Opinion
Argued January 5, 1950.
March 20, 1950.
Negligence — Automobiles — Driver temporarily blinded by lights of oncoming car — Collision with parked vehicle — Contributory negligence.
Where plaintiff's automobile ran into the rear of defendants' tractor-trailer, and it appeared that plaintiff ascended a slight grade, rounded a bend in the road, and was blinded by an oncoming car's headlights; that he, traveling at 35 miles an hour, refrained from applying his brakes because of snow and ice on the road; that when he recovered his vision, he saw a dark bulk without lights in front of him, and immediately applied his brakes, but because of the road conditions was unable to avoid striking the tractor-trailer; and there was evidence that the tractor-trailer had been stopped, partly on the traveled portion of the highway, without lights or flares; it was Held that, under the evidence, the questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury.
Before MAXEY, C. J., DREW, LINN, STERN, PATTERSON, STEARNE and JONES, JJ.
Appeal, No. 20, Jan. T., 1950, from judgment of Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, Sept. T., 1948, No. 905, in case of C. C. Young v. New York Auto Carrier Company et al. Judgment affirmed.
Trespass for personal injuries and property damage.
The facts are stated in the opinion, by HOBAN, P. J., of the court below, as follows:
The action is trespass for personal injuries and damage to plaintiff's automobile. Following a verdict for plaintiff and appropriate motions, the matter is before us on two rules, both seriously pressed by defendant, one for judgment non obstante veredicto and and the other for a new trial.
Reading the testimony in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it appears that on the early morning of January 22, 1948, McVannon, driving a tractor-trailer used for the transport of automobiles but riding empty at the time, with Varner in the cab with him as assistant, was driving West on highway 611 in the vicinity of Moscow, this county. McVannon becoming sleepy pulled the combination to the right of the road so that the right wheels at least were off the highway, stopped the vehicle and asked Varner to take over. Varner had his shoes off at the time and at McVannon's request proceeded to put his shoes on preparatory to taking over the driving job. The highway at this point was from 20 to 22 feet wide and there was ice and snow on it, although there is no evidence that the night in question was stormy. Plaintiff, driving his own car and traveling in the same direction following the tractor-trailer, ran into the rear end of the combination. In the collision he was seriously injured, became unconscious at the impact, not being revived until he found himself in a Scranton hospital. His car was also severely damaged.
It now becomes important to observe these other facts and the source from which they were elicited: The plaintiff, who was the only witness for himself as to the collision itself, testified that just prior to the collision he had ascended a slight grade, rounded a bend in the road and as he did so he was blinded by the glare of the headlights from a car coming from the opposite direction. When he recovered from his temporary blindness he saw a dark bulk without lights in front of him. He immediately applied his brakes and because of the slippery condition of the road was unable to avoid striking the rear end of what turned out to be the tractor-trailer combination. At the time he was blinded by the headlights of the car passing him in the opposite direction he was traveling at thirty-five miles an hour and refrained from applying his brakes to slow his car because of the known fact that a sudden application of brakes on a road which had snow or ice on it might, instead of actually slowing down the vehicle, result in a dangerous skid and thus enhancing rather than diminishing the chance of accident because of his temporary blindness.
From the foregoing facts the plaintiff claims negligence on the part of defendant's driver, first, for unlawfully parking his vehicle on an open road on the traveled portion of the highway; secondly, for parking it without lights; third, for parking it as a commercial vehicle without placing flares on the highway as required by The Vehicle Code when a vehicle is disabled for any reason on the traveled portion of a highway. Of course, from the plaintiff's point of view he knew nothing of the fact that the stop was a momentary one, that being a matter of defense and, therefore, for the jury.
It is argued that plaintiff is clearly on his own statement guilty of contributory negligence in failing to have his car under such control, under the driving conditions, that he could stop within an assured clear distance ahead made visible by his headlights. The cases have held that a motorist temporarily blinded by oncoming headlights is not required to stop; that such temporary blindness excuses him from responsibility for strict adherence to the assured clear distance requirement, but that if he is proceeding at more than a moderate rate of speed, he is required to slow down and proceed with caution. Defendant here attempts to argue, first, that if plaintiff's story as to rounding the curve just before he came into the danger area and exposure to the opposing headlights is correct, the physical facts negative his theory, because the opposing lights at such a curve ought to go off at a tangent rather than strike plaintiff in the eyes. We must reject this contention as a serious factor in determining plaintiff's contributory negligence as a matter of law, first, because the facts as to time and place depend on verbal testimony alone; secondly, because experience and common knowledge tell us that under driving conditions as described neither surveyor nor mathematician can say that the progress of passing vehicles would be such as to assure the placing of the light beam with mathematical accuracy. Slight inequalities in the driving surface and variations in handling the wheel could easily cause the headlights to traverse the width of the road that they covered with almost every change of road surface conditions.
