Young v. State

6 Citing cases

  1. Grant v. State

    770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000)   Cited 298 times
    Holding that a sentence with a mandatory minimum under the PRR statute and longer concurrent sentence under the HVFO statute does not violate double jeopardy

    Here, as observed by the Second District in the decision below, all of the provisions of chapter 97-239, Laws of Florida (which created the Act) pertain to reoffenders. Accord Jackson v. State, 744 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Where, as here, there is a logical nexus between the statute's various provisions, the single subject requirement of the Florida Constitution has not been violated.

  2. Nelson v. State

    761 So. 2d 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 4 times

    Id. at 586. In Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998),review denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999), the court rejected a claim that the Act did not apply to those inmates released prior to the Act's effective date. The court noted that al though section 944.705(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), requires the Department of Corrections to give notice of the Act, a separate provision, section 944.705(6)(b), allowed a trial court to impose an enhanced sentence under the Act regardless of whether this notice was given. Reading these two provisions together, the court concluded that the Act was intended to apply to those released from prison prior to the Act who had committed new crimes after the Act.

  3. Palmore v. State

    790 So. 2d 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 3 times
    Reversing HFO sentence where defendant sentenced as PRR to life and HFO statute does not authorize sentence longer than life

    See Ch. 97-239, § 7, at 4404, Laws of Fla. But he committed robbery with a firearm on January 24, 1998, after the effective date of the act, and is therefore properly subject to the act. See Chambers v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly D387, D388 (Fla. 1st DCA, Feb. 11, 2000); Grant v. State, 745 So.2d 519, 522 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Gonzales v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2356, D2356 (Fla. 3d DCA Oct. 13, 1999); Arnold v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1834, D1835 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug. 4, 1999);Gray v. State, 742 So.2d 805, 806 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Plain v. State, 720 So.2d 585, 586 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), review denied, 727 So.2d 909 (Fla. 1999); Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), review denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999).See also Perkins v. State, 583 So.2d 1103, 1105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). In pronouncing sentence, the trial court committed Mr. Palmore "to the custody of the Department of Corrections to serve a term of life in prison as a prison releasee reoffender and as a violent career criminal."

  4. Nelson v. State

    No. 2D98-3855 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2000)

    Id. at 586. In Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998),review denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999), the court rejected a claim that the Act did not apply to those inmates released prior to the Act's effective date. The court noted that although section 944.705(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), requires the Department of Corrections to give notice of the Act, a separate provision, section 944.705(6)(b), allowed a trial court to impose an enhanced sentence under the Act regardless of whether this notice was given. Reading these two provisions together, the court concluded that the Act was intended to apply to those released from prison prior to the Act who had committed new crimes after the Act.

  5. Grant v. State

    745 So. 2d 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 62 times
    In Grant, this court held the Act constitutional based on challenges against single subject, separation of powers, cruel and unusual punishment, vagueness, due process, equal protection, and ex post facto violations.

    However, the First, Fifth, and Fourth Districts have rejected this argument as it relates to the Act. See Durden v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2050, D2050 (Fla. 1st DCA Sept. 1, 1999); Lawton v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1940, D1940 (Fla. 5th DCA Aug. 20, 1999); Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010, 1011-12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), review denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999). The Fourth District has provided the following analysis:

  6. Rollinson v. State

    743 So. 2d 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 41 times
    Holding that the Act does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, the single subject requirement, substantive due process, procedural due process, or the equal protection clause

    Williams v. State, 729 So.2d 1005, 1006 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). This court has previously held that the Act does not violate the single subject requirement of Article III. See Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), rev. denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999). IV SEPARATION OF POWERS