Young v. State

25 Citing cases

  1. Pittman v. State

    No. 21A-CR-1919 (Ind. App. Jul. 22, 2022)

    Instead, Pittman contends that a "theft was fully complete" before he used any force, and therefore, "there was no robbery[.]" Brief of Appellant at 22. In making his argument, Pittman attempts to distinguish his case from our supreme court's decision in Young v. State, 725 N.E.2d 78 (Ind. 2000). Specifically, he argues that unlike Young where the defendant was not yet in control of the victim's property when he used force, Smith was in "complete control" of the marijuana prior to Pittman accelerating the truck forward and accordingly, there was no robbery.

  2. Rodriguez v. State

    No. 23A-CR-1419 (Ind. App. Jan. 18, 2024)

    See I.C. § 3542-1-1(2). [¶10] To support his assertion, Rodriguez attempts to distinguish this case from our Supreme Court's decision in Young v. State, 725 N.E.2d 78 (Ind. 2000).Specifically, he argues that, unlike Young where the defendant was not yet in control of the victim's property when the defendant used force, he was in complete control of the car prior to hitting Schaefer and, thus, there was no robbery.

  3. Jones v. State

    31 N.E.3d 35 (Ind. App. 2015)

    [11] The use of force necessary to elevate a theft to a robbery may occur when the thief tries to leave with the stolen goods. Young v. State, 725 N.E.2d 78 (Ind.2000). Jones's use of his car to prevent Officer Kolls from catching up to the blue Honda constituted the requisite force or the threat of force.

  4. Earthman v. State

    21 N.E.3d 899 (Ind. App. 2014)

    The force exerted to commit a robbery must be used before the defendant contemplates taking the property from the victim. Young v. State, 725 N.E.2d 78 (Ind.2000). However, our Courts have held that when the robbery and the violence are so closely connected in point of time, place, and continuity of action, they constitute one continuous scheme or transaction.

  5. U.S. v. Garcia-Caraveo

    586 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2009)   Cited 39 times
    Determining California's version of robbery is the generic version of robbery set out in application note 1(B) to § 2L1.2

    There are, thus, thirty-one remaining states that have, either through legislative enactment or by judicial decision, adopted the continuing offense theory of robbery. See Ala. Code § 13A-8-43; Ariz.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1901(2); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-102(a); Cal.Penal Code § 211; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 831(b); Fla. Stat. § 812.13(3)(a); Haw.Rev. Stat. § 708-842; Iowa Code § 711.1; Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.530(2); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-401(3); Nev.Rev. Stat. § 200.380(1)(c); N.H.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 636:1(II); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:15-1(a); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-22-01(3)(a); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2911.02(A); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3701(a)(2); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.01; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(2)(c); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-401(d); People v. Villalobos, 159 P.3d 624, 627 (Colo.App. 2006); State v. Martinez, 133 Idaho 484, 988 P.2d 710, 713-14 (1999); People v. Hay, 362 Ill.App.3d 459, 298 Ill.Dec. 622, 840 N.E.2d 735, 741 (2005); Young v. State, 725 N.E.2d 78, 81 (Ind. 2000); Mack v. Commonwealth, 136 S.W.3d 434, 437 (Ky. 2004); State v. Meyers, 620 So.2d 1160, 1162-63 (La. 1993); Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 699 A.2d 1170, 1183-85 (1997); Commonwealth v. McCourt, 438 Mass. 486, 781 N.E.2d 808, 814 (2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 404 Mass. 774, 537 N.E.2d 583 (1989)); State v. Bell, 194 Neb. 554, 233 N.W.2d 920, 922 (1975); People v. Nelson, 233 A.D.2d 926, 649 N.Y.S.2d 754, 755 (N.Y.App.Div. 1996); State v. Jones, 107 Or.App. 301, 812 P.2d 9, 10 (1991); State v. Moore, 374 S.C. 468, 649 S.E.2d 84, 89-91 (2007). Two states — Vermont and West Virginia — do not appear to have addressed the question of when the use of force must occur for the purposes of a robbery conviction.

  6. Young v. Warden

    CAUSE NO. 3:19-CV-1015-DRL-MGG (N.D. Ind. May. 12, 2020)

    The state trial court entered a final appealable order, and Mr. Young appealed from it. See Young v. State, 725 N.E. 2d 78 (Ind. 2000). The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction on March 14, 2000.

  7. Lewis v. Superintendent

    Civil Action No. 3:14-CV-2000 JVB (N.D. Ind. Jul. 19, 2016)

    As a threshold matter, the State was not required to prove that Engelking suffered a physical impairment; the State only needed to show that Engelking suffered bodily injury. See Lewis, 898 N.E.2d at 434, 435 (statutory citations omitted); See also Young v. State, 725 N.E.2d 78, 81, 82 (Ind. 2000).

  8. Guidry v. State

    138 Nev. Adv. Op. 39 (Nev. 2022)   Cited 3 times

    Under the unique facts here, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that when Guidry accelerated with Osorio on her car, that was part of a continuous transaction that began with her physically taking his watch while he was inside the car.See, e.g., Barkley v. State, 114 Nev. 635, 636-37, 958 P.2d 1218, 1218-19 (1998); Young v. State, 725 N.E.2d 78, 80-81 (Ind. 2000). In addition, contrary to Guidry's assertion, a vehicle crashing into something is not an element of leaving the scene.

  9. Hines v. State

    30 N.E.3d 1216 (Ind. 2015)   Cited 76 times
    Considering sexual battery a "violent crime[]," although not classified as such by our legislature

    For example, in Eddy v. State, we interpreted the statutory requirement that a homicide-robbery transaction be continuous to encompass a transaction where all the statutory elements of the robbery had been completed before the commission of the homicide:Krempetz v. State, 872 N.E.2d 605, 610–11 (Ind.2007) ; Jackson v. State, 597 N.E.2d 950, 960 (Ind.1992) ; Mahone v. State, 541 N.E.2d 278, 280 (Ind.1989) ; Eddy v. State, 496 N.E.2d 24, 27–28 (Ind.1986) ; Mauricio v. State, 476 N.E.2d 88, 92 (Ind.1985) ; Thompson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 192, 194 (Ind.1982) ; Stroud v. State, 272 Ind. 12, 14, 395 N.E.2d 770, 771 (1979) ; see also Young v. State, 725 N.E.2d 78, 81 (Ind.2000) (discussing when asportation occurred in the context of robbery).Bartlett v. State, 711 N.E.2d 497, 500 (Ind.1999) Haggard v. State, 445 N.E.2d 969, 972 (Ind.1983), holding modified on other grounds, Bailey v. State, 472 N.E.2d 1260 (Ind.1985).

  10. State v. Greene

    16 N.E.3d 416 (Ind. 2014)   Cited 24 times
    In Greene, however, "the jury could have reasonably inferred that Greene's act of force, strangulation, both facilitated his removal of [his girlfriend] from their bedroom to their living room and resulted in serious bodily injury to her."

    But this would be mistaken, as A utilized force to effectuate the taking of B's property, and it is “the absence of force [that] reduces a robbery to theft.” Young v. State, 725 N.E.2d 78, 80 (Ind.2000). Ind.Code § 35–42–2–1 (effective July 1, 2014).