Opinion
CIVIL 6:23-CV-00608-ADA-JCM
04-25-2024
STEPHEN YOUNG, et al, Plaintiffs, v. MCLENNAN COUNTY, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JEFFREY C. MANSKE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO: THE HONORABLE ALAN D ALBRIGHT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), and Rules 1(f) and 4(b) of Appendix C of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges. Before the Court are Defendant McLennan County's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6), Plaintiffs' Response (ECF No. 10), and Defendant's Reply (ECF No. 13). For the following reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS Defendant's Motion be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
Waco Police Department officers arrested Jesse Evans on June 3, 2022, because of a physical domestic dispute between Evans and his girlfriend. Pls.' Compl. (ECF No. 1) at ¶ 10. Officers placed Evans in the backseat of a patrol vehicle and transported him to the McLennan County Jail. Id. On the way to the jail, Evans banged his head on the vehicle and told the officers that he could not live without his girlfriend and would kill himself. Id.
During the intake process, LVN Chris Jones completed a jail intake screening form for Evans. Id. at ¶ 11, 12. The form indicated that Evans had previously attempted suicide and that he had felt depressed prior to arrest. Id. at ¶ 11. The form also indicated that Evans had received services for emotional and mental health problems through Travis County MHMR. Id. at ¶ 12. Finally, the form indicated that Evans had been diagnosed with depression and anxiety. Id.
Jones did not view any documents relating to Evans's prior incarcerations at the McLennan County Jail which Plaintiffs allege would have changed Evans's suicide watch classification. According to jail records, Evans had been incarcerated at the McLennan County jail at least three times. Id. at ¶ 15-17. In late 2017, jail staff notified a magistrate judge that jail staff suspected Evans may be suicidal or suffer from a medical or mental impairment. Id. at ¶ 15. In April 2018, Evans was placed on suicide watch due to his history of suicide attempts. Id. at ¶ 16. Again, in August 2018, Evans's intake screening form indicated that he had attempted suicide before and received services for mental health problems. Id. at ¶ 17
In light of Evans's answers on the form, Jones placed Evans on a low-risk suicide watch. Id. at ¶ 13. Jailers placed Evans in a jail cell with a privacy partition with many holes which could be used as tie-off points for a ligature. Id. at ¶ 18. Jailers also gave Evans standard jail clothing, not suicide prevention clothing, and a blanket. Id. Evans tore the blanket, tied a knot in it, threaded it through two of the partition's holes, tied another knot, and used the blanket as a noose to hang himself. Id. Plaintiffs also allege that Evans's suicide occurred during a period in which he had not been checked for longer than fifteen minutes. Id.
After Evans's suicide, Texas Ranger Jim Hatfield investigated the suicide. Id. at ¶ 19. As part of his investigation, Hatfield reviewed security footage from the jail and described his perspective of the footage in his report. Hatfield's report indicates that Evans was locked in his cell at 7:05 p.m. Id. at ¶ 51. It also includes various observations by jailers at the following times: 7:09 p.m., 7:18 p.m., 7:23 p.m., 7:27 p.m., 7:31 p.m., and 7:48 p.m. Id. at ¶ 51-53. Evans was found hanging from his blanket during the 7:48 p.m. check. Id. at ¶ 53.
Plaintiffs sued McLennan County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of Evans's constitutional rights to be protected from suicide under the Fourteenth Amendment on August 16, 2023. McLennan County filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Def.'s Mot. That Motion is before the Court.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Upon motion or sua sponte, a court may dismiss an action that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 2006). To survive Rule 8, a nonmovant must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “The court's task is to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim that is plausible, not to evaluate the plaintiff's likelihood of success.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). The court begins by identifying which allegations are well-pleaded facts and which are legal conclusions or elemental recitations, accepting as true the former and rejecting the latter. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court need not blindly accept every allegation of fact; properly pleaded allegations of fact amount to more than just conclusory allegations or legal conclusions “masquerading as factual conclusions.” Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002). The court then determines whether the accepted allegations state a plausible claim to relief. Id. at 379.
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “The court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the [nonmovant].” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the [nonmovant] pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the [movant] is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. For purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), “pleadings” include the complaint, its attachments, and documents referred to in the complaint and central to a plaintiff's claims. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-499 (5th Cir. 2000).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiffs' Complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 8.
McLennan County argues that Plaintiffs' Complaint should be dismissed for failing to comply with Rule 8. Def.'s Mot. at 2, n.3. A plaintiff's complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). McLennan County argues that Plaintiffs' “haystack complaint” causes an undue burden on the Court like a 130-page pro se complaint. Def.'s Mot. at 2 (citations omitted). The Court disagrees and notes that, while Plaintiffs' Complaint is long and not organized chronologically, it is logically organized. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint under Rule 8 should be denied.
