Opinion
Civil Action No. 98-2244 (NHP).
July 30, 1999
Ms. Christine Zagorski, Clifton, N.J., Plaintiff Pro Se.
Anthony J. La Bruna, Assistant U.S. Attorney, FAITH S. HOCHBERG, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newark, N.J., Attorneys for Defendant.
THE ORIGINAL OF THIS LETTER OPINION IS ON FILE WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT
Dear Counsel:
Plaintiff Christine Zagorski brings this action before the Court, pursuant to §§ 205(g) and 1631(c) of the Social Security Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 1383(c), seeking to overturn the final determination of Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff's claim for disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income under the Social Security Act. For the reasons stated herein, the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF FACTS PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Christine Zagorski (hereinafter "plaintiff") was born on April 25, 1947. See Transcript of Proceedings, April 16, 1997 at page 36. She attended college, where she received a Bachelors of the Arts degree in Psychology. (Tr. 36). Prior to the onset of her condition, plaintiff worked as an employment counselor sometime between 1977 and 1991, (Tr. 42), and then as an office manager. (Tr. 39).In July 1991, plaintiff had her first angioplasty. (Tr. 39), Approximately one week later, plaintiff returned to work as an office manager, and now alleges that her employer let her go because of her cardiac condition. (Tr. 40). Thereafter, plaintiff collected unemployment for approximately fifteen months. (Tr. 40). During that time, she had a Mary Kay "franchise" and also tried to establish a business with dancers. (Tr. 40).
Sometime thereafter, plaintiff resumed full-time employment as a bar manager. (Tr. 41). Plaintiff again began to experience heart pains which forced her to quit her job. (Tr. 38). Thereafter, plaintiff resumed work, and was gainfully employed until May 1995 at which time she again experienced the angina attacks. (Tr. 38). Plaintiff ceased working on May 31, 1995, and her next angioplasty was performed on July 7, 1995. (Tr. 45).
On June 28, 1995, plaintiff filed applications for Social Security disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income (hereinafter "SSI"), alleging that her condition became "disabling" as of May 30, 1995. Plaintiff alleges disability due to coronary artery disease and to the fact that she is a recovering alcoholic. See Statement of Stipulated and Disputed Facts, dated February 8, 1999 at page 2. Plaintiff's claim for benefits was initially denied, and then denied upon reconsideration. Next, the plaintiff requested a hearing before the Administrative Law Judge. A hearing before the Honorable Javier A. Arrastia, Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ") then was scheduled for April 16, 1997. On May 22, 1997, Judge Arrastia determined that plaintiff was not entitled to a period of disability or disability insurance benefits. Judge Arrastia's findings contained in the May 1997 decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when, on March 21, 1998, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review. On apro se appeal to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, plaintiff contends that the decision of the Commissioner denying her application for disability benefits is not based upon substantial evidence.
Hereinafter, this Court will refer to the Statement of Stipulated and Disputed Facts as "Stip."
DISCUSSION
Jurisdiction over this appeal is conferred upon this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which is made applicable to SSI cases by 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).
A . Standard of Review
Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) establishes the limitations that this Court must adhere to in reviewing said appeals. In accordance with the statute, a court may review the factual findings of the Commissioner only to determine whether the administrative record contains substantial evidence for such findings. This Court must affirm the Commissioner's findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence. If there is substantial evidence in the record to maintain the Commissioner's findings, they are conclusive; and as a result, the court is not empowered, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to conduct a de novo review. Instead, the court's role must be viewed as narrowly tailored, with considerable deference to the Commissioner's fact-finding. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This Court's inquiry must be directed to finding whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence.
The United States Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence in a Social Security case as "more than a mere scintilla" and as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The fact that the record contains evidence which would have supported a different conclusion does not undermine the Commissioner's decision so long as there is substantial support for the decision in the record. See Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1992). Consequently, this Court must review the record and the ALJ's findings and conclusion within the narrow confines of its limited scope of review.
B . Substantial Evidence
In reaching the findings in a disability benefits proceeding, the ALJ is entitled to draw inferences logically flowing from the evidence, and where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ's conclusions that must be upheld. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5); see also Miranda v. Secretary of Health, Educ. Welfare, 514 F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 1975). However, the ALJ's ruling should clearly explain the foundation upon which it rests. See Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981). The ALJ is charged with the responsibility of analyzing all the relevant evidence and explaining why certain evidence was considered relevant while other evidence was dismissed. See Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1978). Although administrative decisions are accorded a certain level of deference, it is the responsibility of this Court to closely sift through the record in order to determine whether the ALJ's ruling is supported by substantial evidence.
