OCGA § 16-1-7. Gore v. State, 246 Ga. 575 (4) ( 272 S.E.2d 306) (1980); Young v. State, 238 Ga. 548, 550 ( 233 S.E.2d 750) (1977). Judgment affirmed in part; reversed in part.
4. "The conviction for the offense of escape must be set aside as it merged into the greater crime of felony murder." Young v. State, 238 Ga. 548, 550 ( 233 S.E.2d 750) (1977). 5. Gore's conviction for felony murder is affirmed.
2. We find no error in the court's charging the jury on the offense of public drunkenness, as it was a misdemeanor offense, supported by the testimony of the officers, and could have served as the basis for a lawful arrest by an officer for such offense committed in his presence (OCGA § 17-4-20), or by the same officer acting as a citizen in making a citizen's arrest (OCGA § 17-4-60); Young v. State, 238 Ga. 548, 549 ( 233 S.E.2d 750). 3. There was no reversible error in charging the jury with the definition of probable cause for arrest.
Anderson v. State, 123 Ga. App. 57, 61 ( 179 S.E.2d 286). Thereafter, when appellant's voice was identified as that of the one making the threatening phone calls, his immediate arrest was called for and certainly appropriate. Morgan v. State, 241 Ga. 485, 487 ( 246 S.E.2d 198); Young v. State, 238 Ga. 548, 549 ( 233 S.E.2d 750). We reject this first enumeration of error.
Thus, it does not matter whether the police officers had sufficient personal knowledge of the crime to give them cause for a warrantless arrest (Code § 27-207), for they did not consummate the arrest, and their knowledge is not the test for the validity of this warrantless arrest. See Young v. State, 238 Ga. 548 ( 233 S.E.2d 750) (1977). The arrest itself being lawful, there can be no question that the subsequent search of the appellant's personal effects, on her person and within her immediate control and possession, was likewise lawful.
As felony murder is defined under Georgia law, the underlying felony is a lesser included offense of felony murder and thus the same offense under Blockburger. See Young v. State, 238 Ga. 548, 233 S.E.2d 750 (1977); Reed v. State, 238 Ga. 457, 233 S.E.2d 369 (1977). Once the State tried and convicted petitioner for kidnapping, it would be barred from prosecuting him for felony murder only if the underlying felony upon which that prosecution was based were that same kidnapping.
As felony murder is defined under Georgia law, the underlying felony is a lesser included offense of felony murder and thus the same offense under Blockburger. See Young v. State, 238 Ga. 548, 233 S.E.2d 750 (1977); Reed v. State, 238 Ga. 457, 233 S.E.2d 369 (1977). Once the State tried and convicted petitioner for kidnapping, it would be barred from prosecuting him for felony murder only if the underlying felony upon which that prosecution was based were that same kidnapping.
Though the officer did not see appellee actually furnish the minors alcoholic beverages, the direct, probative and reasonable evidence irresistibly points to the conclusion by a reasonable man that a felony had been or was being committed in his presence. See Young v. State, 238 Ga. 548. It is well settled that an officer at the time of a lawful custodial arrest may, without a warrant, make a full search of the person of the accused (United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 ( 94 SC 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427)), a limited area within the control of the person arrested (Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (89 SC 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685)) and of an automobile in his possession at the scene of the arrest for the discovery and preservation of criminal evidence (Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 ( 92 SC 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612)).