Summary
concluding that appeal from tax-delinquency judgment was moot because trial court had granted motion to vacate the judgment under Tax Code section 33.56
Summary of this case from Brazoria Civic Club v. Brazoria Cty. Appraisal Dist.Opinion
NO. 01-15-00346-CV
12-01-2015
ARACELI ZAPATA D/B/A EL SUPER, VELJACO CORP., INC., D/B/A EL SUPER MEAT MARKET & TAQUERIA, AND CARMEN GLORIA VELJANOVICH, Appellants v. CLEAR CREEK INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, THE CITY OF WEBSTER, AND HARRIS COUNTY, Appellees
On Appeal from the 165th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2013-04925
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants, Araceli Zapata d/b/a El Super, Veljaco Corp., Inc., d/b/a El Super Meat Market & Taqueria, and Carmen Gloria Veljanovich, appealed from the trial court's final judgment, signed on March 2, 2015, in this tax delinquency case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a)(1). On June 23, 2015, this Court granted the appellants' motion for extension of time to file their notice of appeal, filed on April 16, 2015, because it was filed within the fifteen-day extension period and appellants provided a reasonable explanation. See TEX. R. APP. P. 10.5(b), 26.3.
On November 3, 2015, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss for mootness. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(1). The parties request that we dismiss the appeal because the trial court recently granted appellee Clear Creek Independent School District's petition to vacate the judgment, filed under Tax Code Section 33.56, and signed an order on October 30, 2015, vacating the final judgment. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.56(a)(2) (West Supp. 2014). Thus, the parties contend that this appeal has been rendered moot because there is no longer an issue in controversy. See Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 154 (Tex. 2012).
Generally, this Court has civil appellate jurisdiction over final judgments or interlocutory orders specifically authorized as appealable by statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.012, 51.014(a)(1)-(12) (West Supp. 2014); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). After the trial court vacated the final judgment, there is no appealable final judgment or interlocutory order, and no exception applies here. See Cooper v. Hamilton Cnty., No. 10-03-283-CV, 2003 WL 23122323, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 31, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (granting parties' motion to dismiss appeal for want of jurisdiction after trial court granted taxing entities' motion to vacate judgment under section 33.56(a)(1) of Tax Code). Also, the motion to dismiss is signed by counsel for the appellants and appellees, Clear Creek Independent School District, The City of Webster, and Harris County. See TEX. R. APP. P. 10.1(a)(5), 10.3(a)(2). No other party has filed a notice of appeal and no opinion has issued. See id. 42.1(a)(1), (c).
Accordingly, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(1), 43.2(f). We dismiss any other pending motions as moot.
PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Higley, Huddle, and Lloyd.