Yuncevich v. State

9 Citing cases

  1. Doucette v. State

    774 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. App. 1989)   Cited 6 times
    In Doucette the majority held no jurisdiction reposed in the district court. Here in Simmons sub judice the Court reasons to the contrary.

    Compare Bailey v. State, 543 S.W.2d 653 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976), where the substance alleged was lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) which had only one possible penalty range and that was a second degree felony. Yuncevich v. State, 626 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982), listed the elements of the offense of bail jumping, pursuant to TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. sec. 38.11 (Vernon 1989), as follows: "`(1) a person

  2. Mumphord v. Lumpkin

    Civil Action 4:22-cv-1446 (S.D. Tex. Sep. 29, 2023)   Cited 1 times

    “It is well settled that an indictment must allege all the essential elements of the offense charged.” Yuncevich v. State, 626 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (citations omitted). Under Texas law, an indictment which tracks the statutory language is legally sufficient to provide notice to the defendant.

  3. Williams v. State

    675 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)   Cited 84 times
    Holding that line up was not impermissibly suggestive even though appellant was only one of two men who appeared to match age given in witness's description and others appeared to be younger

    Addressing the State's contentions first, we find that we incorrectly set aside the cumulation order on original submission. While the term "stacked" is not used in the statute, it has a well-known usage as synonymous with "cumulative" or "consecutive" when used in the context of criminal sentencing. Indeed, members of this Court have used the same term in this manner in opinions; see e.g. Goodwill v. State, 639 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982) (dissenting opinion); Yuncevich v. State, 626 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982), at note 2; Ex parte Davis, 506 S.W.2d 882 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974); Ex parte Reynolds, 462 S.W.2d 605 (Tex.Cr.App. 1970), at note 2; as have members of the Courts of Appeals; see e.g. Grant v. State, 635 S.W.2d 933 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1982, no review hist.); Nunn v. State, 625 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1981, no review hist.). In Grant v. State, supra, the court addressed and rejected a similar challenge to the use of the words "stacked on" in sentencing:

  4. Ward v. State

    642 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)   Cited 15 times
    In Ward, the issue was whether informations charging false imprisonment were fundamentally defective for failing to allege that the restraint was "without consent."

    In addition, where an indictment or information tracks the statute, as here, it is ordinarily sufficient to allege an offense. Yuncevich v. State, 626 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982); Few v. State, 588 S.W.2d 578 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979). We hold that the challenged informations sufficiently alleged the offense of false imprisonment.

  5. State v. Ojiaku

    424 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. App. 2014)   Cited 7 times

    At that point, all of the elements of bail jumping and failure to appear had occurred and the offense was complete. SeeTex. Penal Code Ann. 38.10(a); Yuncevich v. State, 626 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982) (listing elements of bail jumping). On that date, or any time within the following three years, the State was free to indict appellee for the offense.

  6. State v. Ojiaku

    No. 05-13-00840-CR (Tex. App. Dec. 23, 2013)

    At that point, all of the elements of bail jumping and failure to appear had occurred and the offense was complete. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.10(a); Yuncevich v. State, 626 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982) (listing elements of bail jumping). On that date, or any time within the following three years, the State was free to indict appellee for the offense.

  7. Hogue v. State

    752 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. App. 1987)   Cited 15 times
    Applying former article 6701/-5 of the Texas Revised Statutes, since repealed and re-codified as § 724.015

    An indictment drawn in the language of the statute creating and defining the offense, as in this case, is ordinarily sufficient. Lewis v. State, 659 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983); Yuncevich v. State, 626 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982); Few v. State, 588 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979). Definitions of terms and elements are essentially evidentiary and need ordinarily not be alleged in the indictment.

  8. Williams v. State

    690 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. App. 1985)   Cited 4 times

    Subject to rare exceptions, an indictment or charge that tracks the words of the statute is sufficient. Lewis v. State, 659 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983) (en banc); Yuncevich v. State, 626 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982); Marrs v. State, 647 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983). Both instruments specifically recited lack of consent, the essence of the offense of sexual assault.

  9. Harris v. State

    666 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. App. 1984)   Cited 8 times

    An indictment drawn in the language of the statute creating and defining an offense is ordinarily sufficient. Yuncevich v. State, 626 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982). Prior to amendment by the legislature in 1981, the applicable section of the Penal Code provided that a person committed aggravated rape if he "compel[led] submission to the rape by threat of death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping to be imminently inflicted on anyone."