In order for a claimant to be deemed disabled, and thus entitled to benefits under the Act, he must comply with all relevant statutory requirements. To comply, the claimant must first meet the insured status requirements listed in 42 U.S.C. § 423(c) and the resource and income restrictions set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a) and (b) in order for SSI to be paid. Secondly, the claimant must establish that he is not "engage[d] in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or impairment which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months" as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) and 1382(c)(3)(A). Finally, the claimant must show that he is disabled within the meaning of the statute.
An individual is determined to be under a disability "only if his physical or mental impairment(s) are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(2)(B)(d) and § 1382(c)(3)(B). Thus, a claimant must have a medically determinable impairment and this impairment must cause a functional limitation which negates the claimant's ability to do any kind of work which exists in the national economy.
In this matter, the plaintiff has satisfied the first two requirements in that the plaintiff is insured and is not "engaged in substantial gainful activity." The issue before this Court is whether the ALJ's ruling denying the plaintiff "disabled" status is supported by substantial evidence.
The Social Security Act prescribes a five-step sequential analysis that must be satisfied in order for a claimant to be entitled to benefits.See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1995). First, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that he is not currently employed or engaged in "substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (1995); see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146-47 n. 5 (1987). Second, the plaintiff must also prove that he is inflicted with a severe medical impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) (1995); see also Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146-47 n. 5. Third, the ALJ must determine whether the severe impairment is listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P., App. 1 (1995). Fourth, the claimant is under an obligation to prove that he cannot return to the particular type of work the claimant has previously performed if the claimant's impairment does not meet the criteria set forth in the list of impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) (1995);see also Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146-47 n. 5. Failure to prove this requisite will result in a denial of benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) (1995). Fifth, if the claimant has proven that he is unable to perform prior occupational duties, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant is able to work in some other occupation in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) (1995). If the Commissioner is unable to carry this burden, the claimant is entitled to benefits. Id.
The type of physical or mental impairment necessary to prove the existence of a disability has been defined as "[a]n impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(3) and 1382(a)(3)(c). Although Congress requires the Commissioner to develop a complete medical record and make every reasonable effort to obtain all medical evidence, Congress nonetheless places the burden upon a plaintiff to show his entitlement to disability benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A), incorporated by 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(H) ("An individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as the [Commissioner] may require.").
In the present matter, this Court must look to the factual record developed at the April 16, 1997 hearing. At that time, plaintiff asserted that, in May 1991, she began to experience problems that precluded her from work. (Tr. 37-38). Plaintiff stated that she had her first angioplasty in July, 1991. (Tr. 38). Although plaintiff was able to return to work shortly thereafter, she again began to experience pain. (Tr. 38). Plaintiff alleged that this pain again precluded her from working, and underwent another angioplasty in July, 1995. (Tr. 45).
Judge Arrastia employed the sequential evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 in order to conclude that plaintiff was not disabled under § 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act. The ALJ made the following findings:
1. The claimant met the disability insured status requirements of the Act on May 30, 1995, the date she stated she became unable to work, and continued to meet them through December 31, 1996, but not thereafter.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 30, 1995.
3. The medical evidence establishes that the claimant has severe coronary artery disease, but that she does not have an impairment or combination of impairments, listed in, or medically equal to, one listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.
4. The claimant has exertional chest pain and shortness of breath which imposes significant functional limitations on her. However, her cardiac complaints and functional limitations are not shown to be as severe as alleged and are only partially credible.
5. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform work related activities except for work involving standing or walking more than 1 to 2 hours in an 8-hour day, lifting or carrying more than 10 pounds, or bending, stooping, crouching, crawling, or climbing on more than an occasional basis. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 and § 416.945.
6. The claimant's past relevant work as an employment counselor did not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the above limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565 and § 416.965.
7. The claimant's impairment does not prevent her from performing her past relevant work.
8. The claimant was not under a "disability," as defined in the Social Security, at any time through the date of this decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) and § 416.920(e).
The ALJ determined, based on the lack of any medical evidence provided by plaintiff for the period from May 30, 1995 through the date of the ALJ's decision, that plaintiff was not disabled at this time. Consequently, plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act, given her age, education, and work experience.
On appeal, plaintiff asserts that the ALJ's decision to deny disability benefits under §§ 216(i) and 223 of the Act was not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in his finding that the plaintiff does not have any impairments which significantly limit her ability to perform work related functions. Further, plaintiff asserts that the record does not support the ALJ's conclusions in questioning the credibility of the plaintiff's cardiac complaints and functional limitations. Finally, plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in his determination that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of sedentary work.
In refuting plaintiff's alleged inability to work, the ALJ found the most critical factor to be the lack of medical evidence submitted by the plaintiff for the period at issue. As the record illustrates, plaintiff has been examined on several occasions in order to diagnose her particular ailments. From a medical standpoint, the ALJ recognized that the plaintiff has a long history of coronary artery disease, and that this condition has had more than a slight effect on her ability to perform basic work activities since her alleged disability date. However, although she clearly has a "severe" impairment, the ALJ found that it is equally clear that the claimant has not presented manifestations of ischemic heart disease comparable in severity to those impairments described in section 4.04 of Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the Regulations No. 4 for a continuous 12 month period.
