Opinion
SUCV2015-00309-C
10-31-2016
Danielle Youngblood v. City of Boston Public Schools et al No. 135328
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
Peter M. Lauriat, Justice
The plaintiff, Danielle Youngblood (" Youngblood"), brought this action against the defendants, City of Boston Public Schools (" BPS"), BPS Superintendent Tommy Chang (" Chang") and Marco Curnen (" Curnen") (collectively, " the defendants"), seeking damages arising from the defendants' purported retaliation against her in violation of the Massachusetts Fair Employment Practices Act, G.L.c. 151B, § 4. The defendants have now moved to dismiss Youngblood's Amended Complaint pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. (12)(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, the defendants' motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from Youngblood's Amended Complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of deciding the defendants' motion to dismiss.
The Amended Complaint is unclear as to when BPS hired Youngblood, but indicates she has worked for BPS as a middle school English Language Arts (" ELA") instructor since at least the 2007 to 2008 school year, and that she attained " permanent teacher status" in September 2010. For the 2010 to 2011 and 2011 to 2012 school terms, BPS assigned Youngblood to teach at the McKay School in East Boston (the " School") where she reported to Curnen, who was the School's principal.
The Amended Complaint does not explain the significance of this designation, but the court infers that it is akin to tenure.
In December 2010, Youngblood informed Curnen that a student, referred to in the Amended Complaint as John Doe, was sexually harassing her and had given her a note that stated she had " a fat butt." Following John Doe's disciplinary hearing for this incident, Youngblood approached Curnen to suggest the School offer " gender-based learning . . . to provide advisory support to all students to avoid another sexual harassment situation." During this conversation, Youngblood also told Curnen that her male students often asked her questions that were too personal and disregarded her professional role. Curnen responded that the problem " probably [came] from" how Youngblood interacted with her male students.
Other allegations in the Amended Complaint indicate discipline was not handled by Curnen, but the School's assistant principal.
On April 29, 2011, Curnen issued Youngblood a written warning, which she and the Boston Teacher's Union grieved on May 5, 2011. The Amended Complaint does not describe the facts alleged in support of this warning, but Youngblood contends that it was related to " a retaliatory campaign" Curnen had orchestrated against her following her complaint about John Doe.
On June 15, 2011, Youngblood reported to Curnen that a male student, referred to in the Amended Complaint as John Doe #2, had written her a letter threatening an assault and battery on her. Curnen allegedly responded by asking Youngblood why she wanted John Doe #2 to face consequences and telling Youngblood she should handle the situation herself. On an unspecified date following this discussion, but prior to June 23, 2011, Curnen set up a meeting with John Doe #2 and two mediators. The Amended Complaint is unclear as to whether the meeting was in response to the note John Doe #2 gave Youngblood on June 15, 2011; however, during the meeting, one of the mediators asked John Doe #2 whether Youngblood had ever " disrespected him or made him feel unsafe, " John Doe #2 responded, " no, " and stated that he had previously given Youngblood a " hard time" because " she would not allow him to say the N-word in school."
On June 23, 2011, Curnen completed and issued Youngblood's first-term evaluation (" Spring 2011 Evaluation"). The Spring 2011 Evaluation stated that Youngblood had not met BPS standards regarding " safe, respectful, [and] culturally sensitive and responsive learning communities, " and that Youngblood focused " on her personal presence in the classroom as opposed to the relationship between professional and student." Apparently referencing the December 2010 incident with John Doe, Curnen wrote that Youngblood " continue[d] to define one inappropriate and mistaken decision by one student as 'sexual harassment from a student.'" Prior to the Spring 2011 Evaluation, Youngblood's evaluations had consistently ranked her as having " met or exceeded" all BPS expectations. Her students' ELA scores on the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (" MCAS") for the 2010-2011 school year ranked in the eighty-fourth percentile.
In September 2011, Youngblood contacted Curnen about her application to the Performance Review Program for Initial Licensure (" PRPIL"). Youngblood alleges that the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education required her to participate in the PRPIL program, though the precise consequences of a failure to participate are unclear. During their conversation, Curnen agreed to sign the " Principal's Agreement" Youngblood needed to certify she had Curnen's approval to participate in the PRPIL program. Curnen also instructed Youngblood to set up a meeting with him and her prospective mentor.
Though the Amended Complaint does not explicitly say so, the court infers that PRPIL applicants are required to have a mentor to participate in the program.
