And, when surface and mineral rights are severed, the parties contemplate that mining operations will not needlessly render the surface useless. Following Stonegap, the Court decided Yukon Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Ratliffe, 181 Va. 195, 24 S.E.2d 559 (1943), a case of particular interest to us because it construed the Buchanan Coal Coke deed from which both Beatrice Pocahontas and some of the property owners in this case trace their title. There the coal company had been granted, in addition to the mineral rights, sufficient land to erect certain specified structures and other devices necessary for the mining and manufacturing of coal.

This principle also applies when "a [written instrument] covers particular or express matters." Yukon Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Ratliff, 181 Va. 195, 203 (1943) (quoting 16 Am. Jur., Deeds § 232 at 537).

Unlike the provisions at issue in Goodson, the 1849 deed's granting clause and the Yard Restriction can both be true: it is a commonplace in property law for a person to hold formal title to property yet be unable to use some portion of it in his or her preferred manner, whether because of a deed restriction, government regulation, or some other reason. See, e.g., Yukon Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Ratliff, 24 S.E.2d 559, 563 (Va. 1943) (enforcing deed restrictions that prevented a mineral-estate owner from accessing certain parts of that estate). Thus, the Yard Restriction is not void under the doctrine of repugnancy.

But he is not limited, as we have already said, to such appliances as were in existence when the grant was made, but may keep pace with the progress of society and modern inventions. Id. at 395 (quoting Williams v. Gibson, 84 Ala. 228, 233–234, 4 So. 350 (1888) ) (emphasis added); accord Yukon Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Ratliff, 181 Va. 195, 24 S.E.2d 559, 563–64 (1943). In response, plaintiffs rely heavily on the case of Phipps v. Leftwich, 216 Va. 706, 222 S.E.2d 536 (1976), but Carmeuse rightly points out that Phipps is distinguishable.

There appear to be competing legal principles as to this issue. Compare, e.g., Yukon Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Ratliff, 24 S.E.2d 559, 56364 (Va. 1943) (a miner's rights are "not limited ... to such appliances as were in existence when the grant was made, but may keep pace with the progress of society and modern inventions") and Beury, 144 S.E. at 633 (recognizing, in 1928, that only way limestone can be removed is by "quarrying, which requires the taking off of any top soil that may lie above it and blast it off. There is nothing left when the limestone is taken.") with Traylor v. Holloway, 142 S.E.2d 521, 523 (Va. 1965) (citing the "elementary rule of construction that the purpose or intent of a written instrument must be determined from the language used in the light of the circumstances under which it was written") and Lowe v. Guyan Eagle Coals, Inc., 273 S.E.2d 91, 93 (W. Va. 1980) (in discussing possible limitations on an easement, holding that "no use may be made of a rightofway, different from that established at the time of its creation so as to burden the servient estate to a greater extent than was contemplated at the time

Pooling Agreement § 6.01. The Pooling Agreement must be interpreted in light of the purposes of the parties to it, Meritor and Bankers Trust. See Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co. v. Richmond-Petersburg Turnpike Authority, 202 Va. 1029, 121 S.E.2d 499, 503 (1961); Yukon Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Ratliff, 181 Va. 195, 24 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1943).III

Substantially the same comment is made in "Coal Mining Rights and Privileges in West Virginia," 52 West Virginia Law Review, 39-40, by the same author. Plaintiffs also cite Yukon Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Ratliff, 1943, 181 Va. 195, 24 S.E.2d 559, 561, to sustain their position concerning expressed rights precluding any implied rights, but the case is quite different from the instant one. There the Virginia court refused to allow use of the surface for the erection of hotels, hospitals, gardens, and employees' homes under a deed which granted use of the surface for making draft mouths, air shafts, wells, tipples, tanks, pipe lines, washers, pumping stations, and "such other devices as [are] necessary for the successful mining and manufacturing and removing said coal," applying the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

" The court held "there is no merit in the contention that `the reservation of one-half acre around the graveyard was not of the fee.' The language clearly imports the retention of the fee. . . ." Yukon Pocahontas Coal Company v. Ratliff, 181 Va. 195, 205, 24 S.E.2d 559, 563 (1943). See also Mannerback v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 16 Pa. Super. 622 (1901).

Appellants correctly assert that if the meaning of the language used is plain the instrument must be given effect accordingly. Yukon Poca. Coal Co. v. Ratliff, 181 Va. 195, 202, 24 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1943). Explicit language in a deed, granting the "right to strip the surface" for fire clay, has been held sufficient in Pennsylvania to permit stripping, even though modern stripping methods were unknown at the time of severance.

It is well settled that, in construing the language of a deed, the chief object is to ascertain the grantor's intent. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 194 Va. 925, 929, 76 S.E.2d 204; Yukon Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Ratliff, 181 Va. 195, 202, 24 S.E.2d 559. Should there exist any doubt or ambiguity as to the meaning, the deed must be construed against the grantor. 5 Mich. Jur., Deeds, Sec. 58, page 732.