Compare Bailey v. State, 543 S.W.2d 653 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976), where the substance alleged was lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) which had only one possible penalty range and that was a second degree felony. Yuncevich v. State, 626 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982), listed the elements of the offense of bail jumping, pursuant to TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. sec. 38.11 (Vernon 1989), as follows: "`(1) a person
“It is well settled that an indictment must allege all the essential elements of the offense charged.” Yuncevich v. State, 626 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (citations omitted). Under Texas law, an indictment which tracks the statutory language is legally sufficient to provide notice to the defendant.
Addressing the State's contentions first, we find that we incorrectly set aside the cumulation order on original submission. While the term "stacked" is not used in the statute, it has a well-known usage as synonymous with "cumulative" or "consecutive" when used in the context of criminal sentencing. Indeed, members of this Court have used the same term in this manner in opinions; see e.g. Goodwill v. State, 639 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982) (dissenting opinion); Yuncevich v. State, 626 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982), at note 2; Ex parte Davis, 506 S.W.2d 882 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974); Ex parte Reynolds, 462 S.W.2d 605 (Tex.Cr.App. 1970), at note 2; as have members of the Courts of Appeals; see e.g. Grant v. State, 635 S.W.2d 933 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1982, no review hist.); Nunn v. State, 625 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1981, no review hist.). In Grant v. State, supra, the court addressed and rejected a similar challenge to the use of the words "stacked on" in sentencing:
In addition, where an indictment or information tracks the statute, as here, it is ordinarily sufficient to allege an offense. Yuncevich v. State, 626 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982); Few v. State, 588 S.W.2d 578 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979). We hold that the challenged informations sufficiently alleged the offense of false imprisonment.
At that point, all of the elements of bail jumping and failure to appear had occurred and the offense was complete. SeeTex. Penal Code Ann. 38.10(a); Yuncevich v. State, 626 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982) (listing elements of bail jumping). On that date, or any time within the following three years, the State was free to indict appellee for the offense.
At that point, all of the elements of bail jumping and failure to appear had occurred and the offense was complete. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.10(a); Yuncevich v. State, 626 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982) (listing elements of bail jumping). On that date, or any time within the following three years, the State was free to indict appellee for the offense.
An indictment drawn in the language of the statute creating and defining the offense, as in this case, is ordinarily sufficient. Lewis v. State, 659 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983); Yuncevich v. State, 626 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982); Few v. State, 588 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979). Definitions of terms and elements are essentially evidentiary and need ordinarily not be alleged in the indictment.
Subject to rare exceptions, an indictment or charge that tracks the words of the statute is sufficient. Lewis v. State, 659 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983) (en banc); Yuncevich v. State, 626 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982); Marrs v. State, 647 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983). Both instruments specifically recited lack of consent, the essence of the offense of sexual assault.
An indictment drawn in the language of the statute creating and defining an offense is ordinarily sufficient. Yuncevich v. State, 626 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982). Prior to amendment by the legislature in 1981, the applicable section of the Penal Code provided that a person committed aggravated rape if he "compel[led] submission to the rape by threat of death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping to be imminently inflicted on anyone."