( People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 681 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253].) Defendant relies on People v. Slone (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 611, 631 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 61], and decisions from two other states, State v. Fukusaku (1997) 85 Haw. 462 [ 946 P.2d 32], and Young v. State (1994) 316 Ark. 225 [ 871 S.W.2d 373], to argue that the presumptive blood tests performed are irrelevant in the absence of positive confirmatory test results indicating the stains were human blood. We rejected the reasoning in Slone as unpersuasive in People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 527 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251].
[1] Preservation of appellant's right to freedom from double jeopardy requires that we consider a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence prior to considering alleged trial error. Young v. State, 316 Ark. 225, 871 S.W.2d 373 (1994); Lukach v. State, 310 Ark. 119, 835 S.W.2d 852 (1992); Harris v. State, 284 Ark. 247, 681 S.W.2d 334 (1984) (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978)). Therefore, although raised as the final point of appeal, we consider the sufficiency argument prior to considering the other points relating to alleged trial error.
Our law is well-settled that luminol test results indicating the presence of blood are inadmissible without follow-up tests confirming the presence of human blood related to the crime. Young v. State, 316 Ark. 225, 871 S.W.2d 373 (1994); Palmer v. State, 315 Ark. 696, 870 S.W.2d 385 (1994); Brenk v. State, 311 Ark. 579, 847 S.W.2d 1 (1993). Because luminol testing can return false positive results by reacting with substances other than human blood, and because luminol testing is not time-specific, luminol test results are not relevant per se and their admission without additional factors that relate that evidence to the crime would confuse a jury.
Appellant's previous conviction of the same crime was reversed for two errors at the first trial relating to the admission of luminol test results and the admission of testimony acquired pursuant to appellant's grant of immunity. Young v. State, 316 Ark. 225, 871 S.W.2d 373 (1994). The sole point of error raised in this appeal is the denial of appellant's motion for directed verdict.
The coroner's opinion amounted to "little more than choosing up sides," and therefore should have been excluded. Some cases that further illustrate the error of the court's ruling are Houston v. State, 321 Ark. 598, 906 S.W.2d 286 (1995); Young v. State, 321 Ark. 225 [ 316 Ark. 225], 871 S.W.2d 373 (1994); Palmer v. State, 315 Ark. 696, 870 S.W.2d 385 (1994); and Brenk v. State, 311 Ark. 579, 847 S.W.2d 1 (1993). In all of these cases, the court dealt with the issue of whether the results of luminol testing, an unrecognized scientific test for the presence of blood, was admitted in error.
See, e.g., Meador v. Paulson, 385 Fed.Appx. 613 (8th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 action based on Younger abstention principles where ongoing state criminal case). Finally, to the extent Plaintiff claims the evidence against him in his state criminal case was manufactured by the Defendants in violation of his constitutional rights, such claims can be raised in those proceedings. See generally, Young v. State, 871 S.W.2d 373, 244 (1994) (explaining that proof that prosecutor knew evidence was false is required to demonstrate a deprivation of the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment rights). Moreover, Plaintiff does not contend that he cannot raise his claims in his state criminal case, and he has not identified any extraordinary circumstances warranting this Court to interfere in his criminal case.
See Palmer, supra. In Young v. State, 316 Ark. 225, 871 S.W.2d 373 (1994), we held that it was error for the trial court to allow evidence of positive luminol test reactions on appellant's truck where follow-up tests from the State Crime Lab did not confirm the presence of human blood. [4] We believe that Brenk and its progeny are distinguishable from the instant case because in those cases either no follow-up testing was done, see Brenk, supra, or the follow-up testing that was conducted did not confirm the presence of human blood.
[1, 2] We first address the sufficiency of evidence issues Carter raises, because an appellant's right to freedom from double jeopardy requires a review of the sufficiency of the evidence prior to a review of any asserted trial errors. Young v. State, 316 Ark. 225, 871 S.W.2d 373 (1994). The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial.
This court has previously noted that the defendant's rights under Kastigar were preserved by defense counsel making the "appropriate objections" at trial. Young v. State, 316 Ark. 225, 871 S.W.2d 373 (1994). [13, 14] We view the present situation much like those cases in which a motion in limine was filed prior to the trial.
In this respect, this court has held that a defendant's false or improbable explanation of suspicious circumstances may be admissible as proof of guilt. Stewart v. State, 338 Ark. 608, 999 S.W.2d 684 (1999); Young v. State, 316 Ark. 225, 871 S.W.2d 373 (1994). Stated in different terms, the court has held that a jury may infer a defendant's guilt from improbable explanations of incriminating conduct.