In fact, except for the excessive speed, it would appear that the dangerous situation would not have existed, for the driver of the car rear-ended testified that he was proceeding at the maximum authorized rate of speed, 55 mph. No one is entitled to relief from the consequences of neglecting to exercise ordinary care for his own protection and safety because failure to do so arose from an emergency brought about by his own act in voluntarily placing himself in a situation of peril. Briscoe v. Southern R. Co., 103 Ga. 224 ( 28 S.E. 638); Raybon v. Reimers, 138 Ga. App. 511, 512 ( 226 S.E.2d 620); Young v. Tate, 112 Ga. App. 603 ( 145 S.E.2d 747). This enumeration is without merit. 2.
The jury was properly charged on proximate cause and foreseeability and these issues are always for jury resolution except in those rare cases in which reasonable minds cannot disagree. See Young v. Tate, 112 Ga. App. 603 ( 145 S.E.2d 747) (1965). Furthermore, the issue here is not whether injury to this particular plaintiff was reasonably to be anticipated, but whether licensees and trespassers in general could reasonably be expected to be within the range of danger from the unguarded machinery and whether the appellant took reasonable steps to prevent such injury. "Upon the principle that persons are responsible for the usual and natural results of their acts, one may be liable for an injury resulting from his negligence although he could not reasonably have anticipated the particular injury inflicted, or that the particular person would be injured. Mitchell v. J. S. Schofield's Sons Co., 16 Ga. App. 686 ( 85 S.E. 978)."
A jury might well find in the circumstances of this case that, had the proper equipment been more accessible, and therefore more visible, the defendant would have thought to use it, and the decedent's drowning would have been averted. "Where the minds of reasonable men may disagree as to whether an act alleged to be negligence is in fact negligence, and where reasonable minds may disagree as to whether the negligent acts were the proximate cause of an injury, these questions should go to a jury for decision. Young v. Tate, 112 Ga. App. 603 ( 145 S.E.2d 747). `Questions as to diligence, negligence and proximate cause will not be decided by the courts as a matter of law except in clear and indisputable cases.' Hargrove v. Tanner, 98 Ga. App. 16 ( 104 S.E.2d 665)." Trotter v. Peet, 135 Ga. App. 580, 582 ( 218 S.E.2d 295) (1975).
Of course, "No one is entitled to relief from the consequences of neglecting to exercise ordinary care for his own protection and safety because failure to do so arose from an emergency brought about by his own act in voluntarily placing himself in a situation of peril." Briscoe v. Southern R. Co., 103 Ga. 224 ( 28 S.E. 638); Young v. Tate, 112 Ga. App. 603 ( 145 S.E.2d 747). In this case, however, the evidence is in conflict as to whether defendant exercised a reasonable standard of care prior to the collision.
"It is generally a question for a fact-finding body to determine questions of negligence and whose negligence and what negligence involved is the sole proximate cause of the injury. It is only where the negligent conduct alleged is susceptible of but one inference that it becomes a question of law for the court to determine." Smith v. American Oil Co., 77 Ga. App. 463, 491 ( 49 S.E.2d 90). Where the minds of reasonable men may disagree as to whether an act alleged to be negligence is in fact negligence, and where reasonable minds may disagree as to whether the negligent acts were the proximate cause of an injury, these questions should go to a jury for decision. Young v. Tate, 112 Ga. App. 603 ( 145 S.E.2d 747). "Questions as to diligence, negligence and proximate cause will not be decided by the courts as a matter of law except in clear and indisputable cases." Hargrove v. Tanner, 98 Ga. App. 16 ( 104 S.E.2d 665).
While the plaintiff may well have used this doctrine to justify its acts in reacting to the presence of the metal object flung in its path, the defendant-driver could not utilize this rule, since his negligent activity had been previously commenced. See Clackler v. Barnwell, 83 Ga. App. 515 ( 64 S.E.2d 384); Young v. Tate, 112 Ga. App. 603 ( 145 S.E.2d 747). Since the evidence unequivocally showed defendant-driver to be negligent and since none of the defenses offered raised a genuine issue of fact, we hold that the trial court's grant of plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict on the issue of liability was proper.
The charge contained correct principles of law. See Young v. Tate, 112 Ga. App. 603, 606 ( 145 S.E.2d 747); Ware v. Alston, 112 Ga. App. 627, 630 ( 145 S.E.2d 721). Moreover, the objection interposed was, in essence, that the charge did not delineate the fact the defendant was not "charged with the same care that an ordinary, prudent person would be charged with if the emergency had not been created." The charge contained explicit language to that effect and was not error for the reason assigned.
We are of the opinion that it did not. Whether the defendant's actions of throwing up her hands and screaming when confronted with an approaching truck in her line of traffic was the result of an emergency situation and excused her from being charged with gross negligence, was a question of fact and one for the jury. Shockey v. Baker, 212 Ga. 106, 110-111 ( 90 S.E.2d 654); Fetzer v. Rampley, 81 Ga. App. 806, 809 ( 60 S.E.2d 184); Ware v. Alston, 112 Ga. App. 627, 630 ( 145 S.E.2d 721); Young v. Tate, 112 Ga. App. 603, 606 ( 145 S.E.2d 747). This court cannot hold as a matter of law that the defendant's actions of throwing up her hands screaming demanded a finding that she exercised slight care. Judgment reversed for the reasons stated in Division 1. Bell, P. J., Jordan, P. J., Hall, Pannell, Deen, Quillian and Whitman, JJ., concur.
" Sarno v. Hoffman, 110 Ga. App. 164, 167 ( 138 S.E.2d 96). Applying these principles with respect to the allegations that these defendants failed to control the movements and speed of their vehicle so as to avoid the collision, we are of the opinion that the trial court did not err in overruling their general demurrers. Brown v. Johnson, 111 Ga. App. 376 ( 141 S.E.2d 791); Young v. Tate, 112 Ga. App. 603, 606 ( 145 S.E.2d 747); Ware v. Alston, 112 Ga. App. 627, 630 ( 145 S.E.2d 721). 2.