Opinion
Editorial Note:
This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA9 Rule 36-3 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
Argued and Submitted April 9, 1987. Submission Vacated June 25, 1987.
Resubmitted Nov. 21, 1988.
D. Hawaii
AFFIRMED.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii; Marilyn H. Patel, District Judge, Presiding.
Before CHOY, POOLE and WILLIAM A. NORRIS, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Circuit Rule 36-3.
On November 14, 1979, Alan Zator ("Zator") was struck by a car while he was walking across a highway, and was rendered mentally incompetent as a result. Zator's attorney and State Farm Insurance Co.--the insurer of the alleged driver--exchanged letters establishing that Zator's personal injury claims would be settled for $25,000, leaving unresolved his claims for no-fault benefits. On September 23, 1981, Rosemary Leary was appointed by a Hawaii state court as guardian of Zator's property. The letter of guardianship expressly authorized Leary to settle the $25,000 personal injury claim on Zator's behalf, which Leary did shortly thereafter.
Leary took no action to pursue the no-fault claim. However, on July 6, 1984, Zator's attorney wrote a letter to State Farm requesting payment of the no-fault benefits. On August 7, 1985, Walter Zator--Zator's father--filed suit in federal court as next friend of Alan Zator, seeking a declaratory judgment that Zator was entitled to $15,000 in no-fault benefits.
State Farm then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the suit had not been filed within the two-year statute of limitation period provided in the Hawaii no-fault chapter, Haw.Rev.Stat. § 294-36 (1985). Walter Zator filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, relying upon Haw.Rev.Stat.§ 657-13 (1985), a provision in the Hawaii chapter on statutes of limitation which tolls the running of a limitation period if at the time a cause of action accrues the person entitled to bring the action is insane. Walter Zator argued that section 657-13 applies to the no-fault limitation period set forth in section 294-36, and thus operated to toll the running of the statute of limitation period on Zator's no-fault claim because of Zator's disability.
In pertinent part, section 294-36 provides:
In pertinent part, section 657-13 provides:
The district court agreed with Walter Zator's argument that the tolling provision in section 657-13 applies to the no-fault limitation period. Nevertheless, the district court granted summary judgment to State Farm, holding that the letter of guardianship gave Leary the power to prosecute Zator's no-fault claim, notwithstanding Walter Zator's contention that Leary only had the authority to pursue the $25,000 personal injury claim. The district court stated that in the absence of express limitations on a guardian's power Haw.Rev.Stat. § 560:5-424(c)(24) (1985) grants the guardian of a disabled person's property the power to prosecute any claim for the protection of estate assets. The court found that Leary had not been limited in her authority to pursue Zator's no-fault claim. The court then held that because the Hawaii tolling provision ceased to apply when Leary obtained the right of action over Zator's no-fault claim, the two-year statute of limitation period began to run when Leary was appointed guardian of Zator's property. The court then concluded that because Zator's no-fault claim had been brought more than two years after Leary's appointment, the claim was barred by the statute of limitation.
In pertinent part, section 560:5-424(c)(24) provides:
Zator appeals the district court grant of summary judgment, claiming that the district court misconstrued Hawaii law. State Farm cross-appeals, contesting the district court ruling that the tolling provision in Haw.Rev.Stat. § 657-13 applies to the two-year limitation period for no-fault claims codified at Haw.Rev.Stat. § 294-36. After hearing oral argument, we certified to the Hawaii Supreme Court the following two questions concerning the law of Hawaii which we felt were determinative of the case and on which we found no clear controlling precedent in the Hawaii judicial decisions:
1) Does the tolling provision of Haw.Rev.Stat. § 657-13 apply to toll the running of the two-year statute of limitation period prescribed in Haw.Rev.Stat. § 294-36?
2) Did the statute of limitation on Zator's no-fault claim begin to run when Leary was appointed as guardian of Zator's property?
