Opinion
FSTCV196039771S
08-08-2019
Siji Yu v. Pitney Bowes, Inc.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Sommer, Mary E., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (#106.00)
SOMMER, J.
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF FACTS
On January 25, 2019, the plaintiff, Siji Yu, filed a four-count complaint against the defendant, Pitney Bowes, Inc., alleging the following relevant facts. On or about September 23, 2014, the plaintiff entered into a contract to work as an independent contractor for the defendant as an IT consultant. The plaintiff performed services for the defendant from September 2014 through approximately the end of January 2016 when he was terminated without notice. During the plaintiff’s employment, he regularly worked overtime hours and the defendant promised to compensate him for these extra hours worked. The defendant also promised to pay the plaintiff a severance payment. The plaintiff has alleged that after his termination, the defendant failed to fully compensate him by providing him with the agreed-upon overtime and severance payments. The plaintiff further alleges that because he was terminated without one month’s notice prior to the end of his contract, his family’s financial and emotional life was injured.
On May 30, 2019, the defendant moved to strike (#106) the plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that it is legally insufficient. The motion was accompanied by a memorandum of law. On July 2, 2019, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to defendant’s motion with an attached exhibit. The plaintiff, thereafter, filed a supplemental memorandum of law in opposition on July 16, 2019 with an additional attached exhibit. The court heard oral arguments from both sides at short calendar on July 15, 2019.
II. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
"[A] motion, to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court ... [The court] construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency ... Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied ... Moreover, [the court notes] that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged ... It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant’s motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted ... Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 398, 142 A.3d 227 (2016). "If any facts provable under the express and implied allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint support a cause of action ... the complaint is not vulnerable to a motion to strike." Bouchard v. People’s Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991).
"The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 117, 19 A.3d 640 (2011).
In his four-count complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110b et seq. In particular, the plaintiff, in counts one and two, alleges that the defendant violated CUTPA by breaching its oral contract with the plaintiff that required it to fully compensate the plaintiff for overtime hours worked (count one) and to provide the plaintiff with a severance payment (count two). The plaintiff, in count three, alleges that the defendant violated CUTPA by failing to provide him with notice prior to termination in accordance with their employment contract, causing his family to suffer emotional and financial harm. In count four, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant violated CUTPA by refusing to produce any evidence or consent to what appears to be an internal-mock-trial exercise regarding the plaintiff’s claims for overtime, severance, and lack of notice.
In its motion to strike, the defendant argues that the plaintiff’s complaint is legally insufficient because the plaintiff has failed to raise any viable claims under CUTPA. The defendant has raised four reasons that the plaintiff has failed to plead a viable CUTPA claim. First, the defendant argues that the plaintiff cannot allege a CUTPA violation because the plaintiff worked as an independent contractor for the defendant. The primary argument put forward by the defendant is that the legal status of an independent contractor falls within the type of employment-related relationship that is excluded from the definition of trade or commerce under CUTPA. Second, the defendant contends that although there is an exception to CUTPA where an employer’s conduct that falls outside the scope of an employment relationship may constitute a CUTPA violation, the plaintiff’s allegations do not meet the standard to qualify for this exception because the plaintiff has not alleged that the defendant engaged in any anticompetitive behavior within the scope of CUTPA. Third, the defendant argues that even if the conduct alleged by the plaintiff falls within this exception, the plaintiff is alleging that the defendant breached an oral contract. Oral contracts are not actionable under CUTPA absent substantial aggravating circumstances. Fourth, the defendant also argues that even if the plaintiff brought a legally sufficient cause of action under CUTPA, its claims are barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations since the plaintiff did not bring the action within three years after the alleged conduct occurred.
The plaintiff, in his memorandum of law in opposition to the plaintiff’s motion to strike, essentially restates the facts alleged in his complaint and concludes that the defendant violated CUTPA based on unfair and deceptive acts and practices and that his cause of action was brought within the three-year statute of limitations. The plaintiff, however, fails to offer any case law that supports either of these arguments. The plaintiff, thereafter, filed a supplemental memorandum in opposition to the plaintiff’s motion to strike, where he argued that he did not have an employment relationship with the defendant and that the defendant conducted an unfair trade practice in violation of CUTPA by purposely deceiving him.
