The trial court granted defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings on count I, the libel count, and granted defendants a summary judgment as to count II. The appellate court affirmed, ( 82 Ill. App.2d 463,) and we have granted plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal from the judgment of the appellate court affirming the trial court's judgment on the pleadings as to the libel count. The alleged cause of action arose out of a letter by plaintiff's ex-employer in response to an inquiry about the plaintiff's employment status.

In passing upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court must consider only those material facts and allegations which are well pleaded, disregarding all surplusage and conclusory allegations. ( Zeinfield v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 82 Ill. App.2d 463, 226 N.E.2d 392.) Motions for judgment on the pleadings admits the truth of facts well pleaded, as distinguished from mere conclusions, together with all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.

" ( Sullivan v. Bard, 44 Ill. App.2d 16, 22, 194 N.E.2d 18.) "A motion for judgment on the pleadings will be allowed when the court is able to determine from the pleadings alone the relative rights of the parties in the subject matter; in passing upon such motion the court must consider only those material facts and allegations which are well pleaded, disregarding all surplusage and conclusionary allegations." ( Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 82 Ill. App.2d 463, 467, 226 N.E.2d 392, rev'd on other grounds, 41 Ill.2d 345, 243 N.E.2d 217.) • 6 In a number of recent cases it has been held that due to the presence of an administrative procedure for determining certain issues (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 91 1/2, par. 12-12), such issues were not necessary to be proved or alleged in the complaint.

[6] If this view be in actual doubt, or if it might be said that ordinary reasonable people might draw different conclusions, we are bound to apply the rule stated in John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill.2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105, which holds that the allegedly libelous matter is to be read as a whole and words given their natural and obvious meaning, and that where such are capable of being read innocently they must be so read and declared nonactionable as a matter of law. See also Grabavoy v. Wilson, 87 Ill. App.2d 193, 230 N.E.2d 581; Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 82 Ill. App.2d 463, 226 N.E.2d 392; Kamsler v. Chicago American Pub. Co. Inc., 82 Ill. App.2d 86, 225 N.E.2d 434; and Reed v. Albanese, 78 Ill. App.2d 53, 223 N.E.2d 419. A contrasting result where the representation is incapable of innocent construction is found in Coursey v. Greater Niles Tp. Pub. Corp., 82 Ill. App. 76, 227 N.E.2d 164. The conclusions reached upon the several issues considered require affirmance of the order dismissing the complaint.