Youngblood unsuccessfully tried to set up a meeting with Curnen regarding her PRPIL application throughout the rest of September, October, and December 2011. Curnen was never able to confirm a day or time for the PRPIL meeting, but nonetheless continued to initiate meetings with Youngblood to share his observations of her classroom.
Hereinafter, these meetings are referred to as " post-observation meetings."
On Thursday, December 1, 2011, Curnen asked Youngblood to send him certain data about her students, including parent communication logs and writing samples with grading rubrics attached, by the following day. Youngblood told Curnen she would get him the data as soon as possible, but was out sick the following day. When Youngblood returned on Monday, December 5, 2011, Curnen approached Youngblood during her planning period and asked for the data again. Youngblood responded she needed at least one more day " to put together a polished presentation, " but Curnen maintained that he needed the information the same day. When Youngblood presented the information to Curnen in his office at the end of the school day, he handed her a preprinted term evaluation in return (" Fall 2011 Evaluation").
The Fall 2011 Evaluation stated Youngblood had not met BPS standards regarding " equity and high expectations" and " instructional planning and implementation." The Amended Complaint states that Curnen " copied and pasted" prescriptions for improvement, but does not indicate from where the prescriptions were " copied and pasted." When Youngblood told her colleagues about the Fall 2011 Evaluation, they suggested she sign up for a peer assistance program that Curnen had apparently told Youngblood's colleagues about, but had never mentioned to her. Shortly thereafter, Youngblood emailed Curnen and invited him to observe her classroom so that he could see her teaching was in accord with the prescriptions set forth in the Fall 2011 Evaluation, but Curnen did not respond.
During a January 20, 2012 post-observation meeting, Youngblood mentioned a 2011 incident to Curnen where John Doe had written a letter to her that stated, " Ms. Youngblood you got a fat butt. Shhh!!!" Youngblood told Curnen that the note constituted sexual harassment, that she was offended as a woman, and that John Doe's conduct was " hurtful and violating." Curnen agreed that John Doe had engaged in inappropriate conduct, but told Youngblood that the behavior did not constitute sexual harassment. Curnen also told Youngblood that " her primary identity in the classroom was as a teacher, and her identity of 'womanhood' was secondary."
It is unclear when in 2011 this incident occurred, though the underlying allegations are substantially similar to the incident with John Doe in December 2010.
On January 27, 2012, Youngblood informed Curnen that John Doe had told her she had a " Brazilian bubble butt" several times that day. Youngblood alleges she repeatedly, and explicitly stated that she neither felt comfortable nor safe around John Doe, " and " explicitly requested that a meeting take place of only men, where [John Doe] would be provided with a supportive male perspective, who could support that student's understanding of the necessity of healthy gender-based interaction." Curnen never arranged the requested meeting, and allegedly told Youngblood that a representative from the BPS Equity Office would address her concerns about John Doe.
Youngblood avers that this term references a pornographic website.
On January 30, 2012, Youngblood told Curnen that she urgently needed him to sign the Principal's Agreement so she could send in her PRPIL application materials. Curnen signed the agreement, but also noted on the agreement that Youngblood's performance did not currently meet BPS standards. Youngblood submitted her PRPIL application the following day.
At an unspecified time thereafter, Curnen told Youngblood that his most recent evaluation of her " left him with reservations." Youngblood responded that she was working with a " peer assistant" " who had given her valuable feedback and high marks." Youngblood also told Curnen her peer assistant had tried to set up a meeting with him to discuss his or her support for Youngblood's PRPIL application, but Curnen did not respond to the peer assistant's emails until just before the application deadline. Shortly after this conversation, Youngblood spoke to the director of the PRPIL program, who asked Youngblood to ask Curnen to call her to confirm his position on the Principal's Agreement. Youngblood alleges that Curnen ignored the PRPIL director's request. On February 6, 2012, Curnen told Youngblood he had withdrawn his signature from her PRPIL application and accused Youngblood of not making the application a priority.
The Amended Complaint does not allege why Curnen and Youngblood's peer assistant could not set up a meeting at that time.
On February 8, 2012, Curnen initiated and held a disciplinary meeting with Youngblood during which he asserted that Youngblood was using inappropriate language in the classroom. The Amended Complaint states that Curnen initiated a second investigatory disciplinary meeting with Youngblood on an unspecified date thereafter, for reasons that are not clear.
