provision that reads: "[t]he Defendant will be required to pay the total due in monthly installments during the period of parole in accordance with any payment agreement determined by the Fayette County Clerk of Courts." (Zellie's Br., Ex. B-2, B-4, B-6.) This appears to be a standard phrase in the trial court's orders. (Zellie's Br., Exs. B-1, B-3, B-5.)
It should be noted that there is some uncertainty about the length of Zellie's sentence. In his Petition for Review, Zellie indicated that he was sentenced to 42 to 84 years in prison, (Petition for Review at 2), while in his brief he indicated "he was sentenced to a long term in a state correctional facility," (Zellie's Br. at 7). The Department initially adopted the 42 to 84 number in its Cross-Motion but, upon further reflection, realized that Zellie's actual sentences for the three convictions at issue in this case add up to 7½ to 21 years. The Department is uncertain how Zellie calculated 42 to 84 years. Zellie was convicted and ordered to pay restitution for two other crimes at approximately the same time as the three convictions at issue, but no deductions have been made in regard to those two convictions. The record does not indicate the length of the sentences for these other two convictions, and the Department is unaware of any sentences that add up to 42 to 84 years. (Department's Br. at 5 n.2.)
The Department is currently litigating another case before this Court, Duncan v. Wetzel, No. 101 M.D. 2011, in which an inmate is making similar arguments as Zellie based on identical language in another sentencing order from the trial court. Given the confusion and challenges regarding this recurring language in the trial court's sentencing orders, the trial court may wish to consider reevaluating the language it uses in its sentencing orders.
After Zellie was sentenced, the Fayette County Clerk of Court (Clerk of Courts) filled out DC-300B Court Commitment forms for each of Zellie's sentences, reflecting the amounts of fines, costs, and restitution due for each sentence, and transmitted them to the Department. The forms did not, however, include the specific language of the sentencing orders that is at issue here. Pursuant to its authority under Act 84, the Department began deducting money from Zellie's inmate account almost immediately after Zellie's arrival at State Correctional Institute at Mahanoy (SCI-Mahanoy) in June of 2000 in order to satisfy the debts he owed Fayette County. Between June 27, 2000 and July 1, 2004, the Department deducted $665 from Zellie's account to satisfy Zellie's debts in regard to his conviction for theft by unlawful taking. The Department then began deducting funds to cover Zellie's debts regarding his conviction for theft by unlawful taking, collecting $468.45 from July 1, 2004 through December 13, 2005. Beginning on December 13, 2005, the Department deducted funds to cover the costs and fines related to Zellie's conviction for burglary, collecting $2,246.13 before it stopped all deductions on January 25, 2010. In sum, the Department deducted $2,246.13 from Zellie's inmate account between June 27, 2000 and January 25, 2010. Zellie received notice of these deductions and was given periodic account statements that reflected the deductions. All of the deducted funds were sent to Fayette County and were applied to Zellie's debts in that county. (Department's Answer and New Matter, ¶¶ 7, 25, 27, 34-39, 46-47, Exs. A-C.)
Zellie's first challenge of these deductions came in the form of an inmate request to staff at SCI-Mahanoy on January 19, 2010, in which he inquired as to whether the Department had a court order to make these deductions. After reviewing Zellie's request and examining the language of the sentencing orders, the Department decided, on January 25, 2010, to stop making deductions from Zellie's account "[o]ut of an abundance of caution." (Department's Answer and New Matter, ¶¶ 42-43.) In another inmate request to staff dated February 8, 2010, Zellie requested that the Department stop making the Act 84 deductions, which it had already done. (Department's Answer and New Matter, ¶¶ 40-43, 45.)
Zellie first sought relief through the inmate grievance system, exhausting his administrative remedies as required under Department policy DC-ADM 804. After his final appeal was denied on January 31, 2011, Zellie submitted his Petition for Review to this Court on March 3, 2011. At the close of the pleadings, Zellie moved for a judgment on the pleadings on June 20, 2011, and the Department filed its Cross-Motion on June 28, 2011.
Under Rule 1034 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move for a judgment on the pleadings once "the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to unreasonably delay the trial." Pa. R.C.P. No. 1034(a). A motion for judgment on the pleadings in this Court's original jurisdiction takes the form of a demurrer, meaning that "all of the opposing party's allegations are viewed as true and only those facts which have been specifically admitted by him may be considered against him." Trib Total Media, Inc. v. Highlands School District, 3 A.3d 695, 698 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). In reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, we "may only consider the pleadings themselves and any documents properly attached thereto." Id. The motion should be granted "only when the pleadings show there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. Additionally, the party moving for judgment on the pleadings "must admit the truth of all the allegations of his adversary and the untruth of any of his own allegations that have been denied by the opposing party." Pfister v. City of Philadelphia, 963 A.2d 593, 597 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). Where there exist material issues of fact, "judgment on the pleadings cannot be entered." Id.
