Young v. State

42 Citing cases

  1. Grant v. State

    770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000)   Cited 298 times
    Holding that a sentence with a mandatory minimum under the PRR statute and longer concurrent sentence under the HVFO statute does not violate double jeopardy

    Here, as observed by the Second District in the decision below, all of the provisions of chapter 97-239, Laws of Florida (which created the Act) pertain to reoffenders. Accord Jackson v. State, 744 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Where, as here, there is a logical nexus between the statute's various provisions, the single subject requirement of the Florida Constitution has not been violated.

  2. Clark v. State

    790 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 2001)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that the offense of resisting an officer with violence is an offense that may qualify a defendant for enhanced penalties as a prison releasee reoffender

    Moreover, the term "any defendant" in the Act is "all-inclusive [and] requir[es] no statutory interpretation." See Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (citing to Owners Ins. Co. v. Conquest, 658 So.2d 928, 929 (Fla. 1995)) Therefore, we determine that Clark's assertion on this issue is unavailing. Clark's related argument, that the Legislature simply did not intend for incarcerated persons to be subject to sentencing under the Act, is similarly unavailing.

  3. State v. Marks

    833 So. 2d 249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 1 times

    See Clark v. State, 790 So.2d 1030, 1032 (Fla. 2001) (stating that "the term `any defendant' in the Act is `all-inclusive [and] require[es] no statutory interpretation.'") (quoting Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (citing Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Conquest, 658 So.2d 928, 929 (Fla. 1995))). Under these rules of construction, "any prosecution for perjury" includes prosecutions for perjury by way of the "principals" statute, section 777.011. Therefore, Drinks's recantation precludes the perjury charges in this case.

  4. Wencel v. State

    768 So. 2d 494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that under the Prisoner Releasee Reoffender Act, the State must only prove that the defendant and the releasee identified by the Florida Department of Corrections are one and the same person by the preponderance of the evidence and that it may do so through photographic evidence

    See Rollinson v. State, 743 So.2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), review granted, No. SC96713 (Fla. Apr. 12, 2000). Wencel also raises issues of the constitutionality of the Prison Release Reoffender Act. He asserts the act violates the ex post facto rule, an argument previously rejected by this court in Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), review denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999), and most recently in Rollinson v. State, 743 So.2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). His arguments on substantive due process, and cruel and unusual punishment have also been rejected in prior cases. See Edwards v. State, 753 So.2d 578 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Jennings v. State, 744 So.2d 1126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Rollinson, 743 So.2d at 588-89.

  5. Harris v. State

    762 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

    We affirm as to all other issues raised, including the challenge to the constitutionality of the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, which have previously been addressed and rejected. See State v. Cotton, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S463 (Fla. June 15, 2000); Edwards v. State, 753 So.2d 578 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); and Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), review denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999). AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

  6. Barge v. State

    763 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 2 times

    Appellant's contention that section 775.082(8) violates the single subject provision of the Florida Constitution has likewise been rejected. See Jackson v. State, 744 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1st DCA), review granted, 749 So.2d 503 (Fla. 1999); Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), review denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999). Appellant's contentions that the Act violates due process and equal protection, is unconstitutionally vague, and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment have also been rejected.

  7. Nelson v. State

    761 So. 2d 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 4 times

    Id. at 586. In Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998),review denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999), the court rejected a claim that the Act did not apply to those inmates released prior to the Act's effective date. The court noted that al though section 944.705(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), requires the Department of Corrections to give notice of the Act, a separate provision, section 944.705(6)(b), allowed a trial court to impose an enhanced sentence under the Act regardless of whether this notice was given. Reading these two provisions together, the court concluded that the Act was intended to apply to those released from prison prior to the Act who had committed new crimes after the Act.

  8. Stanley v. State

    757 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that gun without firing pin was not "weapon" under standard jury instruction because state had not proved it could cause serious injury or death and it was not "used in a manner which would or could cause death or serious bodily injury"

    Stanley also raises a challenge to the constitutionality of the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, section 775.082(8)(a)1., which we have previously affirmed. See Rollinson v. State, 743 So.2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), rev. granted, No. SC 96713 (Fla. Apr. 12, 2000); Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), rev. denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999). However, because of our reversal, appellant will have to be resentenced and the application of the act's provisions reconsidered with respect to a new sentence.

  9. Philmore v. State

    760 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 12 times
    In Philmore v. State, 760 So.2d 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), this court held that PRR sentences may not be imposed consecutively for offenses arising out of the same criminal episode.

    We affirm the trial court's denial of Philmore's motion to suppress and affirm his sentences under section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), which this court has found to be constitutional. See Smith v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2393 (Fla. 4th DCA Oct. 20, 1999); Adams v. State, 750 So.2d 659 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Rollinson v. State, 743 So.2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), review granted, No. SC96713 (Fla. Apr. 12, 2000); Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), review denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999). On his two convictions Philmore was sentenced under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act to two life terms to run consecutively.

  10. Palmore v. State

    790 So. 2d 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 3 times
    Reversing HFO sentence where defendant sentenced as PRR to life and HFO statute does not authorize sentence longer than life

    See Ch. 97-239, ยง 7, at 4404, Laws of Fla. But he committed robbery with a firearm on January 24, 1998, after the effective date of the act, and is therefore properly subject to the act. See Chambers v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly D387, D388 (Fla. 1st DCA, Feb. 11, 2000); Grant v. State, 745 So.2d 519, 522 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Gonzales v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2356, D2356 (Fla. 3d DCA Oct. 13, 1999); Arnold v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1834, D1835 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug. 4, 1999);Gray v. State, 742 So.2d 805, 806 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Plain v. State, 720 So.2d 585, 586 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), review denied, 727 So.2d 909 (Fla. 1999); Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), review denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1999).See also Perkins v. State, 583 So.2d 1103, 1105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). In pronouncing sentence, the trial court committed Mr. Palmore "to the custody of the Department of Corrections to serve a term of life in prison as a prison releasee reoffender and as a violent career criminal."