Summary
granting summary judgment where plaintiff failed to establish an adverse employment action
Summary of this case from Gibson v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Opinion
00 Civ. 8019 (GEL)
November 5, 2002
Steven C. Jackson, New York, N.Y. for Plaintiff.
Margaret Blair Soyster, Clifford Chance Rogers Wells LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Patricia J. Young brings this employment discrimination action against her former employer, Rogers Wells, LLP ("RW"), alleging that RW discriminated against her on the basis of race. On July 24, 2000, Young received a "Right to Sue" letter from the EEOC, and shortly thereafter, brought this action. She charges that RW subjected her to disparate work assignments and a hostile work environment because she is African-American, and that after she filed complaints with her supervisors and with the EEOC, defendant retaliated against her by terminating her employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (1982) ("Title VII"). The defendant has moved for summary judgment. The motion will be granted.
BACKGROUND
From April to November 1996, Young worked at RW as a "temp" on the third shift (Pl. Dep. at 243), which ran from midnight to approximately 8 am. (Carminio Dep. at 10). On or about November 1996, Third Shift Coordinator Scot Gallagher, a white man, invited her to apply for employment. (Pl. Dep. at 250.) Young was hired on Gallagher's recommendation, as an employee-at-will word processing operator on November 4, 1996. (Carminio Aff. ¶ 2 and Ex. 2; Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶ 1.) Young became the third African-American among the four third-shift operators. (Pl. Dep. at 260; Carminio Aff. ¶ 3.) Gallagher and Marilyn Carminio, the Manager of Professional Support Services, supervised her. (Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶ 2.) Initially, Young's work performance was satisfactory, though Gallagher noted that she needed to improve in some areas. (Pl. 56.1 Statement Ex. A.)
In 1997, some of Young's weaknesses were documented in reviews. In a July 1997 evaluation, for example. attorneys rated Young's work below that of others in her department (Pl. Dep. at 326; Carminio Aff. ¶ 5 and Ex. 3) — an appraisal that Young considered fair (Pl. Dep. at 327). Young's year-end 1997 review continued in the same vein, with Young rated satisfactory ("consistently meets expectations") overall but with less than consistently adequate performance in several individual areas such as attitude, professional demeanor, and timeliness. (Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶ 4 and Ex. B; Carminio Aff. ¶ 6.) Carminio informed Young that although she had showed some improvement since July, she needed to continue improving. (Pl. Dep. at 327-28, 330; Carminio Aff. ¶ 6 and Ex. 4.) Young considered this review "almost fair," objecting vaguely that she was blamed for someone else's errors. (Pl. Dep. at 330.) In addition to agreeing that these reviews were fair, Young generally had no complaints about her job in 1997, except for some concerns involving control over room temperature. (Pl. 56.1 Statement Ex. D, E; Carminio Dep. at 263-65.)
Around March or April 1998, however, Young began complaining to Carminio about how Gallagher treated her. Specifically, Young complained that because Gallagher preferred white employees, he overloaded her with work while other employees often sat idle (Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶ 13), and he commonly referred to her as his "workhorse" a characterization she claims to have found racially offensive and insulting (id. ¶¶ 10, 11). Carminio did not formally respond to Young's complaints about Gallagher but did note that third-shift employees were dissatisfied and felt overburdened by the workload. (Pl. Dep. at 298; Carminio Dep. at 84-86.) Young also complained about an incident in which Gallagher asked her. "What's in the bag, bitch?" (Pl. Dep. at 287.) This incident was isolated. As Young admits, after she complained, Gallagher never used such language again. (Pl. 56.1 Statement Ex. G at 2.) As the year went on, Young also complained to Laura Saklad, a member of RW's Human Resources Department (Pl. Dep. at 291-92, 298-99, 306 and Ex. E), which allegedly caused Carminio to treat Young with "anger" and "disdain" (Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶ 29).
