Opinion
No. 36725.
2015-08-4
Tanya ZAPPOLA v. Dominick ZAPPOLA, Jr.
James F. Cirillo, Jr., filed a brief for the appellant (defendant). Robert K. Walsh, North Haven, filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).
James F. Cirillo, Jr., filed a brief for the appellant (defendant). Robert K. Walsh, North Haven, filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).
SHELDON, KELLER and NORCOTT, Js.
PER CURIAM.
The defendant in this marriage dissolution action, Dominick Zappola, Jr., appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in part in favor of the plaintiff, Tanya Zappola, on the plaintiff's postjudgment motion for contempt. On appeal,the defendant claims that (1) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the parties' dissolution judgment, which was rendered in New York and subsequently domesticated in Connecticut; (2) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because, inter alia, he resides in New York; (3) the court improperly determined that the parties' prenuptial agreement was not valid and enforceable; (4) the court improperly denied his request for a stay or a judgment of dismissal due to the pendency of bankruptcy proceedings involving the subject property; and (5) the court improperly determined that his failure to pay sums due under the dissolution judgment in favor of the plaintiff constituted wilful contempt. The defendant's brief is inadequate, and, thus, we decline to review his claims. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Although the defendant claims that the court determined that the prenuptial agreement was not valid and enforceable, our review of the court's memorandum of decision reveals the court concluded that there was no pending matter that required the court to interpret the agreement and, therefore, the defendant's claim regarding the prenuptial agreement was moot.
A New York court rendered judgment dissolving the parties' marriage in July, 2007, and entered related financial orders. On September 23, 2009, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt in the Superior Court for the judicial district of New Haven, seeking enforcement of the financial orders. On October 23, 2009, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, in which he argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him and lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's motion for contempt. On September 8, 2010, the trial court, Hon. James G. Kenefick, Jr., judge trial referee, held a hearing on the defendant's motion to dismiss, and subsequently denied the motion. On September 25, 2013, the defendant filed a second motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the court, Munro, J., rendered judgment for the plaintiff in part, denying the defendant's second motion to dismiss on the ground that it was a “rehash of the [first] motion and facts that were before Judge Kenefick in 2010,” finding the defendant in contempt of the New York judgment, and entering additional financial orders to enforce that judgment. The defendant subsequently filed this appeal.
On September 22, 2009, the parties' dissolution judgment was domesticated in Connecticut, and thereby made enforceable under General Statutes § 46b–71.
The court denied the plaintiff's request to have the defendant incarcerated.
Practice Book § 67–4 prescribes the required components of an appellant's brief. It is necessary to this court's review of a party's claims on appeal that his brief contain, inter alia, argument and analysis regarding the alleged errors of the trial court, with appropriate references to the facts bearing on the issues raised. See Practice Book § 67–4(d). The defendant's brief is completely devoid of those required components.
“It is well settled that [w]e are not required to review claims that are inadequately briefed .... We consistently have held that [a]nalysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. ... [F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal ... the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs. We do not reverse the judgment of a trial court on the basis of challenges to its rulings that have not been adequately briefed .... The parties may not merely cite a legal principlewithout analyzing the relationship between the facts of the case and the law cited .... [A]ssignments of error which are merely mentioned but not briefed beyond a statement of the claim will be deemed abandoned and will not be reviewed by this court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clelford v. Bristol, 150 Conn.App. 229, 233, 90 A.3d 998 (2014).
The defendant has presented this court with an inadequate brief. Accordingly, we decline to review the claims raised in the defendant's appeal.
The judgment is affirmed.