Having received a response from the Hawaii Supreme Court on the questions certified, we now affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to State Farm. We also affirm the district court's ruling that section 657-13 applies to the two-year statute of limitation found at section 294-36. Before discussing the Hawaii Supreme Court's answers to our questions, however, we first address and reject Zator's argument that State Farm is estopped from raising the statute of limitation as a defense.
For Zator's estoppel argument to succeed, he must show that he reasonably and detrimentally relied upon statements or conduct by the defendant indicating that the no-fault benefits would be paid or that the limitation period would not act as a bar to a no-fault action. See Ravelo v. County of Hawaii, 66 Haw. 194, 658 P.2d 883 (1983); Fred v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 53 Haw. 384, 494 P.2d 783 (1972). Zator can point to no such statements or conduct here.
State Farm never promised Zator that it would pay any no-fault benefits. In response to statements made by Zator's attorney in correspondence in 1980 and 1981 indicating that he believed that no-fault benefits were available, State Farm merely indicated that it could not process any no-fault claim until an application for benefits was completed. State Farm did not express any opinion as to the availability of no-fault benefits. Thus, any reliance by Zator or his representatives on the availability of no-fault benefits would not have been reasonable.
Nor does Zator point to any statements or conduct by State Farm which reasonably lead him to believe the statutory period of limitation would be extended or that the limitation provision would not be enforced. In short, Zator does not cite any statement or conduct which supports his estoppel argument.
Having determined that State Farm is free to raise the statute of limitation as a defense, we now examine the responses by the Hawaii Supreme Court to the questions we certified in order to determine whether the limitation period bars Zator's no-fault suit. An examination of these responses, which were published by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Zator v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 752 P.2d 1073 (1988), compels the conclusion that the district court was correct in ruling that Zator's no-fault claim is barred.
In response to the first question certified--whether the tolling provision of Haw.Rev.Stat. § 657-13 applies to the two-year limitation period prescribed by Haw.Rev.Stat. § 294-36--the Hawaii Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. Noting that laws "in pari materia," or on the same subject matter, should be construed with reference to each other, the court had little trouble concluding that section 294-36 should be interpreted in light of section 657-13. 752 P.2d at 1075.
The Hawaii Supreme Court also answered yes to the second question we certified--whether the statute of limitation on Zator's no-fault claim began to run when Leary was appointed as guardian of Zator's property. The court, citing Haw.Rev.Stat. § 560:5-426 (1985), held that Leary was authorized to prosecute Zator's no-fault claim since no express limitation with regard to the no-fault claim was placed on Leary in the letters of guardianship. The court also held that the statute of limitation period commenced running upon Leary's appointment. 752 P.2d at 1076.
In pertinent part section 560:5-426 provides:
Given these holdings of the Hawaii Supreme Court, we necessarily conclude that Zator's no-fault action cannot proceed. There is no dispute that Zator's no-fault action was brought more than two years after September 23, 1981, the date upon which Leary was appointed as the guardian of Zator's property. As a result, section 294-36 bars Zator's no-fault claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
No suit shall be brought on any contract providing no-fault benefits or any contract providing optional additional coverage more than ... [t]wo years from the date of the motor vehicle accident upon which the claim is based....
If any person entitled to bring any action specified in this part ... is, at the time the cause of action accrued, ... [i]nsane; ... such person shall be at liberty to bring such actions within the respective times limited in this part, after the disability is removed or at any time while the disability exists.
[A] guardian of property ... may ... [p]rosecute or defend actions, claims or proceedings in any jurisdiction for the protection of estate assets and of the guardian of the property in the performance of the guardian's duties ...
The court may, at the time of appointment or later, limit the powers of a guardian of the property otherwise conferred by sections 560:5-424 and 560:5-425, or previously conferred by the court, and may at any time relieve the guardian of any limitation. If the court limits any power conferred on the guardian of the property by section 560:5-424 or 560:5-425, the limitation shall be endorsed upon the guardian's letters of guardianship.