Zeller v. First Nat'l Bk. T. Co.

8 Citing cases

  1. La Salle National Bank v. Vega

    520 N.E.2d 1129 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 20 times
    In La Salle National Bank v. Vega (1988), 167 Ill. App.3d 154, 520 N.E.2d 1129, the court dealt with a real estate sales document which was signed by the seller as offeror and clearly stated that a contract would be in full force upon execution by the purchasing trust.

    ( McCarty v. Verson Allsteel Press Co. (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 498, 509, 411 N.E.2d 936, 944.) The language of an offer may moreover govern the mode of acceptance required, and, where an offer requires a written acceptance, no other mode may be used. ( Zeller v. First National Bank Trust Co. (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 170, 172, 398 N.E.2d 148, 150; Nationwide Commercial Co. v. Knox (1973), 10 Ill. App.3d 13, 15, 293 N.E.2d 638, 640; Brophy v. City of Joliet (1957), 14 Ill. App.2d 443, 453-56, 144 N.E.2d 816, 821-23.) In the case at bar, the document at issue stated clearly that the contract would be in full force upon the trust's execution.

  2. Loeb v. Gray

    131 Ill. App. 3d 793 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 22 times

    • 1-3 It is elementary that in order to constitute a contract between two parties there must be mutual assent by the contracting parties on the essential terms and conditions of the subject about which they are contracting. ( Bank of Marion v. Robert "Chick" Fritz, Inc. (1973), 9 Ill. App.3d 102, 291 N.E.2d 836, aff'd (1974), 57 Ill.2d 120, 311 N.E.2d 138.) For a contract to exist there must be an offer and acceptance, and to create a binding contract the acceptance must comply strictly with the terms of the offer. ( Zeller v. First National Bank Trust Co. (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 170, 398 N.E.2d 148.) An acceptance requesting modification or containing terms that vary from those offered constitutes a rejection of the original offer and becomes a counterproposal that must be accepted by the original offeror before a valid contract is formed. ( Zeller v. First National Bank Trust Co. (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 170, 398 N.E.2d 148.)

  3. NATIONAL PROD. WORKERS UNION INS. TRUST v. LINA

    Case No.: 05-cv-5415 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2010)   Cited 4 times

    But even if the RFP were considered to be an offer, the policies issued constituted a counteroffer because they did not strictly comply with the RFP. See Zeller v. First Nat'l Bank Tr. Co., 398 N.E.2d 148, 150 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1979) (holding that an acceptance which does not "comply strictly with the terms of the offer" and instead modifies its terms "constitutes a rejection of the original offer, and becomes a counterproposal which must be accepted by the original offeror before a valid contract is formed"). However, the Trust contends that this is not the usual case because it never received copies of either the draft policies or the final policies.

  4. L.B. Foster Co. v. Tie Track Systems, Inc.

    No. 07 C 3692 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2009)   Cited 1 times

    It is also well settled that "[a] purported acceptance of an offer which does not substantially accept the offer in accord with its terms is a counter offer requiring in its turn acceptance in order to constitute an agreement." C. Iber Sons, 248 N.E.2d at 132-34 (holding that a general contractor's acceptance of only one of three areas of the subcontractor's bid amounted to a counteroffer); see also Zeller v. First Nat'l Bank Tr. Co., 398 N.E.2d 148, 149 (Ill.App.Ct. 1979) (holding that an acceptance which does not "comply strictly with the terms of the offer" and instead modifies its terms "constitutes a rejection of the original offer, and becomes a counterproposal which must be accepted by the original offeror before a valid contract is formed."). In this case, the original "offer" was for nine items of steel ties. It is not disputed that the "acceptance" was for only three of the nine items. It is also not disputed that Tie Track rejected L.B. Foster's "counteroffer" of the three items.

  5. U.S. v. Integrated Construction Technology Corporation

    Case No. 07 CV 2633 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 28, 2007)   Cited 1 times

    "The language of an offer may moreover govern the mode of acceptance required, and, where an offer requires a written acceptance, no other mode may be used." LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Vega, 167 Ill. App. 3d 154, 161 (Ill.App.Ct. 1988) (citing Zeller v. First Nat'l Bank Trust Co., 79 Ill. App. 3d 170, 172 (Ill.App.Ct. 1979)). In this case, the Subcontract Agreement that IMJV sent to Countryside constituted an offer.

  6. Lakshman v. Vecchione

    102 Ill. App. 3d 629 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 14 times

    It is elementary that for a contract to exist there must be an offer and an acceptance. ( Zeller v. First National Bank Trust Co. (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 170, 172, 398 N.E.2d 148; O'Keefe v. Lee Calan Imports, Inc. (1970), 128 Ill. App.2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 758.) The general rule is that the acceptance of the offer may be made in any reasonable manner, provided that such acceptance is communicated to the offeror.

  7. Jones v. Eagle II

    99 Ill. App. 3d 64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 23 times

    For those reasons, we find that the trial court properly dismissed count III. Turning then to count IV, we note that for a contract to exist there must be an offer and acceptance. Zeller v. First National Bank Trust Co. (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 170, 398 N.E.2d 148; O'Keefe v. Lee Calan Imports, Inc. (1970), 128 Ill. App.2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 758. Plaintiff essentially alleges in count IV that the property report constituted an irrevocable offer to sell the units to the tenants of No. 7 at the initial prices listed, and that the refusal of defendants to allow plaintiffs to accept the offer or to otherwise make such units available on those terms constituted a breach of contract.

  8. Lynge v. Kunstmann

    94 Ill. App. 3d 689 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 36 times
    Noting that "[i]t has been held that questions of intent are particularly inappropriate for summary judgment"

    ( Dakovitz v. Arrow Road Construction Co. (1975), 26 Ill. App.3d 56, 324 N.E.2d 444.) Summary judgment is improper where there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the seller and purchaser of real estate had a meeting of the minds as to conditions precedent in the contract or whether they were waived. Fox v. Stewart (1980), 91 Ill. App.3d 201, 414 N.E.2d 881. • 2 First, we note that Mr. Lynge telegraphed his conditional acceptance May 20 to the contract which had been amended and signed by the buyers and Mrs. Lynge on May 17. Setting the significance of the mode of Mr. Lynge's conditional acceptance aside for the moment, clearly Mr. Lynge's telegram of May 20 was a rejection of the Kunstmanns' offer and constituted a counteroffer ( Arthur Rubloff Co. v. Drovers National Bank (1980), 80 Ill. App.3d 867, 871, 400 N.E.2d 614; Zeller v. First National Bank Trust Co. (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 170, 398 N.E.2d 148) and could not be construed as an acceptance of the offer since it was conditional. Therefore, any act constituting acceptance had to be after May 20. ( O'Brien v. Kawazoye (1975), 27 Ill. App.3d 810, 327 N.E.2d 236.)