Our review of the pleadings reveals that there do not appear to be any material facts in dispute here. Rather, the sole question presented to this Court is whether the Department violated the trial court's orders, Pennsylvania law, and its own regulations and, therefore, must reimburse Zellie the $2,246.13 deducted from his inmate account. Zellie argues that the Department violated its own policy relating to the collection of inmate debts. The policy in question, which the Department was required to enact by Act 84, is Section D.5 of DC-ADM 804, which reads:
Court orders that require payment upon or within a certain amount of time after parole or release, may not be collected as set forth in this section unless the sentencing court stipulates, via court order, that the Department is to begin collection prior to the inmate being paroled or released.Id. Zellie asserts that his sentencing orders "clearly defer the payment of his fines, costs and restitution until the time of parole." (Zellie's Br. at 9-10.) Zellie further argues that the Department errantly relied on the DC-300B Court Commitment forms to determine Zellie's financial obligations, which were filled out by the Clerk of Courts and did not include the questionable language of the sentencing orders. Zellie maintains that the Department should abide by the trial court's orders and reimburse Zellie for the $2,246.13 it deducted from his account.
The Department asserts that it is entitled to judgment on the pleadings because: (1) Zellie's claim is barred by the relevant statute of limitations; (2) the Department has the statutory authority to make deductions from Zellie's inmate account to cover court-ordered costs and restitution; and (3) the language of the trial court's orders is vague, Zellie delayed in questioning the deductions, the Department suspended the deductions when Zellie complained, and Zellie would be unjustly enriched if the Department is ordered to reimburse him. We first address the Department's statute of limitations argument.
Under Act 84, the Department is authorized to deduct funds from an inmate's account "for the purpose of collecting restitution or any other court-ordered obligation." Section 9728(b)(5) of the Act 84, 42 Pa. C.S. § 9728(b)(5). Zellie argues that the court orders pertaining to him do not authorize the Department to make any deductions from his account until the time of his parole. Therefore, Zellie argues, the Department has exceeded its statutory authority and should be compelled by this Court, through a writ of mandamus, to return the money it has collected from Zellie's account in order to properly perform its public duty under Act 84. "A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy designed to compel official performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty." Evans v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (PBPP), 820 A.2d 904, 914 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). "The purpose of mandamus is not to establish legal rights but to enforce those legal rights already established." Id. at 915. Under Section 5522(b)(1) of the Judicial Code, a plaintiff bringing an action against "any officer of any government unit for anything done in the execution of his office" has six months from the date of the injury to file a claim. 42 Pa. C.S. § 5522(b)(1). The existence of a continuing violation does not toll the statute of limitations. Fleming v. Rockwell, 500 A.2d 517, 519 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985). Rather, "a statute of limitations period begins to run when the cause of action accrues; i.e., when an injury is inflicted and the corresponding right to institute a suit for damages arises." Gleason v. Borough of Moosic, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 15 A.3d 479, 484 (2011). The party seeking to bring the action has the affirmative duty to use all reasonable diligence to learn the facts and circumstances that form the right of recovery and to bring the suit within the prescribed time period. Id. A lack of knowledge, mistake, or misunderstanding does not toll the statute of limitations. E.D.B v. Clair, 605 Pa. 73, 98, 987 A.2d 681, 696 (2009).
Although Section 5522(b)(1) refers to actions against an "officer of any government unit" rather than actions against the government unit itself, this provision still applies in this matter. Rule 1094(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which applies to this original jurisdiction matter pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 106, states that in an action seeking the performance of a public act or duty by, inter alia, an executive or administrative agency, the party commencing the action may name only the department and is not required to specifically join the government official who would be required to perform the act or duty if mandamus relief is granted. Nonetheless, Zellie's mandamus action against the Department is, essentially, an action against the Department official, who would otherwise be joined as a party, to comply with Act 84 and return the money the Department withdrew from Zellie's inmate account. Pa. R.C.P. No. 1094(a) applies where the mandamus action is against a political subdivision and not, as here, an executive department of the Commonwealth. This section provides that it is sufficient, in an action seeking to compel the performance of a public act or duty by a political subdivision, to name the political subdivision's officers in their official capacities. In Township of Bensalem v. Moore, 620 A.2d 76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993), this Court held, in a situation under Pa. R.C.P. No. 1094(a), that:
[a] mandamus action against a municipality properly lies against the municipal officer whose duty it is to perform the act commanded to be done. . . . In a mandamus action brought against a municipality, [Pa. R.C.P.] No. 1094(a) requires that the proper officers and officials of the municipality be made party defendants.