On February 16, 2012, Youngblood filed a complaint against Curnen with the BPS Equity Office alleging sex discrimination, student sexual harassment, and retaliation. On February 29, 2012, an Equity Office representative informed Curnen and his supervisors of Youngblood's complaint. Curnen issued Youngblood a written letter of reprimand the same day.
The Amended Complaint does not indicate whether Curnen learned of Youngblood's complaint before or after he issued the letter of reprimand. The court is nonetheless required to make all reasonable inferences in favor of Youngblood at this stage, and therefore, will presume Curnen learned of Youngblood's complaint before issuing the letter.
On March 8, 2012, the defendants issued Youngblood notice of a disciplinary hearing scheduled for May 9, 2012. The notice stated that on January 27, 2012, the same day that Youngblood complained to Curnen about John Doe sexually harassing her, Youngblood had " addressed students in an unprofessional manner, as well as made inappropriate comments about a district school and its students, e.g., 'English High is not a good school because the girls get pregnant . . .'" On March 12, 2012, Curnen allegedly gave Youngblood a letter for a disciplinary hearing scheduled for March 22, 2012. The basis of this disciplinary hearing is unclear. On March 16, 2012, Curnen issued Youngblood an incomplete, but negative, interim evaluation.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Youngblood filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (" MCAD") on April 18, 2012 and removed her case to the Superior Court on February 2, 2015. Youngblood's February 2, 2015 Complaint set forth claims for sex discrimination, retaliation and hostile work environment against Curnen and BPS.
On April 30, 2015, BPS and Curnen filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, seeking dismissal of the sex discrimination and hostile work environment claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The Partial Motion to Dismiss also sought to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety for misnomer of a party pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(8) because Youngblood had improperly named BPS as " Boston Public Schools a/k/a Boston School Committee ." (Emphasis added.) In response to the Partial Motion to Dismiss, Youngblood voluntarily withdrew her claims for sex discrimination and hostile work environment.
On March 16, 2016, the court dismissed the Complaint in its entirety without prejudice to Youngblood filing an Amended Complaint reciting the facts alleged in support of her retaliation claim " against the proper entities to be sued." Youngblood filed her Amended Complaint on April 19, 2016, and the defendants thereafter filed their present motion to dismiss.
DISCUSSION
Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a plaintiff's complaint may be dismissed as a whole or in part for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In considering a motion to dismiss, this court takes " as true the allegations in the complaint and favorable inferences drawn therefrom." Lipsitt v. Plaud, 466 Mass. 240, 241, 994 N.E.2d 777 (2013).
To survive a motion to dismiss, " a complaint . . . does not need detailed factual allegations, " but " requires more than labels and conclusions, " and must contain " allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) an entitlement to relief." Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636, 888 N.E.2d 879 (2008), quoting Bell A. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
I.
The defendants first argue that Youngblood's retaliation claim is barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in G.L.c. 151B, § 9. In support, the defendants argue the court extinguished Youngblood's action in its entirety when it allowed the defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss, and as a result, the Amended Complaint does not relate back to the date of filing of the original complaint. See Mass.R.Civ.P. 15(c). According to the defendants, the statute of limitations has expired on Youngblood's retaliation claim because it accrued before April 19, 2013, viz., more than three years before Youngblood filed her Amended Complaint on April 19, 2016.
The defendants' statute of limitations argument is based on an incorrect reading of the March 15, 2016 hearing transcript and the March 2016 Order. In particular, the defendants contend that the March 2016 Order dismissed Youngblood's action in its entirety because during the March 15, 2016 hearing, Youngblood's counsel never requested leave to file an amended complaint and declined the court's offer to allow him to do so.
Youngblood's counsel agreed to file an Amended Complaint at the hearing and the court's March 2016 Order explicitly granted him leave to do so. See Mass.R.Civ.P. 15(a); Bengar v. Clark Equip. Co., 401 Mass. 554, 556, 517 N.E.2d 1286 (1988) (" Massachusetts has long had a liberal policy allowing amendments which add or substitute parties after the statute of limitations has expired"); Doherty v. Admiral's Flagship Condo. Trust, 80 Mass.App.Ct. 104, 112, 951 N.E.2d 936 (2011) (" [F]ollowing the entry of an order of dismissal, a pleading may be amended with leave of court and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires") (quotation omitted).
In light of the defendants' argument that it " would be unfairly prejudicial" to allow Youngblood's claim to proceed, it is worth noting that during the March 15, 2016 hearing, the defendants' counsel stated that she would not argue against allowing Youngblood to file an amended complaint " since that's proper course and [she was] trying to be practical . . ."
