Opinion
[P.C. No. 31, September Term, 1959.]
Decided November 23, 1959.
POST CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT — Counsel — Lack Of — No Showing Of Element Of Unfairness As Result Of. The Court found no cause in this post conviction case for reviewing the finding below that the petitioner had not met the burden of showing that, as a result of his not being represented by counsel, some element of unfairness operated actively in the processes which resulted in his confinement. p. 585
POST CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT — Application For Leave To Appeal — Additional Question Raised On, Not Before Court — Claim Of Excessive Sentence, No Merit To. An additional question raised on an application for leave to appeal in a post conviction proceeding is not properly before the Court of Appeals. Moreover, even if reviewable, the contention as to an excessive sentence was not sound in this case, since the sentence did not exceed the statutory limit for the offense of which the petitioner was convicted. p. 586
J.E.B.
Decided November 23, 1959.
Walter S. Young instituted a proceeding under the Post Conviction Procedure Act, and from a denial of relief, he applied for leave to appeal.
Application denied.
Before BRUNE, C.J., and HENDERSON, HAMMOND, PRESCOTT and HORNEY, JJ.
The applicant contended that the fact that he was denied counsel at his original trial amounted to a denial of due process. Judge Sodaro, after a hearing at which the appellant testified with regard to this contention, found that the applicant had not met the burden of showing that, as a result of his not being represented by counsel, some element of unfairness operated actively in the processes which resulted in his confinement. No sufficient reason has been advanced to show that this finding may have been erroneous, and we therefore see no cause for reviewing it. We also think that all other points raised by the applicant in the court below were there correctly decided by Judge Sodaro.
The applicant has sought to raise an additional question on appeal. It is not properly before us. Even if reviewable, it does not seem to present a sound contention. The applicant contends that his sentence of two years exceeds the limit of eighteen months provided by one of the larceny statutes (now Code (1957), Art. 27, § 342). Young was convicted on a charge of burglary. His sentence did not exceed the statutory limit for the offense of which he was convicted.
Application denied.