From July 28, 1998, until November 2, 1998, Young took a short-term disability leave. (Pl. Dep. at 341, 409.) Her physician informed RW that he was treating Young for "situational agitated depression" and that she would be out of work for an "indeterminate" period of time. (Pl. Dep. at 394-94, 398 and Ex. L.) During her disability leave, however, plaintiff worked at two other law firms, on a regular four-day-a-week basis (Soyster Aff. ¶ 5 and "Timesheets"), despite receiving full salary from RW for six of those weeks (Pl. Dep. at 407).
When Young returned in November 1998, Larue Stanley, a white woman, was the Acting Third Shift Coordinator. (Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶ 34; Pl. Dep. at 409.) Young alleges that Stanley made racially derogatory and repugnant comments. (Compl. ¶¶ 27-29.) Specifically, Young overheard Stanley refer to herself as "the head nigger in charge" (Pl. Dep. at 191), and on three separate occasions Stanley told Young that her brother liked to use the word "nigger," apparently in a clumsy attempt to imply that she herself was not the sort of person who used such derogatory terms (Pl. Dep. at 190; Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 37, 38). Unlike the incidents with Gallagher, Young did not report these comments to management until her year-end review because she wanted to "fit back in" rather than cause friction. (Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶ 41; Pl. Dep. at 200.)
Young's performance reviews did not improve after her disability leave. In her year-end 1998 review, Young was rated overall as "usually meets expectations." (Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶ 55; Carminio Aff. Ex. 5 at 1.) Carminio considered this rating (a rating lower than "consistently meets expectations") to be unsatisfactory. (Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶ 55; Carminio Dep. at 128.) Young's evaluation was based on attorney surveys that Young claims were erroneous (Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 44, 47, 56), consultations with Stanley and other shift supervisors (Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶ 47; Carminio Dep. at 102-103), and comments from Leslie Schwartz, a fellow employee, that Young claims were false (Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 19, 53; Carminio Dep. at 130). Young requested that she receive another evaluation after three months to assess any improvement. (Carminio Aff. Ex. 5, at 3; Pl. Dep. at 315, 323.)
At her deposition, Carminio could not recall any evidence of errors, but stated that even if evidence had been produced, it would not have changed Young's evaluation. (Carminio Dep. at 212-215.)
Beginning in 1999, Young began complaining about Stanley to Carminio and Grace McLaughlin, Carminio's supervisor. Young told Carminio that she did not trust Stanley and doubted that Stanley would review her work fairly. (Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶ 62; Carminio Dep. at 208.) In response, Carminio offered Young a transfer to the second shift (Pl. Dep. at 467; Carminio Aff. ¶ 11), which plaintiff initially accepted effective April 1, 1999, but ultimately declined for family reasons (Carminio Aff. ¶¶ 11, 12 and Ex. 8; Pl. Dep. at 476). Young complained that Stanley constantly spoke to her in an uncivil tone and discussed confidential matters about her work. (Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶ 63.) Carminio again responded, instructing Stanley to maintain a civil tone and to keep information about employees in strict confidence. (Pl. 56.1 Statement Ex. J.) Young also complained to McLaughlin (Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶ 66; Carminio Dep. at 178-79), and raised concerns about the accuracy of the records being kept with regard to her document performance (Pl. Dep. at 480; Carminio Aff. ¶ 13 and Ex. 8).
