It is true that Pryor does apply a strict "actual evidence" substantive double-jeopardy test in regard to the utilization of aggravating circumstances in death-penalty cases, so as to prohibit imposition of the death penalty for murder where the aggravating circumstance is the commission of murder while the offender was engaged in the commission of kidnapping with bodily injury, and a single act on the part of the defendant constituted both the killing of the victim and the infliction of the bodily-injury element of the kidnapping-with-bodily-injury charge. However, the rationale of Pryor was disapproved in Zant v. Redd, 249 Ga. 211 (2) ( 290 S.E.2d 36) (1982), aff'd sub nom. Lowenfield v. Phelps, ___ U.S. ___ ( 108 S.C. 546, ___ L.Ed.2d ___) (1988), wherein it was held that statutory aggravating circumstances are not offenses for double-jeopardy purposes, but rather are procedural standards designed to control a jury's discretion in capital cases in order to ensure against capricious and arbitrary enforcement of the death penalty.

3. In footnote 11 of the Young v. Kemp opinion, 760 F.2d at pp. 1106-1107, the court expressed its agreement with Green v. Zant, 738 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1984), and Zant v. Redd, 249 Ga. 211 ( 290 S.E.2d 36) (1982); however, in Young these cases were found to be inapposite. (a) Zant v. Redd, supra, involved the following situation: The defendant Redd was sentenced to death for murder.

Like the defendant in this case, and unlike the defendant in Bullington, the defendant in Gilbert had not been acquitted of the death penalty. The Georgia Supreme Court in Zant v. Redd, 249 Ga. 211, 290 S.E.2d 36 (1982), concluded that Bullington's double jeopardy proscription after acquittal of the death penalty does not apply where a finding of death is made, supported by only one of several aggravating circumstances urged. The court noted that, as relates to the aggravating circumstances not found, there was no jury rejection since the Georgia death penalty statute, like Louisiana's, requires only a finding of one aggravating circumstance in order to allow imposition of the death penalty.

This we decline to do. As the Georgia Supreme Court pointed out while rejecting a similar argument in Zant v. Redd, 249 Ga. 211, 290 S.E.2d 36 (1982), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 3552, 77 L.Ed.2d 1398 (1983): A different rule applies to cases in which the reversal is for insufficiency of the evidence.

Such cases stand on an entirely different footing than those which have not yet resulted in any conviction. When a murder conviction or death sentence is overturned on legal grounds, it is nullified, the slate is wiped clean, and the State and the defense start anew. Spraggins v. State, 255 Ga. 195, 199 (1), 201 (3) (a) ( 336 SE2d 227) (1985); Zant v. Redd, 249 Ga. 211, 214 ( 290 SE2d 36) (1982). Indeed, whether there will even be a new trial depends upon whether the State chooses to retry the defendant.

11. The State was entitled to allege and prove the OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (7) aggravating circumstance at the 1999 trial, even if it was not alleged at the 1976 trial. See Zant v. Redd, 249 Ga. 211 (2) ( 290 S.E.2d 36) (1982). 12. Presnell contends the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the State to use at trial a book, entitledRadiant Identities by author Jock Sturges which contained photographs of nude children, that the State claimed Presnell had ordered in 1996 from his prison cell. Pretermitting the issue whether the admission of the book was error because of the State's failure to authenticate it, we find that no reversible error occurred because the State established by independent evidence the facts sought to be proved by the book itself.

Nor is the evidence in question barred on the ground of double jeopardy, because the defendant is not being tried for those prior crimes. Poland v. Arizona, ___ U.S. ___ ( 106 S.C. 1749, 1755, 95 L.Ed.2d 123) (1986); Zant v. Redd, 249 Ga. 211 ( 290 S.E.2d 36) (1982). 2.

However, it was clear that the jury intended to find an aggravating circumstance and to recommend the death penalty. Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616, 618 ( 284 S.E.2d 422) (1981); Zant v. Redd, 249 Ga. 211 ( 290 S.E.2d 36) (1982). Furthermore, the evidence supported that verdict.

Accordingly, the state is not prohibited from seeking anew the death penalty. Upon retrial, the state may introduce evidence of kidnapping with bodily injury, and of any other aggravating circumstances, including any which were not presented to the first jury. Zant v. Redd, 249 Ga. 211, 214 ( 290 S.E.2d 36) (1982); Spraggins v. State, 255 Ga. 195, 204 (7) ( 336 S.E.2d 227) (1985); see also Gregory, J., special concurrence, id. at 205. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

The appellant's argument is that his double-jeopardy plea should have been sustained under the authority of Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 ( 101 S.C. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270) (1981), which was rendered by the United States Supreme Court subsequent to our earlier remand. However, we have recently held in Zant v. Redd, 249 Ga. 211 ( 290 S.E.2d 36) (1982), in accordance with our earlier decision in Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616 (1) ( 284 S.E.2d 422) (1981), that the ruling in Bullington v. Missouri, supra — that the state cannot seek the death penalty on resentencing after the original sentencing jury has imposed a life sentence — does not apply where the jury has imposed the death penalty and the death penalty is vacated on legal grounds as opposed to grounds that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Cf. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 ( 98 S.C. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1) (1978).