Nor can it be said that the failure of plaintiff to apply his brakes as he progressed during the moment of temporary blindness was negligence on his part; first, because it is not apparent that the speed at which he was traveling was either unsafe or was not moderate and, secondly, for the very sound reason that the application of brakes might increase rather than diminish the hazard. What he did was to exercise his judgment, and the exercise of judgment, even if it should turn out to be wrong, does not necessarily expose one to the imputation of negligence. Defendant can scarcely suggest that the speed was not moderate or commensurate with driving standards, for on its own behalf it produced witnesses who testified that driving at about the same speed prior to the time of this accident they were able to observe and halt behind this same vehicle without particular difficulty.
It is quite true that as to the question of the necessity for the stopping of defendant's vehicle and whether or not it was lighted when it came to a halt there was conflicting testimony, but for the purposes of considering the motion for judgment n. o. v., we must take that competent testimony which if believed, would warrant the inferences favorable to the plaintiff and reject testimony which would call for opposite inferences. From the facts as stated, we cannot say as a matter of law that the plaintiff either violated any rule of the road or conducted himself in a manner not consistent with that of a reasonable man under like circumstances. Hence, contributory negligence, if any, on his part is a matter of affirmative defense, consequently for the jury. In reaching this conclusion we have considered the effect of the decisions in the cases excusing plaintiffs from the obligation to stop within an assured clear distance ahead because of temporary blindness caused by the lights of another vehicle, commencing with Farley v. Ventresco, 307 Pa. 441, and in particular the statement of the appropriate principles by Mr. Justice STERN in Vierling v. Fry, 354 Pa. 66, and we believe that our decision is in strict accord with the principles held in those cases.
Nor can we say as a matter of law that McVannon, the driver of the tractor-trailer, was not negligent in the manner of halting his vehicle or failing to establish proper precautions against accident during the halt. His defense, to wit, that the halt was momentary for the purpose of protecting the safety of the vehicle and other motorists by relieving a sleepy driver, that he pulled off the road as far as was possible and that the lights on his vehicle were on at the time, is a good one if believed. But since it is a factual defense, it was for the jury and not the court. The testimony of the plaintiff that the vehicle was parked without any lights derives some support from the testimony of another witness on plaintiff's behalf, who came on the scene at some time after the accident occurred and stated that he observed the vehicle without lights. The fact that the stop was somewhat more than momentary is questionable in view of the testimony of some of defendants' own witnesses, two of whom at least stated that they had passed the parked vehicle after bringing their own cars to a halt in its rear at some time prior to the accident. We are convinced that the question of negligence was one for the jury.
The motion for judgment non obstante veredicto must be discharged.
Defendants seem to base their argument for a new trial on the theory that the jury capriciously and unreasonably disregarded the weight of certain competent and impartial testimony in several important respects, particularly as to the exact location of the accident and as to the physical consequences to plaintiff from the injuries received in the crack-up.
We can find no serious reason for a new trial in the conflict of testimony as to the location of the exact point of the accident. The plaintiff himself could describe it only in the most general terms and although his supporting witness, Kerr, observed a tractor-trailer combination and a damaged car at a point according to his recollection some 1000 or 1500 feet away from the place where the defendant's undoubtedly impartial witnesses placed it, Kerr's identification of these vehicles as the ones involved in the accident was sketchy at the most. In any event, so far as the question of liability is concerned, it seems to us that the point involved was the manner and the occurrence of the accident rather than its location on the highway. See our remarks on the question of the physical impossibility of opposing lights causing temporary blindness in our discussion of the motion for judgment n. o. v.
There was some serious conflict in the medical evidence as to whether some of the physical ailments suffered by plaintiff following the accident, and one of his periods of confinement to the hospital, were actually due to the injuries received or to some independent physical condition. But there was medical opinion that a chest condition and subsequent effect on plaintiff's heart was traceable to the operation on his knee, which was undoubtedly necessitated by the injuries received in the accident. Granted that there was reasonable medical opinion to the contrary, nevertheless the conflict is one for the jury, which was adequately instructed as to the effect of the medical testimony and the fact that the amount of damages for physical injuries, expenses consequent thereto and pain and suffering would depend on their acceptance of so much of the medical testimony as they believed, and that the credibility of such testimony was entirely for the jury.
The verdict was for ten thousand dollars. There was evidence that the property damage amounted to twelve hundred dollars, which would leave eighty-eight hundred as damages for the physical injuries and losses directly traceable thereto. Even if so much of the testimony as pertained to plaintiff's chest and heart condition and the subsequent hospitalization therefor were rejected, the amount of this award would not be an unreasonable one considering the undoubtedly serious injuries which plaintiff suffered otherwise and the serious medical expenses to which he was put, as well as expenses incident to carrying on his own business during the period of disability. While this would not be sufficient reason for refusing a new trial if we were convinced that the testimony had been admitted in error, it is some indication that the jury at least gave careful consideration to the value of the testimony and that their finding was not capricious. On the whole we are convinced that the case was one for the jury and it was fairly tried and adequately presented and we can see no reason for disturbing the jury's verdict.
Defendants appealed.
Hugh J. McMenamin, with him O'Malley, Harris, Harris Warren, for appellants.
Z. R. Bialkowski, with him Bialkowski, Bialkowski Bialkowski, for appellee.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed on the opinion of President Judge HOBAN.