As a result of Young's continued concerns about Stanley and her inability to transfer to another shift, McLaughlin and Carminio, in conjunction with Doris Hibner, a Document Specialist in RW's Information Systems Department (McLaughlin Aff. ¶ 3; Carminio Aff. ¶ 14), developed special review procedures for Young, which excluded Stanley from the review process. (Pl. Dep. at 485-86; Carminio Aff. ¶ 13 and Ex. 8.) Young agreed to the development and implementation of the special review procedure. (Pl. Dep. at 486: Carminio Aff. ¶ 13 and Ex. 8; McLaughlin Aff. ¶¶ 5, 6 and Ex. 12.) Under the new process, Hibner would review copies of all of Young's jobs and note the time taken to complete them. (Carminio Dep. at 14.) She would periodically provide her evaluations to Carminio and McLaughlin. (Id.) McLaughlin informed plaintiff that if her work performance during the period of special review did not meet the level expected of a word processing operator of her experience, her continued employment at RW would be reassessed. (Pl. Dep. at 493; McLaughlin Aff. ¶ 6 and Ex. 12.) Young acknowledges that she understood that her job was potentially in jeopardy if her performance did not improve. (Pl. Dep. at 493.) In addition to setting up this special review procedure, McLaughlin encouraged Young to take advantage of additional Word/Manage training — an offer plaintiff declined because she felt that her skills were "very good" and that she "did not think [she] needed more training." (Pl. Dep. at 496; McLaughlin Aff. ¶ 6 and Ex. 12.)
Young's job performance did not improve under the special review process and in May 1999, Young was informed that she could lose her position. Hibner found that Young spent an excessive amount of time on most jobs and that her work was often inaccurate or improperly formatted. (Hibner Aff. ¶ 3.) On May 20, 1999, McLaughlin and Carminio met with Young to relay Hibner's assessment and to inform her that she was not performing at the level expected of an RW operator. (Pl. Dep. at 509; McLaughlin Aff. ¶ 9; Carminio Aff. ¶ 17.) Young announced that there was no reason to continue because the matter would be resolved in court. (Pl. Dep. at 509-10; McLaughlin Aff. ¶ 9; Carminio Aff. ¶ 17.) Carminio reminded Young that she had agreed to the special review process, but Young rebuffed the reminder and said that McLaughlin's special procedure memorandum was designed to "cover [RW's] ass." (Carmino Aff. ¶ 17 and Ex. 11; McLaughlin Aff. ¶ 19.) At the end of the meeting, McLaughlin told plaintiff that she and Carminio would meet with her again in two weeks. (Carminio Aff. ¶ 17 and Ex. 11; McLaughlin Aff. ¶ 19.) After the meeting, McLaughlin reminded Young in writing that her work needed to improve soon or RW would have to consider terminating her employment. (Pl. Dep. at 512; McLaughlin Aff. ¶ 10 and Ex. 14.)
Over the next two weeks, plaintiff's work did not improve, and Hibner noted that Young was regularly late for work and had a "generally apathetic attitude." (McLaughlin Aff. ¶ 11.) Hibner passed along another negative assessment to Carminio and McLaughlin (Hibner Aff. ¶ 4), and they, in turn, recommended to Maureen Reid, RW's Director of Human Resources, that Young be terminated. (Reid Aff. ¶ 2; McLaughlin Aff. ¶ 12: Carminio Aff. ¶ 20.) Reid concluded that Young was not meeting RW's performance standards and that there was no reason to expect improvement. (Reid Aff. ¶ 2.) Hibner agreed. (Hibner Aff. ¶ 5.) In a meeting on June 11, 1999, and also in a letter dated that same day, Reid and McLaughlin informed Young that she was being fired for failure to meet performance expectations. (Compl. ¶ 44; Reid Aff. ¶ 4 and Ex. 15; McLaughlin Aff. ¶ 13.)
Prior to her termination, on May 31, 1999, Young filed a complaint with the EEOC. (Pl. 56.1 Statement Ex. F.) This action followed on October 20, 2000.
DISCUSSION
I. Standards for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment may only be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b). The party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon mere allegations or denials," rather it must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."Id. 56(e). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "[I]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted."Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). Similarly, the non-moving party cannot defeat summary judgment by "offering purely conclusory allegations of discrimination," Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir. 1985), or by offering evidence in opposition that is merely speculative. See Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1116-17 (2d Cir. 1988). Accordingly, to defeat summary judgment, it must set forth "concrete particulars" showing that a trial is needed. R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 77 (2d Cir. 1984).