Rule 15(c) provides that whenever a " claim or defense asserted in [an] amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment (including an amendment changing a party) relates back to the original pleading." Here, Youngblood's Amended Complaint sets forth allegations that are nearly identical to those set forth in the original Complaint. Therefore, the Amended Complaint relates back to the original Complaint, which was filed on February 2, 2015.
The defendants additionally contend that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed for failure to comply with the court's order " to file an amended complaint within 30 days, along with an accompanying motion for same unless the Defendant City of Boston waived requirements under 9A." As stated in the court's April 19, 2016 order on Youngblood's Emergency Motion to Extend Time to File Amended Complaint, the March 2016 Order " did not require compliance with Rule 9A, but rather assumed that if the defendants assert that the amended complaint should be tested via a Rule 12 motion, that they would serve and file such a motion pursuant to Rule 9A."
Though some of Youngblood's allegations involve acts of discrimination that occurred prior to February 2, 2012 (three years prior to filing the Complaint), " the fact that the limitations period has run on earlier instances of [retaliation] does not make those events irrelevant." Crocker v. Townsend Oil Co., 464 Mass. 1, 11 n.12, 979 N.E.2d 1077 (2012), citing Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 441 Mass. 632, 647, 808 N.E.2d 257 (2004). " Instead, those events may be used as background evidence to support a plaintiff's claims for damages arising out of events that remain within the statute of limitations." Id. Accordingly, the court will consider all of the allegations in the Amended Complaint in evaluating the defendants' alternative argument that Youngblood has failed to make out a prima facie case for retaliation arising from events within the limitations period.
II.
To survive the defendants' Motion to Dismiss her retaliation claim, Youngblood must show that she: (1) engaged in protected conduct; (2) suffered an adverse action; " and [3] that 'a causal connection existed between the protected conduct and the adverse action.'" Mole v. University of Massachusetts, 442 Mass. 582, 591-92, 814 N.E.2d 329 (2004), citing Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 827 (1st Cir. 1991).
As stated, the first prong of the analysis requires Youngblood to show that she engaged in protected conduct. Protected conduct may include filing a formal complaint of sexual harassment, " complaining to management or filing an internal complaint of harassment, or meeting with co-workers to discuss how to stop sexual harassment in the workplace." Ritchie v. Department of State Police, 60 Mass.App.Ct. 655, 664, 805 N.E.2d 54 (2004) (quotation omitted). Here, Youngblood has alleged she engaged in protected conduct when she complained about John Doe sexually harassing her and asked Curnen to take specific action to counteract sexual harassment at the School in December 2010 and on January 20 and 27, 2012. Youngblood also engaged in protected conduct on February 16, 2012, when she filed a complaint against Curnen with the BPS Equity Office.
Youngblood must next demonstrate that she suffered an adverse action. The defendants argue that Youngblood has failed to do so because " she has not alleged to have been fired, demoted, lost wages or salary, been denied benefits or transferred." This argument is unpersuasive. In addition to the consequences cited by the defendants, an adverse action may refer to " effects on working terms, conditions, or privileges that are material . . ." King v. Boston, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 460, 468, 883 N.E.2d 316 (2008). " Material disadvantage for this purpose arises when objective aspects of the work environment are affected. There must be 'real harm'; 'subjective feelings of disappointment and disillusionment' will not suffice." Id., citing MacCormack v. Boston Edison Co., 423 Mass. 652, 663-64, 672 N.E.2d 1 (1996).
Youngblood has alleged she suffered an adverse employment action when Curnen withdrew his support for her PRPIL application on February 6, 2012. Though the defendants characterize the PRPIL program as " optional" and contend that it is merely a " privilege, " at this stage the court is required to take as true Youngblood's assertion that participation in the program is a job requirement. If the program is required, it is reasonable to infer that Youngblood's inability to participate materially disadvantaged her employment. Youngblood has also alleged she suffered adverse employment actions when Curnen took disciplinary action against her on February 29 and March 2, 2012, and issued her a negative interim evaluation on March 16, 2012. See Ritchie, 60 Mass.App.Ct. at 665 (allegations defendants misused and improperly issued employee observation reports and evaluations were sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss retaliation claim). The Amended Complaint thus sets forth sufficient allegations to establish Youngblood suffered an adverse employment action. See King, 71 Mass.App.Ct. at 470 (whether an aspect of employment " is sufficiently material to that employment to be the subject of an adverse employment action" cannot always be determined as a matter of law).
