Opinion
No. 4-865 / 04-0280
Filed January 13, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert J. Blink, Judge.
An applicant for postconviction relief challenges the sentencing court's refusal to reduce his sentence pursuant to Iowa Code section 901.10(2) (1999), alleging defects in the sentencing procedure. AFFIRMED.
Susan R. Stockdale, Ames, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and Jaki Livingston, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Dennis Young pled guilty to several crimes. He was sentenced to prison. Young later applied for postconviction relief, challenging the sentencing court's refusal to reduce his mandatory minimum sentence based on his entry of a guilty plea. Iowa Code § 901.10(2) (1999). The district court denied the application and this appeal followed.
As a preliminary matter, we must address the State's argument that Young waived error by failing to raise his sentencing challenge on direct appeal. See Iowa Code § 822.8 (stating applicant may not, as a general rule, raise an issue in a postconviction relief proceeding that was not raised on direct appeal). The State did not raise this waiver argument before the district court. See DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 63 (Iowa 2002) (binding State to error preservation rule). Although the prosecutor indicated a readiness to make an argument that may have been along these lines, she did not in fact do so, electing instead to proceed to arguments on the merits of the postconviction relief application. We conclude error was not preserved.
Proceeding to the merits, we review the district court's postconviction relief ruling for the correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. That ruling turns entirely on the adequacy of the sentencing court's ruling.
Young concedes the sentencing court provided "minimally adequate" reasons for the sentence it actually imposed. Cf. State v. Johnson, 445 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Iowa 1989) (stating "terse and succinct" reason for imposing a particular sentence is permissible). He also concedes a sentencing court is generally not required to provide reasons for rejecting particular sentencing options. See State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 1996). He contends the sentencing court did not provide a record from which to "determine the basis for the sentencing court's exercise of its discretion," an omission that he claims amounts to a "defective sentencing procedure." He also contends the rule that a sentencing court need not provide reasons for rejecting sentencing options "should not apply to the present case" because there was "vigorous argument" concerning the rejected sentencing option contained in Iowa Code section 901.10(2).
With respect to Young's first argument, it is clear that when a sentencing judge has discretion, it must exercise that discretion. State v. Ayers, 590 N.W.2d 25, 27 (Iowa 1999). A failure to exercise discretion amounts to a defective sentencing procedure. Id. The sentencing judge recognized he had discretion to reduce Young's mandatory minimum sentence based on his entry of a guilty plea. The judge exercised this discretion, stating "the court in its discretion will not be reducing the mandatory minimum under Iowa Code section 901.10 by virtue of the defendant's guilty plea." Therefore, the sentencing procedure used by the court was not defective.
As for Young's second argument, even if the sentencing judge was required to provide a reason for rejecting the sentencing option set forth in Iowa Code section 901.10(2), the court did so. First, the judge explained he was declining to reduce Young's mandatory minimum sentences under another statute because of the absence of mitigating factors. Then, he stated, " likewise, the court in its discretion will not be reducing the mandatory minimum under Iowa Code section 901.10 by virtue of the defendant's guilty plea." (Emphasis added). When this statement is read in context, it is clear that the sentencing judge declined to apply section 901.10(2) in part due to the absence of mitigating factors. This was a non-arbitrary reason.
We discern no error in the sentencing court's ruling and, consequently, no error in the postconviction court's denial of Young's application for relief.