A. Young's Race Discrimination Claim
Young does not claim that she was fired because of her race; rather, she claims that she was subjected to disparate working conditions because of her race, and fired because of in retaliation for her protected complaints about her alleged discriminatory treatment. We consider first her discrimination claim.
Young's brief in opposition to RW's motion for summary judgment consists solely of generalities and sheds no light on why Young claims her termination violated Title VII. Based on her complaint and deposition, however, Young claims only that she was terminated based on her complaints. (Compl. ¶ 45; Pl. Dep. at 282.)
Under the analysis applied in Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc), and reaffirmed in James v. New York Racing Assoc., 233 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2000), we begin by asking whether the plaintiff has established the "minimal" prima facie case defined by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). As the Second Circuit explained in James, the plaintiff need not offer evidence of discrimination and can carry her burden by showing "membership in a protected class, qualification for the position, an adverse employment action," and preference for a person not of the protected class. James, 233 F.3d at 153-54. Meeting this test "creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated." Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1335. This presumption "places the burden of production on the employer to proffer a non-discriminatory reason for its action." Id. at 154. If the employer fails to present such a reason, plaintiff prevails. "On the other hand, once the employer `articulates a non-discriminatory reason' for its actions, Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1336, the presumption completely `drops out of the picture.' St. Mary's [Honor Ctr. v. Hicks], 509 U.S. [502,] 510-11 [(1993)]." James, 233 F.3d at 154. Evidence casting doubt on the employer's proffered justification "may — or may not — be sufficient" to provide this support. Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1333. Thus, when the employer has proffered an explanation and the plaintiff has attempted to refute it, the Court's responsibility is to "examin[e] the entire record to determine whether the plaintiff could satisfy h[er] `ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.'" Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2106). Ambiguities are resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 587.
The Court need not reach the latter stages of this burden-shifting analysis, because Young has not satisfied her burden of establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination. It is true that Young, as an African-American, is a member of a protected class, and that defendant hired Young after she had worked as a "temp" for RW, which, taken in the light most favorable to Young, supports an inference that she was qualified for the position. However, Young has failed to establish that she suffered an adverse action in the form of a "materially adverse change" in the terms or conditions of her employment. See, e.g., Fridia v. Henderson, 99 Civ. 10749, 2000 WL 1772779, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2000) (citing Richardson v. N.Y. State Department of Correctional Service, 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted));Henriquez v. The Times Herald Record, 97 Civ. 6176, 1997 WL 732444 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1997); Davis v. City Univ. of New York, 94 Civ. 7277, 1996 WL 243256, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 1996).
Young alleges that Gallagher and Stanley assigned her more work than they gave to white operators. To support this claim, Young cites an occasion on or around April 16, 1998, when she arrived at work for an overtime shift, under the supervision of Carl Cavaliere and Bolin High, two white males, and a large document was waiting for her, which Cavaliere refused to divide. (Pl. 56.1 Statement Ex. F at 13.) Young also describes an incident on or around July 1, 1998, when she asked Gallagher for additional help to finish a time-sensitive job for a partner, and he did not send another person until "it was way too late." (Pl. 56.1 Statement Ex. G.)
While the bounds of what constitutes a "materially adverse" employment action may be imprecise, Young has not shown how the above instances rise to a level that materially altered her working conditions. "A material adverse change `must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.'" Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of New York, Inc., v. City of New York, 00-9538, 2002 WL 31341477, at *6 (2d Cir. Oct. 17, 2002) (internal citations omitted); see also Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 108 F.3d 462, 466 (2d Cir. 1997). While courts must assess each situation in light of the totality of the circumstances, examples of adverse employment actions include "termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, [or] significantly diminished responsibilities." Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 2002 WL 31341477, at *6. In sum, a "`materially adverse change' is one that `has an attendant negative result, a deprivation of a position or an opportunity.'" Henriquez, 1997 WL 732444, at *5 (citing Davis, 1996 WL 243256, at *7). Disproportionately heavy workload could perhaps be an adverse action, if the additional work significantly changed the employee's responsibilities so as to diminish that worker's role or status. or exposed the worker to dangerous or extreme conditions not appropriate to her job classification. But here, Young has made at best a general complaint of more work. While she describes the work assigned to her as more tedious, she does not claim nor is there any evidence that the tasks were of a different kind than those she was hired to perform, nor does she even attempt to quantify the burden in such a way as to demonstrate that she was assigned an unusually heavy workload.
During the one and one-half years that plaintiff worked for RW, she points to only two specific incidents during which she received heavier or more tedious work assignments than others on her shift, and one of those instances occurred on an overtime shift under Cavaliere's supervision and has no relation to Young's generalized claim that she suffered adverse action under Gallagher's or Stanley's supervision. Even assuming that Young could offer proof at trial of more instances like the two described above, she has not shown that such trivial instances altered or created any substantial change in her responsibilities. Giving an employee more work, which could even be perceived as giving "an employee a chance to excel," is not an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Bogart v. New York City Law Dep't. 00 Civ. 7417 (DLC), 2001 WL 504874, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2001).
Accordingly, summary judgment for defendant on this claim is appropriate.
B. Young's Retaliation Claim
Young next claims that she was terminated because of the complaints she made about discrimination. Reid decided to terminate her with input from McLaughlin, Carminio, and Hibner, after Gallagher had left RW, and after steps had been taken to insulate Stanley from the evaluation process. Young does not assert that Reid harbored any racial animus towards her. Rather, Young asserts that her firing was in retaliation for her protected activity of filing complaints about perceived racial discrimination by Gallagher and Stanley.
In Title VII retaliation claim cases, the burden-shifting framework articulated above applies in the same manner. See, e.g, Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 764 (2d. Cir. 1998); Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 349 (2d Cir. 1998). In a retaliation claim, the plaintiff creates a presumption by establishing a prima facie case by showing "[1] participation in a protected activity known to the defendant; [2] an employment action disadvantaging the plaintiff; and [3] a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action." Quinn, 159 F.3d at 769 (quoting Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1308 (2d Cir. 1995)). The employer can rebut the presumption by offering legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for the contested actions; if it succeeds, the burden reverts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that those reasons are merely pretextual. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 506-07; James, 233 F.3d at 154; Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1333-35. An employer acting for legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons is entitled to summary judgment "unless the plaintiff can point to evidence that reasonably supports a finding of prohibited" retaliation. James, 233 F.3d at 154 (citations omitted); see also Gallagher, 139 F.3d at 349-50.
Reading the facts in the light most favorable to Young, she has made a prima facie case of retaliation. Young argues that she was terminated as a result of her race discrimination complaints to her supervisors and to the EEOC. Clearly, complaints of race discrimination are protected activities, and termination from employment is an adverse action.Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of New York, 2002 WL 31341477, at *6;Fridia, 2000 WL 1772779, at *6.
Young provides amble evidence of written and verbal complaints. She complained in writing in a letter to Saklad dated July 13, 1998, in which she described Gallagher's allegedly "discriminatory" activities. (Pl. 56.1 Statement Ex. G at 5.) Specifically, Young referred to Gallagher's "insensitive and biased treatment regarding the unfair division of the workload," his lax attitude towards her co-workers like Pangeline Edwards and Larry Rosen who stood around and talked while Young was given more work, and his preference for white and/or male opinions over black and/or female opinions. Id. at 5-6. Young also complained to Carminio about Stanley's use of the word "nigger." (Pl. Dep. at 190-91.) In a March 23, 1999, meeting with McLaughlin and Carminio, Young complained that she was being "harassed" and "abused" by Stanley and had been treated similarly by Gallagher. (McLaughlin Aff. ¶ 5.) Young also filed an EEOC Complaint on May 31, 1999. (Compl. ¶ 44.) It is clear that management was aware of most or all of this activity.