The final element of Youngblood's prima facie case requires her to establish a causal connection between her protected conduct and the adverse employment action. The defendants argue that Youngblood has failed to do so because the defendants had noted problems with her performance long before they were aware Youngblood had engaged in any protected activity. See Mole, 442 Mass. at 594 (" [W]here . . . adverse employment actions or other problems with an employee predate any knowledge that the employee has engaged in protected activity, it is not permissible to draw the inference that subsequent adverse actions, taken after the employer acquires such knowledge, are motivated by retaliation").
Though it may be true that Curnen withdrew his support for Youngblood's PRPIL application due to concerns about her performance, the Amended Complaint sets forth numerous allegations that suggest Youngblood's 2011 performance evaluations may have been completed before Curnen had sufficient data to properly assess Youngblood's competency as an instructor, and that Youngblood's performance actually met BPS standards. See Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 684, 46 N.E.3d 24 (2016) (evidence of satisfactory performance may show defendant's reason for adverse employment decision was pretextual).
Youngblood first engaged in protected conduct in December 2010 when she complained to Curnen about John Doe sexually harassing her and asked Curnen to implement measures, such as " gender-based learning, " to prevent further harassment. Immediately following that incident, it appears Curnen " may have judged her through the lens of a stereotype, " allegedly telling Youngblood that her own conduct probably invited the harassment. See Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C., 474 Mass. 382, 407, 50 N.E.3d 778 (2016). See also In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 428 A.2d 126, 138-39 (Pa. 1981) (discussing cultural myth that women invite sexual assault). Four months later, Curnen allegedly initiated unwarranted disciplinary action against Youngblood, and when it came time for her Spring 2011 Evaluation, Curnen purportedly cited Youngblood's refusal to concede that John Doe had not sexually harassed her to justify, in part, why her performance did not meet BPS standards. See Verdrager, 474 Mass. at 399 (evidence defendant " attempted to undermine the plaintiff after she complained about his behavior" may support an inference " that the plaintiff's perceived performance deficiencies resulted in part from [the defendant's] animus rather than from innate inadequacy"). Youngblood had difficulties setting up meetings with Curnen throughout the remainder of 2011, and learned that he did not refer Youngblood to the teacher assistance program that he had recommended to Youngblood's similarly situated colleagues.
Curnen ultimately withdrew his support for Youngblood's PRPIL application just over a week after Youngblood spoke with him about sexual harassment again on January 20 and 27, 2012, at which time Curnen allegedly declined to address Youngblood's concerns and refused to label John Doe's conduct as " sexual harassment." Curnen initiated disciplinary action against Youngblood just two days later, and took further action to discipline Youngblood on the same day he learned she made a complaint about him to the BPS Equity Office. The February and March 2012 disciplinary actions accuse Youngblood of lacking professionalism and allegedly making inappropriate comments in her classroom on January 27, the same day Youngblood complained to Curnen about sexual harassment. See Ritchie, 60 Mass.App.Ct. at 666 (" Close temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse employment action permits an inference of the causal nexus necessary for a finding of retaliation") (quotation omitted).
" From this evidence, a jury could, but need not, infer that a pattern of retaliatory conduct [began] soon after" Youngblood first engaged in protected activity, " and only culminate[d] later in actual adverse action." Verdrager, 474 Mass. at 407, citing Mole, 442 Mass. at 596. Recently, in Verdrager, the Supreme Judicial Court found that criticisms the plaintiff's superiors had made " reflecting stereotypical thinking" about women, " may lend support to the contention that the adverse employment action was made on an impermissible basis." 474 Mass. at 399-400, citing Bulwer, 473 Mass. at 686. One of those criticisms, which asserted that the plaintiff was less concerned about professional development than she was about pursuing a discrimination claim, is reminiscent of Curnen's alleged reminder to Youngblood on January 20, 2012 that her identity as a woman was " secondary" to her identity as a teacher. Verdrager, 474 Mass. at 400. While this comment is open to different interpretations, one such interpretation is that Curnen resented Youngblood's efforts to punish John Doe for the purported sexual harassment and to implement gender-based learning to prevent future sexual harassment.
For these reasons, the court concludes that Youngblood has alleged sufficient fact to establish a prima facie case for retaliation and the defendants' motion to dismiss must be denied.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED .