Young v. State

19 Citing cases

  1. People v. Alexander

    49 Cal.4th 846 (Cal. 2010)   Cited 781 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a witness's prior statements are admissible under the prior inconsistent statements if the court finds that the lack of memory is due to an unwillingness to cooperate

    ( People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 681 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253].) Defendant relies on People v. Slone (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 611, 631 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 61], and decisions from two other states, State v. Fukusaku (1997) 85 Haw. 462 [ 946 P.2d 32], and Young v. State (1994) 316 Ark. 225 [ 871 S.W.2d 373], to argue that the presumptive blood tests performed are irrelevant in the absence of positive confirmatory test results indicating the stains were human blood. We rejected the reasoning in Slone as unpersuasive in People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 527 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251].

  2. King v. State

    323 Ark. 671 (Ark. 1996)   Cited 42 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In King, we held this evidence was insufficient to declare Scott an accomplice as a matter of law, and we adhere to that holding as controlling in Slocum's appeal, as well.

    [1] Preservation of appellant's right to freedom from double jeopardy requires that we consider a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence prior to considering alleged trial error. Young v. State, 316 Ark. 225, 871 S.W.2d 373 (1994); Lukach v. State, 310 Ark. 119, 835 S.W.2d 852 (1992); Harris v. State, 284 Ark. 247, 681 S.W.2d 334 (1984) (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978)). Therefore, although raised as the final point of appeal, we consider the sufficiency argument prior to considering the other points relating to alleged trial error.

  3. Houston v. State

    906 S.W.2d 286 (Ark. 1995)   Cited 4 times
    In Houston in particular, the supreme court noted that luminol testing can return a "false positive," and for that reason, declared the results irrelevant without "additional factors that relate the evidence to the crime."

    Our law is well-settled that luminol test results indicating the presence of blood are inadmissible without follow-up tests confirming the presence of human blood related to the crime. Young v. State, 316 Ark. 225, 871 S.W.2d 373 (1994); Palmer v. State, 315 Ark. 696, 870 S.W.2d 385 (1994); Brenk v. State, 311 Ark. 579, 847 S.W.2d 1 (1993). Because luminol testing can return false positive results by reacting with substances other than human blood, and because luminol testing is not time-specific, luminol test results are not relevant per se and their admission without additional factors that relate that evidence to the crime would confuse a jury.

  4. Young v. State

    906 S.W.2d 280 (Ark. 1995)   Cited 2 times

    Appellant's previous conviction of the same crime was reversed for two errors at the first trial relating to the admission of luminol test results and the admission of testimony acquired pursuant to appellant's grant of immunity. Young v. State, 316 Ark. 225, 871 S.W.2d 373 (1994). The sole point of error raised in this appeal is the denial of appellant's motion for directed verdict.

  5. Moore v. State

    58 Ark. App. 120 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 4 times

    The coroner's opinion amounted to "little more than choosing up sides," and therefore should have been excluded. Some cases that further illustrate the error of the court's ruling are Houston v. State, 321 Ark. 598, 906 S.W.2d 286 (1995); Young v. State, 321 Ark. 225 [ 316 Ark. 225], 871 S.W.2d 373 (1994); Palmer v. State, 315 Ark. 696, 870 S.W.2d 385 (1994); and Brenk v. State, 311 Ark. 579, 847 S.W.2d 1 (1993). In all of these cases, the court dealt with the issue of whether the results of luminol testing, an unrecognized scientific test for the presence of blood, was admitted in error.

  6. Berrios v. Bailey

    CIVIL 5:23-CV-05019-TLB-CDC (W.D. Ark. Apr. 20, 2023)

    See, e.g., Meador v. Paulson, 385 Fed.Appx. 613 (8th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 action based on Younger abstention principles where ongoing state criminal case). Finally, to the extent Plaintiff claims the evidence against him in his state criminal case was manufactured by the Defendants in violation of his constitutional rights, such claims can be raised in those proceedings. See generally, Young v. State, 871 S.W.2d 373, 244 (1994) (explaining that proof that prosecutor knew evidence was false is required to demonstrate a deprivation of the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment rights). Moreover, Plaintiff does not contend that he cannot raise his claims in his state criminal case, and he has not identified any extraordinary circumstances warranting this Court to interfere in his criminal case.

  7. Dunn v. State

    371 Ark. 140 (Ark. 2007)   Cited 29 times

    See Palmer, supra. In Young v. State, 316 Ark. 225, 871 S.W.2d 373 (1994), we held that it was error for the trial court to allow evidence of positive luminol test reactions on appellant's truck where follow-up tests from the State Crime Lab did not confirm the presence of human blood. [4] We believe that Brenk and its progeny are distinguishable from the instant case because in those cases either no follow-up testing was done, see Brenk, supra, or the follow-up testing that was conducted did not confirm the presence of human blood.

  8. Carter v. State

    360 Ark. 266 (Ark. 2005)   Cited 8 times
    In Carter v. State, 360 Ark. 266, 200 S.W.3d 906 (2005) (Carter I), this court affirmed Brady Carter's convictions for kidnapping and third-degree battery; in the same decision, this court reversed on the State's cross-appeal, holding that the trial court erroneously reduced Carter's aggravated robbery charge to the lesser included crime of robbery.

    [1, 2] We first address the sufficiency of evidence issues Carter raises, because an appellant's right to freedom from double jeopardy requires a review of the sufficiency of the evidence prior to a review of any asserted trial errors. Young v. State, 316 Ark. 225, 871 S.W.2d 373 (1994). The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial.

  9. Hale v. State

    343 Ark. 62 (Ark. 2000)   Cited 43 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Declining to adopt Jackson and continuing to following its traditional requirement under state law that there be "substantial evidence" to support a criminal conviction

    This court has previously noted that the defendant's rights under Kastigar were preserved by defense counsel making the "appropriate objections" at trial. Young v. State, 316 Ark. 225, 871 S.W.2d 373 (1994). [13, 14] We view the present situation much like those cases in which a motion in limine was filed prior to the trial.

  10. State v. Larimore

    341 Ark. 397 (Ark. 2000)   Cited 208 times
    Noting that "the time limits of a Rule 37 petition are not applicable to a writ of error coram nobis"

    In this respect, this court has held that a defendant's false or improbable explanation of suspicious circumstances may be admissible as proof of guilt. Stewart v. State, 338 Ark. 608, 999 S.W.2d 684 (1999); Young v. State, 316 Ark. 225, 871 S.W.2d 373 (1994). Stated in different terms, the court has held that a jury may infer a defendant's guilt from improbable explanations of incriminating conduct.