The close proximity in time between her EEOC complaint and her termination supports an inference of causal connection. Borrero v. Collins Bldg. Servs., 01 Civ. 6885, 2002 WL 31415511, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2002) (plaintiff may demonstrate a causal connection "by showing that the protected activity was followed closely by the discriminatory treatment") (internal citations omitted); Kelley v. West, 95 Civ. 1096, 2001 WL 102342, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2001) (proof of causal connection may be found if the protected activity is closely followed in time by the adverse employment action).
Since Young has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to RW to show a non-discriminatory reason for Young's termination. Young's performance reviews since 1996 demonstrated that her work throughout her employment was below RW's standards in several areas, and that she never improved despite repeated warnings and special review procedures. For example, on December 4, 1996, during Young's first performance evaluation, it was noted that plaintiff "tends to spend much more time than necessary on some jobs." (Pl. 56.1 Statement Ex. A.) In July 1997, attorneys rated her work below those of others, and Carminio informed Young that she needed to be more careful and attentive. (Pl. Dep. at 326; Carminio Aff. ¶ 5 and Ex. 3.) On December 23, 1997, plaintiff's overall satisfactory evaluation included six sub-satisfactory areas, including failure to consistently "produce documents in a reasonable time." (Pl. 56.1 Statement. ¶ 4 and Ex. B.) Young's overall review fell below satisfactory in 1998, when she was rated as "usually meets expectations." (Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶ 55; Carminio Aff. Ex. 5 at 1.) In that review, Carminio informed Young that her document skills, accuracy, and proofreading were below those of others in the word processing department. (Pl. Dep. at 315.)
These poor reviews persisted despite steps taken to insulate Young from perceived inequities, to encourage her to improve her skills, and to warn her of the consequences of continued poor performance. When Young expressed concerns about the accuracy of the records Stanley kept regarding her document performance, Carminio and Young agreed to a special review procedure that would exclude Stanley from the process. (Pl. Dep. at 480, 486; Carminio Aff. ¶ 13 and Ex. 8.) Moreover, in March 1999, McLaughlin encouraged Young to take advantage of additional Word/Manage training available at RW. (Pl. Dep. at 496; McLaughlin Aff. ¶ 6 and Ex. 12.) McLaughlin went on to warn Young that if her work performance during the period of special review did not meet the level expected of a word processing operator of her experience level, a decision would be made regarding her continued employment. (Pl. Dep. at 493; McLaughlin Aff. ¶ 6 and Ex. 12.)
The evidence that RW discharged Young for poor performance is overwhelming. Numerous performance assessments consistently rated Young below RW standards. Young failed to heed repeated warnings that she needed to show improvement or else her employment with RW would be in jeopardy. Far from seeking to jettison Young, RW suggested that she take advantage of additional training, and even set up special review procedures to accommodate Young's concerns regarding her shift coordinator Stanley. Hibner, who undisputedly was unaware of any protected activity by Young, found Young's performance inadequate. This evidence is more than sufficient to establish that defendant had a valid non-discriminatory reason to fire Young.
Young, in contrast, presents no evidence that defendant's non-discriminatory reason is pretextual. Young asserts that the reason for her termination was "a lie" (Pl. Dep. at 268), but she fails to provide any evidentiary support for this broad conclusory allegation. In fact, Young's own testimony reflects that she felt her July 1997 and 1997 year-end evaluations were fair, apart from one minor quibble with her year-end evaluation. (Pl. Dep. at 330.) The poor evaluations, moreover, are corroborated by Hibner's review and by attorney surveys, which reflect the opinions of persons who apparently knew nothing of Young or her discrimination complaint. Therefore, Young has presented no evidence that RW's proffered non-retaliatory reason for her termination was merely pretextual. Since the only evidence suggesting retaliation is the relatively weak inference from the timing of discharge, no reasonable jury could find that she has carried her burden of proving retaliatory discharge. Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted for defendant on this claim.
