In return for protection from large jury awards for pain and suffering, employers provide workers with a form of "no fault" insurance. The Board, therefore, rejected the employer's "fault based" argument that it should not be liable for medical expenses that were related to disability which predated the October, 1989, incident and which the ALJ had ruled was noncompensable, citing Haycraft, supra; Young v. Terwort, Ky.App., 459 S.W.2d 136 (1970); and Daugherty v. Watts, supra. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Board and adopted its opinion in full, citing Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685 (1992).
Having concluded that the ALJ's findings were supported by substantial evidence, we will now consider Addington's argument that as a matter of law it is not responsible for the medical expenses arising out of the 1995 incident. This argument must be rejected based upon the plain wording of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 342.020. Young v. Terwort, Ky., 459 S.W.2d 136 (1970). KRS 342.020 (1) states in pertinent part as follows: "[T]he employer shall pay for the cure and relief from the effects of an injury . . . as may reasonably be required at the time of the injury and thereafter during disability[.
The court relied on the fact that KRS 342.020, which authorizes payment for medical expenses, provides no exemption in the case of medical bills due to either prior active disability or preexisting, dormant disability. See also Young v. Terwort, Ky., 459 S.W.2d 136 (1970). As the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence and the Board did not misconstrue controlling statutes or precedent, or commit an error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice, its decision is affirmed.
on the employer. This language has been construed as requiring the employer to bear all medical costs resulting from a work-related injury sustained by an employee, even in situations such as this where all liability for an award is assessed against the Special Fund. Young v. Terwort, Ky., 459 S.W.2d 136 (1970). Indeed, in every case cited to us in which the question of the Special Fund's liability for medical expenses has been raised, our courts have held that KRS 342.020 imposes such liability on the employer, not the Special Fund. Pierce v. Russell Sportswear Corporation, Ky.App., 586 S.W.2d 301 (1979); Proven Products Sales Service v. Crutcher, Ky., 464 S.W.2d 800 (1971); Young v. Terwort, supra.
Answering the questions in reverse order, it has been clearly established that the Special Fund has no liability for medical expense. Young v. Terwort, Ky., 459 S.W.2d 136 (1970), and Proven Products Sales Service v. Crutcher, Ky., 464 S.W.2d 800 (1971). Considering the first question, the Court is puzzled by the procedure utilized by the appellant in seeking to enforce the award.
The employer contends that it cannot be held liable to pay medical benefits in this situation where the employe's disability is attributable solely to the arousal into disabling reality of a preexisting non-disabling disease condition. The same contention was rejected in Young v. Terwort, Ky., 459 S.W.2d 136, to which we adhere. The employer also makes the same argument here as it made concerning compensation for temporary total disability — that the employe should be barred of benefits because of his alleged failure to follow medical advice.