We note that this Court previously has rejected the argument that a continuing violation creates ongoing causes of action, stating:
We find this position unpersuasive. Adopting this rationale would effectively render the limitation period for any cause of action alleging loss of payment meaningless when the payment is received on a regular basis. "[T]he purpose of a statute of limitations is to bar stale claims and avoid problems of proof arising from stale memories." Garcia v. Community Legal Services Corp., . . ., 524 A.2d 980, 984 ([Pa. Super.] 1987). . . . Accepting [the] continuing violation theory would hinder and frustrate the ultimate aim of limitations periods.
The parties agree that the Department first began making deductions from Zellie's inmate account on June 27, 2000. This is the date the six-month statute of limitations began to run. Zellie, however, did not file his Petition for Review until March 3, 2011, nearly 10 years after the Department began making deductions from Zellie's account and well outside of the six-month period for bringing an action in mandamus. Zellie maintains that he was not able to obtain copies of his sentencing orders until January of 2010 and was only then able to learn of the controversial language in each of the sentencing orders. As noted, however, a lack of knowledge does not toll the statute of limitations. Id. Zellie received periodic statements and account balances from the Department that indicated that deductions were being made, and he could have requested his sentencing orders at any time, including the six-month period after the Department first began making deductions. Assuming arguendo that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the Department made its final deduction from Zellie's account on January 25, 2010, Zellie's Petition for Review would still be untimely by more than seven months.
Based on the fact that Zellie's action in mandamus is barred by the six-month statute of limitations under Section 5522(b)(1) of the Judicial Code, we do not need to reach the questions of whether the Department violated the trial court's orders, Pennsylvania law, and its own regulations by deducting money from Zellie's inmate account to pay his debts to Fayette County.
Accordingly, Zellie's Motion is denied, the Department's Cross-Motion is granted, and the Petition for Review is dismissed.
/s/ _________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge ORDER
NOW, March 1, 2012, the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Joseph J. Zellie is hereby DENIED, the Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings of the Department of Corrections is hereby GRANTED, and Zellie's Petition for Review is hereby DISMISSED.
/s/ _________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
Id. at 79-80 (emphasis added and citations omitted). Thus, "once [the petitioner has] joined the . . . official . . . it is clear that [his] action in mandamus would be barred by the statute of limitations in 42 Pa. C.S. § 5522(b)(1)." Id. at 80. Additionally, in Fleming v. Rockwell, 500 A.2d 517, 519 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985), we similarly held that where the plaintiffs filed an action in mandamus against a municipal government and officials seeking hearings in accordance with Section 2 of the act commonly referred to as the Police Tenure Act, Act of June 15, 1951, P.L. 586, as amended, 53 P.S. § 812, more than a year after they were dismissed from their positions, the dismissal of the matter based on Section 5522(b)(1) was appropriate "because it was commenced as an action in mandamus." Id.
The holdings in these cases offer guidance here. The fact that the Department's official is not required to be named as a defendant, pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. No. 1094(c), does not change the nature of the action in mandamus which seeks an order directing an official to perform a public act or duty. As such, the six-month statute of limitations set forth in Section 5522(b)(1) applies here, just as it did in Township of Bensalem and Fleming. Indeed, to hold otherwise would result in actions in mandamus naming the Secretary of Corrections or other officials as defendants and those naming only the Department as defendant to be subject to different statute of limitations periods. This matter is unlike Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), wherein we held that the six-month statute of limitations set forth in Section 5522(b)(1) did not bar the inmates mandamus action because Torres sought only an order requiring the Department to comply with a statute. Id. at 1246. Here, Zellie seeks not only compliance, but the repayment of the funds deducted from his inmate account.
Casner v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 658 A.2d 865, 871 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). Here, the deductions from Zellie's inmate account, like the payments discussed in Casner, occurred on a regular basis. Additionally, Zellie was aware of the ongoing deduction, having received notice with each deduction. Accordingly, Zellie's cause of action accrued when the Department took the first deduction. Moreover, even were we to agree that each deduction constituted a new cause of action that began the running of the statute of limitations, Zellie's Petition for Review was filed on March 3, 2011, which is more than six months after the Department's last deduction of funds on January 25, 2010.