See Rollinson v. State, 743 So.2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), review granted, No. SC96713 (Fla. Apr. 12, 2000). Wencel also raises issues of the constitutionality of the Prison Release Reoffender Act. He asserts the act violates the ex post facto rule, an argument previously rejected by this court in Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), review denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999), and most recently in Rollinson v. State, 743 So.2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). His arguments on substantive due process, and cruel and unusual punishment have also been rejected in prior cases. See Edwards v. State, 753 So.2d 578 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Jennings v. State, 744 So.2d 1126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Rollinson, 743 So.2d at 588-89.
Id. at 586. In Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998),review denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999), the court rejected a claim that the Act did not apply to those inmates released prior to the Act's effective date. The court noted that al though section 944.705(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), requires the Department of Corrections to give notice of the Act, a separate provision, section 944.705(6)(b), allowed a trial court to impose an enhanced sentence under the Act regardless of whether this notice was given. Reading these two provisions together, the court concluded that the Act was intended to apply to those released from prison prior to the Act who had committed new crimes after the Act.
Id. at 586. In Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998),review denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999), the court rejected a claim that the Act did not apply to those inmates released prior to the Act's effective date. The court noted that although section 944.705(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), requires the Department of Corrections to give notice of the Act, a separate provision, section 944.705(6)(b), allowed a trial court to impose an enhanced sentence under the Act regardless of whether this notice was given. Reading these two provisions together, the court concluded that the Act was intended to apply to those released from prison prior to the Act who had committed new crimes after the Act.
However, the First, Fifth, and Fourth Districts have rejected this argument as it relates to the Act. See Durden v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2050, D2050 (Fla. 1st DCA Sept. 1, 1999); Lawton v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1940, D1940 (Fla. 5th DCA Aug. 20, 1999); Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010, 1011-12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), review denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999). The Fourth District has provided the following analysis:
We previously addressed and rejected appellant's arguments that the Act violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws and the single-subject rule. See Plain v. State, 720 So.2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), rev. denied, 727 So.2d 909 (Fla. 1999); Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), rev. denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999). After careful consideration, we likewise reject appellant's argument that the Act (1) violates the separation of powers doctrine because it infringes upon the prosecutor's power to plea bargain with a defendant; (2) violates the right to equal protection because the Act applies only to offenders released from state prison within three years prior to committing an enumerated offense; (3) constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; (4) violates procedural due process because the exceptions are void for vagueness; and (5) violates substantive due process.
Williams v. State, 729 So.2d 1005, 1006 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). This court has previously held that the Act does not violate the single subject requirement of Article III. See Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), rev. denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999). IV SEPARATION OF POWERS