Opinion
CASE NO. 3:19-CV-6157-RJB-DWC
04-22-2020
RUSSELL J. YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. KIRSTIE PUUMALA, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Noting Date: May 15, 2020
The District Court has referred Plaintiff Russell J. Young's pending Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") and Proposed Complaint to United States Magistrate Judge David W. Christel pursuant to Amended General Order 02-19. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff's Proposed Amended Complaint and finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, the Court recommends the Application to Proceed IFP be denied and this case be dismissed.
I. Background
A. Procedural History
On December 2, 2019, Plaintiff Russell J. Young filed a civil complaint and, on December 16, 2019, Plaintiff filed a complete application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"), that is, without paying the filing fee for a civil case. See Dkt. 1-1, 4. The Court reviewed Plaintiff's Proposed Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and found Plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Dkt. 6. The Court re-noted the Application to Proceed IFP and directed Plaintiff to file a proposed amended complaint. Id. After the Court granted Plaintiff an extension of time, Plaintiff filed the Proposed Amended Complaint on April 7, 2020.
B. Factual Allegations
While difficult to decipher, in the Proposed Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. 9. He states he pled guilty to one count of child molestation on October 29, 1992 under the advice of Defendant Alfred Bennett, Plaintiff's attorney. Dkt. 9, p. 1. Plaintiff contends Defendant Kristie Puumala provide false information to local authorities regarding the alleged crimes because she was angry with Plaintiff. Id. at pp. 1-2. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Dkt. 9.
II. Discussion
To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) he suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and (2) the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991).
A. Heck Barred
The allegations in the Proposed Amended Complaint focus on Plaintiff's allegedly unlawful incarceration. See Dkt. 9. The Court finds Plaintiff's conviction would be invalidated if he were to prove the allegations in the Proposed Amended Complaint. Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff's claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S 477 (1994).
A plaintiff may only recover damages under § 1983 for allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment, or for any other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render the imprisonment invalid, if he can prove the conviction or other basis for confinement has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. A "§ 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) -no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of his suit (state conduct leading to the conviction or internal prison proceedings) -if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration." Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (emphasis in original).
Here, Plaintiff alleges he was wrongfully convicted of a crime he did not commit. Dkt. 9. He asserts Defendant Puumala withheld information regarding who committed the child molestation because she was angry with Plaintiff. Id. Defendant Puumala also allegedly coached the victim of the molestation to tell the police Plaintiff molested her. Id. In addition, Plaintiff contends he has been unable to obtain exculpatory information. Id. If Plaintiff proves the allegations in the proposed complaint, it would be grounds for invalidation of his underlying conviction. For example, if Plaintiff proves the victim of the molestation provided false information to the police and if there is exculpatory evidence, it is possible his plea could be found to be involuntary. This could invalidate the conviction.
As Plaintiff's allegations amount to an attack on the constitutional validity of his underlying convictions, the Proposed Amended Complaint may not be maintained under § 1983 unless Plaintiff can show the convictions have been invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 855-56 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff does not allege his convictions have been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The Court directed Plaintiff to show cause why this case should not be dismissed as Heck barred. Dkt. 8. Plaintiff did not provide any evidence or allegations that his conviction has been overturned. Dkt. 9. Rather, Plaintiff appears to request this Court ignore Heck. Id. at p. 4. The Court declines to do so. As Plaintiff's current convictions have not been reversed and as the validity of the convictions would be called into question if Plaintiff were to prove the facts of this case, his claims are barred by Heck.
B. Personal Participation
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing how individually named defendants caused, or personally participated in causing, the harm alleged in the complaint. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988); Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). A person subjects another to a deprivation of a constitutional right when committing an affirmative act, participating in another's affirmative act, or omitting to perform an act which is legally required. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Sweeping conclusory allegations against an official are insufficient to state a claim for relief. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633.
Here, the Proposed Amended Complaint contains no allegations against Defendant Ryan Jurvakainen. Dkt. 9. Further, Plaintiff states only that Defendant Bennett advised Plaintiff to plead guilty to one count of child molestation. Id. at p. 1. Plaintiff fails to allege any wrong-doing by Defendants Jurvakainen and Bennett. He also failed to adequately explain what actions or inactions by these two Defendants result in an alleged constitutional violation. Plaintiff's vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient to show Defendants Jurvakainen and Bennett violated his constitutional rights. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to Defendants Jurvakainen and Bennett. See Jones v. Community Development Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (vague and mere conclusory allegations unsupported by facts are not sufficient to state section 1983 claims).
C. Improper Defendants
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, Plaintiff must also plead facts showing the defendants were acting under color of state law. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show Defendants Puumala and Bennett were state actors acting under the color of state law.
First, Defendant Puumala appears to have been Plaintiff's roommate who provided information to local authorities about Plaintiff's conduct. Dkt. 9. "Generally, private persons cannot be liable under section 1983 unless their actions were 'clothed' with governmental authority." Goehring v. Wright, 858 F.Supp. 989, 997 (N.D. Cal. 1994). There are no allegations Defendant Puumala was a state actor. Therefore, Defendant Puumala cannot be liable under § 1983. See Goehring, 858 F.Supp. at 998 (finding private citizens complaining to local authorities about the plaintiff's alleged activities were not liable under § 1983).
Second, Plaintiff contends he pled guilty under the advice of his attorney, Defendant Bennett. Dkt. 9, p. 1. "[A] lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor 'under color of state law' within the meaning of § 1983." Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981). Defendant Bennett, as Plaintiff's attorney, is not a state actor. Therefore, Defendant Bennett cannot be liable under § 1983.
III. Leave to Amend
The Ninth Circuit has "established that a pro se litigant bringing a civil rights suit must have an opportunity to amend the complaint to overcome deficiencies unless it is clear that they cannot be overcome by amendment." Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff has been allowed to amend his Proposed Complaint and the Court instructed Plaintiff regarding the deficiencies of his Proposed Complaint. See Dkt. 9. The Court also instructed Plaintiff that he must clearly identify each defendant and explain how each defendant is a state actor acting under color of state law. Id. Therefore, the Court recommends Plaintiff not be given additional leave to amend. See Swearington v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 624 F. App'x 956, 959 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing without leave to amend because the plaintiff did not cure the complaint's deficiencies despite the district court's specific instructions about how to do so); see also Fid. Fin. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, 792 F.2d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir.1986) ("The district court's discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where the court has already given the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint.").
IV. Conclusion
For the above stated reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff's Proposed Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983. As Plaintiff has failed to state a claim, the Court recommends the Application to Proceed IFP (Dkt. 4) be denied and this case be dismissed.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report to file written objections. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of appeal. Thomas v Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Accommodating the time limit imposed by Rule 72(b), the Clerk is directed to set the matter for consideration on May 15, 2020, as noted in the caption.
Dated this 22nd day of April, 2020.
/s/_________
David W. Christel
United States Magistrate Judge