In reviewing the medical evidence, the ALJ noted that although cardiac catheterization performed in June 1995 revealed an 80 percent mid-stenosis of the left anterior descending coronary artery, (Tr. 154, 213), angioplasty performed one month later reduced the stenosis to 30 percent, which was considered successful. (Tr. 155). Judge Arrastia further noted that there were no restrictions placed on the plaintiff's activities at this time. (Tr. 156). The ALJ also considered that, in August 1995, an exercised stress test performed on plaintiff confirmed that she had good functional capacity. Plaintiff, at this time, exercised to ninety percent of her predicted maximum heart rate and attained a maximum workload of eleven METS without experiencing chest pain. (Tr. 227). Judge Arrastia finally noted that, although a cardiac catheterization was performed again in December 1995 due to continued symptoms, an 85 percent stenosis of the right coronary artery was reduced with excellent results by angioplasty and stent replacement. (Tr. 247). Similarly, the ALJ noted that a follow-up cardiac exercise test showed good functional capacity, with plaintiff exercising to ninety-four percent of her predicated heart rate and attaining a maximum workload of ten METS. (Tr. 221).
Mid-stenosis is a narrowing of one of the cardiac valves. In this case, it is of the left anterior descending coronary artery. See Stedman's Medical Dictionary (25th ed. 1990).
The ALJ also considered the opinions offered by Dr. Auron, plaintiff's treating physician in making his determination that the plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the Act. Dr. Auron did state that plaintiff was unable to return to her past work, and that she was indeed incapable of minimal (sedentary) activity. (Tr. 287). Further, in a letter to plaintiff's attorney, Dr. Auron considered plaintiff unable to sustain a five day a week job. (Tr. 234). Dr. Auron stated that at most, plaintiff could perform light duty work on a part-time basis. (Tr. 234). However, a physician's statement that an individual is "disabled" or "unable to work" does not mean that the Commissioner will determine him to be disabled within the meaning of the Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1) and 416.927(e)(1).
It is within the sole province of the ALJ, as trier of fact, to weigh all evidence, including medical evidence, and resolve material conflicts in evidence. See Pearles, 402 U.S. at 399; see also Aponte v. Secretary of Dep't of Health and Human Serv., 728 F.2d 588, 591 (2d Cir. 1984);Weber v. Harris, 640 F.2d 176, 178 (8th Cir. 1981). Where medical reports are inconclusive in disability benefit proceedings, questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts in testimony are solely the function of the ALJ. See Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982).
In reviewing the evidence, the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Overall, the record clearly establishes an ability to perform work related activities from a physical viewpoint. Despite plaintiff's complaints of chest discomfort, cardiac exercise testing revealed no negative cardiac signs and plaintiff exhibited good functional capacity. (Tr. 221, 227). Furthermore, Dr. Peyser, a medical expert who reviewed the evidence of record, testified that plaintiff would be capable of sedentary work activity. (Tr. 57). Dr. Peyser refuted Dr. Auron's statements as contradictory. (Tr. 58-60). Dr. Peyser concluded that if Dr. Auron truly believed that plaintiff could not even perform sedentary activity, Dr. Auron would have recommended cardiac bypass surgery, a procedure that has an excellent curative rate for twenty years. (Tr. 58-60).
Plaintiff stated in her brief that Dr. Peyser is not a Board certified cardiologist. See Plaintiff's Brief at 23. However, Dr. Peyser is, in fact, board certified in internal medicine, and maintains a medical specialty in cardiovascular diseases. (Tr. 211).
The ALJ also considered other relevant factors in determining that plaintiff was not "disabled" as defined in the Act. For example, plaintiff was able to perform her own household chores. (Tr. 114). Further, plaintiff was able to use public transportation, as well as, perform sedentary activities requiring concentration, such as reading and needlepoint. (Tr. 114). Thus, review of the record in its entirety contradicts plaintiff's allegations that she is incapable of performing any substantial gainful activity.
Based upon the evidence of record, the ALJ found that the plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform work-related activities except for work involving standing or walking more than 1 to 2 hours in an 8-hour day, lifting or carrying more than 10 pounds, or bending, stooping, crouching, crawling, or climbing on more than an occasional basis. (Tr. 28). Since plaintiff's past relevant work as an employment counselor was not precluded by her residual functional capacity, (Tr. 107), the ALJ's decision that plaintiff was not disabled pursuant to the Act is supported by substantial evidence. Contrary to plaintiff's arguments, there is no basis for reversal in this case.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons it is the determination of this Court that the Commissioner's decision that plaintiff is not entitled to disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, be and hereby is AFFIRMED.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Letter Opinion.
This case is closed.