come of $172,800 ( see Matter of Strella v Ferro, 42 AD3d at 545; DeVries v DeVries, 35 AD3d 794, 795; Peri v Peri, 2 AD3d 425, 426; Gleicher v Gleicher, 303 AD2d 549, 550). Since the combined parental income exceeded $80,000, the Support Magistrate, in the exercise of his discretion, could apply either the statutory percentage or the factors set forth in Family Court Act § 413 (1) (f), or both, to the parental income in excess of $80,000 ( see Family Ct Act § 413 [c] [3]; Matter of Cassano v Cassano, 85 NY2d 649, 655; Matter of Strella v Ferro, 42 AD3d at 546). Under the circumstances presented here, the Family Court correctly concluded that the Support Magistrate providently exercised his discretion in computing child support by applying the statutory percentage to the combined parental income over $80,000 ( see Matter of Strella v Ferro, 42 AD3d at 546; Matter of Lachman v LeJemtel, 19 AD3d 421, 421-422; Matter of Lava v Damianou, 10 AD3d 420, 421; Bains v Bains, 308 AD2d 557, 559; Zaremba v Zaremba, 237 AD2d 351, 352-353) and sufficiently set forth his reasons for doing so ( see Matter of Strella v Ferro, 42 AD3d at 546).

Moreover, it does not appear from this record that any application was made by plaintiff for any pendente lite maintenance or child support ( see MacKinnon v MacKinnon, 245 AD2d 676, 678) and plaintiff did not seek maintenance. Further, plaintiff did not testify to or submit competent documentary proof supporting the claimed expenditures or their necessity ( see Zaremba v Zaremba, 237 AD2d 351, 352). To the extent that these expenditures related to the support of the children, that issue was referred to Family Court where defendant's obligation relates back in time to plaintiff's original application for such relief ( see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [7] [a]; see also Burns v Burns, 84 NY2d 369, 377; Koczaja v Koczaja, 195 AD2d 693, 693, lv denied 83 NY2d 756).

Where combined parental income exceeds $80,000, the Child Support Standards Act (hereinafter the CSSA) provides that the court shall determine the amount of child support by applying the factors set forth in Family Court Act § 413 (1) (f) and/or the statutory child support percentage set forth in the CSSA (Family Ct Act § 413; Domestic Relations Law § 240) ( see Matter of Cassano v. Cassano, 85 NY2d 649, 654). The Support Magistrate providently exercised her discretion in computing child support by applying the statutory percentage to the combined parental income over $80,000 ( see Matter of Lava v. Damianou, 10 AD3d 420; Bains v. Bains, 308 AD2d 557; Matter of Gruttadauria v. Catapano, 256 AD2d 617; Zaremba v. Zaremba, 237 AD2d 351). The Support Magistrate expressly set forth the reasons for applying the statutory percentage to income over $80,000 and thus the Family Court Judge properly denied the objections.

Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the Supreme Court, in calculating the defendant's income for child support purposes ( see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [c] [1]), properly deducted the amount that the defendant was obligated to pay towards the carrying charges on the former marital residence ( see Cohen v. Cohen, 286 AD2d 698; Linda R.H. v. Richard E.H., 205 AD2d 498, 500-501; Ryan v. Ryan, 186 AD2d 245, 246; Krantz v. Krantz, 175 AD2d 863). Furthermore, contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly considered the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (f) when deciding to apply the statutory factor of 17% ( see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [b] [3] [i]) to the amount of the combined parental income that exceeded $80,000 ( see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [c] [3]; Matter of Cassano v. Cassano, 85 NY2d 649; Zaremba v. Zaremba, 237 AD2d 351). The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.

The trial court, which had the opportunity to view the demeanor of the witnesses, was in the best position to gauge their credibility ( see Blasich v. Blasich, 195 A.D.2d 496). The plaintiff's typewritten lists were clearly insufficient to prove that all of her expenditures were necessary or bona fide, and the court was not required to accept a document handwritten by her father as conclusive proof that all the funds he gave the parties were loans ( see Zaremba v. Zaremba, 237 A.D.2d 351). The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff's request that the parties be directed to pay for their daughter's future post-secondary "special or enriched" education.

Since neither of the parties contemplated the implications of the discontinuance on the further proceedings, there was no true meeting of the minds ( see Matter of Gould v. Board of Educ. Of Sewanhaka Cent. High School Dist., 81 N.Y.2d 446, 453; Mahon v. New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 303 A.D.2d 125; cf. Symphony Space v. Pergola Props., 88 N.Y.2d 466, 484). The Supreme Court properly ordered the husband to pay outstanding support arrears, with appropriate credits, pursuant to the pendente lite support order ( see Zaremba v. Zaremba, 237 A.D.2d 351, 352). The husband's remaining contentions are without merit.

Rather, other than its finding as to the amount of time the children will spend with defendant under the court-directed visitation schedule, the findings cited by Supreme Court justify application of a greater percentage. Even considering plaintiff's anticipated income from full-time employment as supplemented by the maintenance and child support currently payable by defendant, it is clear that the wide gap in income here will prevent plaintiff from providing the children with a home and a standard of living to which Supreme Court found that they were accustomed during the marriage and could have expected to continue had the marriage not been dissolved (see, Zaremba v. Zaremba, 237 A.D.2d 351). Only Supreme Court's finding that the children's time with defendant will be "very near" that spent with plaintiff suggests a countervailing basis for this award.

Inconsistencies in defendant's accounting of his finances, his body language, failure to produce relevant discovery materials, and even preparing financial documents during the course of this trial, had an impact on my assessment of defendant's account of his finances. Zarembav. Zaremba, 237 AD2d 351. His testimony was fraught with a wholesale absence of business formalities that would be part of a legitimate corporate existence of his medical practice.

Inconsistencies in defendant's accounting of his finances, his body language, failure to produce relevant discovery materials, and even preparing financial documents during the course of this trial, had an impact on my assessment of defendant's account of his finances. Zaremba v. Zaremba, 237 AD2d 351. His testimony was fraught with a wholesale absence of business formalities that would be part of a legitimate corporate existence of his medical practice.

And, of course, much would depend on the ratio of each parent's income to the other. We start with the premise that children who have been raised in a long-term marriage ought to continue to be raised in an environment that approximates that which would have existed had the parties remained married ( Zaremba v. Zaremba, 237 AD2d 351). Making a standard of living determination can involve some educated guesswork and general assumptions that might not apply to any particular family.