General Statutes § 42-110b(a) provides: "No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." "It is well settled that in determining whether a practice violates CUTPA we have adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the [F]ederal [T]rade [C]ommission for determining when a practice is unfair: (1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise- in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers, [competitors or other businesspersons] ... All three criteria do not need to be satisfied to support a finding of unfairness. A practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets all three ... Thus a violation of CUTPA may be established by showing either an actual deceptive practice ... or a practice amounting to a violation of public policy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ulbrich v. Groth, 310 Conn. 375, 409, 78 A.3d 76 (2013). Although it is clear that CUTPA does not provide a separate remedy for a breach of contract claim, "when the defendant’s contractual breach was accompanied by aggravating circumstances," CUTPA provides a remedy. Id., 411.
"Our jurisprudence regarding CUTPA is well settled. It is remedial in character ... and must be liberally construed is favor of those whom the legislature intended to benefit." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eder Bros, Inc. v. Wine Merchants of Connecticut, Inc., 275 Conn. 363, 379, 880 A.2d 138 (2005). "CUTPA is not limited to conduct involving consumer injury ... [A] competitor or other business person can maintain a CUTPA cause of action without showing consumer injury ... CUTPA ... applies to a broad spectrum of commercial activity ... The purpose of CUTPA is to protect the public from unfair practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce, and whether a practice is unfair depends upon the finding of a violation of an identifiable public policy." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 379-80. "Although our Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that CUTPA does not impose the requirement of a consumer relationship ... the court also has indicated that a plaintiff must have at least some business relationship with the defendant in order to state a cause of action under CUTPA." Dinette v. McLaughlin, 96 Conn.App. 769, 778, 901 A.2d 1269, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 929, 909 A.2d 958 (2006).
It is well established law in Connecticut that "[T]he employer-employee relationship does not fall within the definition of trade or commerce for the purposes of an action under CUTPA ... [A]lthough an employer may engage employees for the purpose of promoting trade or commerce, the actual employment relationship is not itself trade or commerce for the purpose of CUTPA." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 28 Conn.App. 660, 670, 613 A.2d 838 (1992), overruled on other grounds by Hart v. Carruthers, 77 Conn.App. 610, 823 A.2d 1284 (2003).
In applying this standard, courts have generally held that where the plaintiff brought a cause of action concerning a term or condition of employment, the injuries of which the plaintiff complains fall within the employment relationship, and are therefore not actionable under CUTPA, See Evans v. Tiger Claw, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-07-5013346 (May 16, 2008, Licari, J.) (striking CUTPA claim relating to dispute over payment for work performed); Kelly v. Noble Environmental Power, LLC, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-08-5005444 (September 2, 2009, Clarance, J.) (striking CUTPA claim where independent contractor alleged that defendant failed to compensate him for professional services performed pursuant to employment contract and failed to give timely notice prior to terminating the plaintiff); Garcia v. Barrett, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV-12-6009913-S (April 2, 2013, Doherty, J.) (55 Conn.L.Rptr. 833) (striking a CUTPA claim where defendant terminated plaintiff and then refused to rehire him). These cases provide guidance in the present action in which the alleged actions and/or refusal to act by the defendant concerns an employment relationship.
In the present case, the plaintiff, an independent contractor, has alleged facts similar to Noble Environment, by alleging claims regarding a breach of an employment contract as to compensation and timely notice of termination. These allegations do not raise an issue as to whether the defendant engaged in unfair trade or oppressive conduct that extends beyond the confines of the parties’ employment relationship. The court, therefore, finds that the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint fall within the employment relationship and are therefore not actionable under CUTPA. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s complaint is hereby granted.
In finding that the plaintiff’s allegations fall within the parties’ employment relationship, the court does not address the remaining arguments raised by the defendant concerning aggravating circumstances and the statute of limitations.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to strike is granted.