Young v. State

42 Citing cases

  1. Grant v. State

    770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000)   Cited 298 times
    Holding that a sentence with a mandatory minimum under the PRR statute and longer concurrent sentence under the HVFO statute does not violate double jeopardy

    Here, as observed by the Second District in the decision below, all of the provisions of chapter 97-239, Laws of Florida (which created the Act) pertain to reoffenders. Accord Jackson v. State, 744 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Where, as here, there is a logical nexus between the statute's various provisions, the single subject requirement of the Florida Constitution has not been violated.

  2. Grant v. State

    745 So. 2d 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 62 times
    In Grant, this court held the Act constitutional based on challenges against single subject, separation of powers, cruel and unusual punishment, vagueness, due process, equal protection, and ex post facto violations.

    However, the First, Fifth, and Fourth Districts have rejected this argument as it relates to the Act. See Durden v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2050, D2050 (Fla. 1st DCA Sept. 1, 1999); Lawton v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1940, D1940 (Fla. 5th DCA Aug. 20, 1999); Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010, 1011-12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), review denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999). The Fourth District has provided the following analysis:

  3. Adams v. State

    750 So. 2d 659 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 44 times
    Holding sentence as both prison releasee reoffender and habitual felony offender violates double jeopardy

    We affirm as to all other issues, including the challenge to the constitutionality of the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, which we have previously addressed. See Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), rev. denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999). Conviction affirmed; sentence reversed and remanded for vacation of the Prison Releasee Reoffender sentence.

  4. Rollinson v. State

    743 So. 2d 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 41 times
    Holding that the Act does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, the single subject requirement, substantive due process, procedural due process, or the equal protection clause

    Williams v. State, 729 So.2d 1005, 1006 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). This court has previously held that the Act does not violate the single subject requirement of Article III. See Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), rev. denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999). IV SEPARATION OF POWERS

  5. Walls v. State

    765 So. 2d 733 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 33 times
    In Walls v. State, 2000 WL 627661 (Fla. 1st DCA May 17, 2000), the trial court imposed a sentence of life under both PRR and HFO.

    Appellant's contention that section 775.082(8) violates the single subject provision of the Florida Constitution has likewise been rejected. See Jackson v. State, 744 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1st DCA), review granted, No. 96,308 (Fla. Dec. 15, 1999); Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), review denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999). As for appellant's double jeopardy argument, we decline to reach this point for the reasons stated below.

  6. Jackson v. State

    744 So. 2d 466 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 20 times
    Holding single subject rule not violated

    We find that this act does not violate the single subject requirement of the Florida Constitution because each section of chapter 97-239, Laws of Florida, deals with reoffenders and does not accomplish separate and disassociated objects of legislative effort. See Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010, 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). AFFIRMED.

  7. Chambers v. State

    752 So. 2d 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 18 times
    Rejecting ex post facto argument where Act applied to criminal conduct which occurred after the effective date of the Act

    However, we certify the question of great public importance previously certified by this court in Woods v. State, 740 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA), review granted, 740 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1999). Appellant's argument that the prison releasee reoffender act violates the single subject requirement of the Florida Constitution has been decided adversely to his position by this court and the Second and Fourth District Courts of Appeal.See Jackson v. State, 744 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1st DCA), review granted, (Fla. Dec. 15, 1999) (No. 96,308); Grant v. State, 745 So.2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); State v. Eckford, 725 So.2d 427 (Fla. 4th DCA), review dismissed, 732 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1999); Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010, 1011-12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), review denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999). In Jackson, this court held:

  8. Philmore v. State

    760 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 12 times
    In Philmore v. State, 760 So.2d 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), this court held that PRR sentences may not be imposed consecutively for offenses arising out of the same criminal episode.

    We affirm the trial court's denial of Philmore's motion to suppress and affirm his sentences under section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), which this court has found to be constitutional. See Smith v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2393 (Fla. 4th DCA Oct. 20, 1999); Adams v. State, 750 So.2d 659 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Rollinson v. State, 743 So.2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), review granted, No. SC96713 (Fla. Apr. 12, 2000); Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), review denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999). On his two convictions Philmore was sentenced under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act to two life terms to run consecutively.

  9. Nash v. State

    766 So. 2d 310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 8 times
    Finding a battery existed when defendant touched the victim's closely held purse against her will

    Malczewski v. State, 444 So.2d 1096, 1099 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Because the recited evidence would support the reasonable inference that appellant intentionally touched the victim's closely held purse against her will, the court properly denied appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal. Appellant also contends, as he did at sentencing, that the Act creating enhanced punishment for a prison releasee reoffender under section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), violates the single subject requirement of article III, section 6, of the Florida Constitution. He nonetheless acknowledges that this Court has upheld the constitutionality of the Act against a similar charge in Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), rev. denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999). See also State v. Eckford, 725 So.2d 427 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. dismissed, 732 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1999).

  10. Jennings v. State

    744 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 8 times
    Finding that defense counsel's failure to offer a specific objection to evidence admitted after the court receded from a previously granted order in limine waived the issue for review

    We previously addressed and rejected appellant's arguments that the Act violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws and the single-subject rule. See Plain v. State, 720 So.2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), rev. denied, 727 So.2d 909 (Fla. 1999); Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), rev. denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999). After careful consideration, we likewise reject appellant's argument that the Act (1) violates the separation of powers doctrine because it infringes upon the prosecutor's power to plea bargain with a defendant; (2) violates the right to equal protection because the Act applies only to offenders released from state prison within three years prior to committing an enumerated offense; (3) constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; (4) violates procedural due process because the exceptions are void for vagueness; and (5) violates substantive due process.