C. Hostile Work Environment
Finally, in a claim that substantially overlaps with her claim of race discrimination in the conditions of her employment, Young claims that she was subjected to a hostile work environment. Employers may be held liable for the conduct of employees, and particularly supervisors, that is so abusive as to alter the conditions of employment for disfavored classes of employees. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). To prevail on her hostile work environment discrimination claim, Young must prove two elements. First, the conduct must be "severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment — an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive." Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. Second, the plaintiff must have "subjectively perceive[d] the environment to be abusive." Id. Young alleges that she was subjected to a hostile work environment because she is African-American, including subjection to excessive work demands, ostracization, and verbal assaults in the form of racial slurs, threats, harassment, and ridicule. (Compl. ¶ 21.) Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to her, Young falls far short of proving that an objectively hostile environment existed.
Although Harris was a sexual harassment case under Title VII, generally, the same standards apply to both race-based and sex-based hostile environment claims. See Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 630 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 997 (1997) (noting that the same standards for evaluating hostile environment claims are the same whether the alleged discrimination is based on race or sex); Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying sexual harassment case law in case involving Title VII racial harassment).
Young relies on the same incidents to ground this claim as in her other race discrimination claim discussed above. Generally, Young alleges that she was given a heavier workload (Compl. ¶¶ 3, 24), that she was called a "workhorse" (id. ¶ 16) and a "bitch" (Pl. 56.1 Statement Ex. G at 2), that she learned that Gallagher and a co-worker spoke negatively about her in the presence of other employees (id. ¶ 23), and that she heard Stanley use the word "nigger" on four occasions (id. ¶ 38; Pl. Dep. at 190-91). To successfully establish her hostile working environment claim, Young "must demonstrate that the conduct at issue is `so severe or pervasive' as to create an `objectively hostile or abusive work environment.'" Richardson v. New York State, 180 F.3d 426, 436 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22). See also Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 64-65. Thus, Young must demonstrate either that a single incident was extraordinarily severe or that a series of incidents were "sufficiently continuous and concerted" to have altered the conditions of her working environment. Perry, 115 F.3d at 149 (quoting Carrero v. New York Housing Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 577 (2d Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). In order "for racist comments, slurs, and jokes to constitute a hostile working environment, there must be `more than a few isolated incidents of racial enmity.'" 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2d Cir. 1986). "Isolated incidents or episodic conduct will not support a hostile work environment claim." Richardson 180 F.3d at 437 (internal citations omitted).
As discussed under Young's race discrimination claim, any increase in workload Young experienced was not sufficiently continuous nor extreme to have altered the conditions of her working environment or responsibilities. Rather, at most, Young's alleged heavy workload was at most an inconvenience, which is not enough to create a hostile working environment. Similarly, Young's complaints regarding Gallagher's "workhorse" and "What's in the bag, bitch?" comments and Stanley's "nigger" references do not by themselves, nor together with Young's occasional increase in workload, rise to a level which altered the conditions of Young's working environment. By themselves, the comments made by Gallagher and Stanley were isolated or at most episodic incidents which did not continue throughout Young's employment. Gallagher's comments may have been rude, but had no particular racial connotations, and ceased when Young complained; Stanley's use of an offensive term, while insensitive, were not directed at or in reference to Young or any other person of color, and all but one of them were taken even by Young herself as part of an effort to distinguish herself from the kind of person who uses such language in a derogatory way.
There is insufficient evidence to show that any combination of these events could be viewed by a reasonable person as altering Young's work environment. No combination of incidents occurred daily or even weekly, nor were they severe. Accordingly, no reasonable jury could find that Young was subjected to a hostile work environment, and summary judgment is granted for the defendant on this claim as well.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. The Clerk is respectfully directed to enter judgment for defendant.
SO ORDERED.