Young v. State

6 Citing cases

  1. Wencel v. State

    768 So. 2d 494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that under the Prisoner Releasee Reoffender Act, the State must only prove that the defendant and the releasee identified by the Florida Department of Corrections are one and the same person by the preponderance of the evidence and that it may do so through photographic evidence

    See Rollinson v. State, 743 So.2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), review granted, No. SC96713 (Fla. Apr. 12, 2000). Wencel also raises issues of the constitutionality of the Prison Release Reoffender Act. He asserts the act violates the ex post facto rule, an argument previously rejected by this court in Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), review denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999), and most recently in Rollinson v. State, 743 So.2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). His arguments on substantive due process, and cruel and unusual punishment have also been rejected in prior cases. See Edwards v. State, 753 So.2d 578 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Jennings v. State, 744 So.2d 1126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Rollinson, 743 So.2d at 588-89.

  2. Nelson v. State

    761 So. 2d 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 4 times

    Id. at 586. In Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998),review denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999), the court rejected a claim that the Act did not apply to those inmates released prior to the Act's effective date. The court noted that al though section 944.705(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), requires the Department of Corrections to give notice of the Act, a separate provision, section 944.705(6)(b), allowed a trial court to impose an enhanced sentence under the Act regardless of whether this notice was given. Reading these two provisions together, the court concluded that the Act was intended to apply to those released from prison prior to the Act who had committed new crimes after the Act.

  3. Nelson v. State

    No. 2D98-3855 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2000)

    Id. at 586. In Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998),review denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999), the court rejected a claim that the Act did not apply to those inmates released prior to the Act's effective date. The court noted that although section 944.705(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), requires the Department of Corrections to give notice of the Act, a separate provision, section 944.705(6)(b), allowed a trial court to impose an enhanced sentence under the Act regardless of whether this notice was given. Reading these two provisions together, the court concluded that the Act was intended to apply to those released from prison prior to the Act who had committed new crimes after the Act.

  4. Grant v. State

    745 So. 2d 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 62 times
    In Grant, this court held the Act constitutional based on challenges against single subject, separation of powers, cruel and unusual punishment, vagueness, due process, equal protection, and ex post facto violations.

    However, the First, Fifth, and Fourth Districts have rejected this argument as it relates to the Act. See Durden v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2050, D2050 (Fla. 1st DCA Sept. 1, 1999); Lawton v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1940, D1940 (Fla. 5th DCA Aug. 20, 1999); Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010, 1011-12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), review denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999). The Fourth District has provided the following analysis:

  5. Jennings v. State

    744 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 8 times
    Finding that defense counsel's failure to offer a specific objection to evidence admitted after the court receded from a previously granted order in limine waived the issue for review

    We previously addressed and rejected appellant's arguments that the Act violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws and the single-subject rule. See Plain v. State, 720 So.2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), rev. denied, 727 So.2d 909 (Fla. 1999); Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), rev. denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999). After careful consideration, we likewise reject appellant's argument that the Act (1) violates the separation of powers doctrine because it infringes upon the prosecutor's power to plea bargain with a defendant; (2) violates the right to equal protection because the Act applies only to offenders released from state prison within three years prior to committing an enumerated offense; (3) constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; (4) violates procedural due process because the exceptions are void for vagueness; and (5) violates substantive due process.

  6. Rollinson v. State

    743 So. 2d 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 41 times
    Holding that the Act does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, the single subject requirement, substantive due process, procedural due process, or the equal protection clause

    Williams v. State, 729 So.2d 1005, 1006 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). This court has previously held that the Act does not violate the single subject requirement of Article III. See Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), rev. denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999). IV SEPARATION OF POWERS