B. Plaintiffs' claims under Kingsley should be dismissed.
Plaintiffs raise claims against McLennan County under Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015). In Kingsley, the Supreme Court held that in excessive force cases, “a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396-97. Plaintiffs argue in their Complaint that since a pretrial detainee's right to receive medical and mental health care also arises under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause, there is no reason to apply a different standard. Pls.' Compl. at ¶ 98. As McLennan County argues, the Fifth Circuit has already rejected this argument. See Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 207 n. 7 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that, “Since Kingsley discussed a different type of constitutional claim, it did not abrogate our deliberate-indifference precedent.”). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on Kingsley should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
C. Plaintiffs' Monell claims against McLennan County
Plaintiffs also raise claims against McLennan County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of Evans's Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process. Pls.' Compl. at 40-42. Plaintiffs primarily raise a conditions of confinement claim. Id. at ¶ 7. Alternatively, Plaintiffs allege an episodic acts or omissions claim. Id. McLennan County argues that the correct interpretation of Plaintiffs' claims is an episodic acts or omissions claim, but that Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts under either standard. Def.'s Mot. at 12. McLennan County also argues that Plaintiffs have failed to plead an unlawful policy that was the proximate cause of Evans's alleged constitutional violations. Id. at 19.
A municipality may not face liability based on its employees' actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Instead, municipalities face Section 1983 liability “when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” Id. at 694. A municipality may be held liable under section 1983 only when the enforcement of the municipal policy or practice was the “moving force” behind the violation of the plaintiff's federally protected right. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410-11 (1997). The plaintiff must prove three elements to establish liability against a municipality: (1) a policymaker; (2) an official policy; and (3) a violation of constitutional rights whose moving force is the municipal policy or custom. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. The proper analysis of municipal liability under section 1983 “requires [a separation of] two different issues . . . (1) whether plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether the city is responsible for that violation.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992).
1. Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiffs allege a conditions of confinement claim against McLennan County for Evans's suicide. Pls.' Compl. at ¶ 7. A challenge to a condition of confinement is a challenge to “general conditions, practices, rules, or restrictions of pretrial confinement.” Estate of Henson v. Wichita Cnty., Tex., 795 F.3d 456, 463 (5th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). These conditions can be explicit, such as the number of bunks per cell, or it may reflect a de facto policy evidence by a sufficiently extended or pervasive pattern of acts or omissions. Id. This theory “rests on the idea that the County has imposed what amounts to punishment in advance of trial on pretrial detainees, and it requires no showing of specific intent on the part of the County.” Sanchez v. Young Cnty., 866 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 2017). When a plaintiff challenges a condition of confinement, courts must ask whether the condition is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective. Estate of Henson, 795 F.3d at 463.
The County's primary argument relating to Plaintiffs' conditions of confinement claim is that Plaintiffs' claims are actually episodic acts or omissions claims because “jail suicide cases are typically considered as episodic acts or omissions claims.” Def.'s Mot. at 12. To support this position, the County relies on a case from the Northern District of Texas. Id. at n.38. In Hetchler v. Rockwall Cnty. Tex., the court interpreted the plaintiff's claim regarding a jail suicide as an episodic acts or omissions claim because the “reported cases of the Fifth Circuit uniformly hold that inmate suicides involve ‘episodic acts or omissions' claims.” No. 3:08-CV-0551-B, 2009 WL 1160284, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2009). That statement is no longer correct. In 2020, the Fifth Circuit expressly held that “a fact issue exists over whether multiple policies interacted to cause constitutionally inadequate confinement conditions” in a case involving a jail suicide. Sanchez v. Young Cnty., Tex., 956 F.3d 785, 796 (5th Cir. 2020).
The County secondarily argues that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege policies, practices, or customs to support their claims. The County argues that “Plaintiffs claims should be dismissed as pleadings based on information and belief are deficient.” Def.'s Mot. at 15, n.68. The Fifth Circuit has, however expressly held that pleading based upon information and belief is permissible where the facts are peculiarly within the possession and control of the defendant or where the belief is based on factual information that makes the inference of culpability plausible. Innova Hosp. San Antonio, Ltd. P'ship v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 892 F.3d 719, 730 (5th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). Without any specific arguments about which of Plaintiffs' allegations based upon information and belief are either not within the possession and control of the defendant or where the belief is not based on information making the inference plausible, the Court should reject this argument.
Further, Plaintiffs identify a series of alleged policies, practices, and customs throughout their Complaint based on information and belief. First, Plaintiffs allege that the County had a policy of providing pretrial detainees on low-risk suicide watch with a blanket and standard jail clothing which the County knows are used as ligatures in a room with numerous tie-off points without adequately monitoring the detainees. Pls.' Compl. at ¶ 18, 46, 97. Plaintiffs also identify a policy, custom, or practice of failing or being unable to review documents relevant to determining a detainee's risk of suicide regarding prior incarcerations in the McLennan County Jail. Id. at ¶ 31. Finally, Plaintiffs allege a practice of creating false observation records and lax pass-down of information about suicidal detainees during shift changes. Id. at ¶ 97.
Plaintiffs support each of these alleged policies with sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss. The jail's policies relating to what items may be given to detainees on suicide watch, the enforcement of pass-down of information policies, and what documents must be reviewed when determining a detainee's suicide risk are policies peculiarly within the possession and control of the defendant. Plaintiffs have supported the third policy with adequate facts which plausibly confirm its existence. Plaintiffs attached the observation log for Evans and included a detailed summary of the Texas Rangers' report of the surveillance videos with time stamps of when Evans was checked. The Texas Rangers' report varies significantly from the observation log, which supports a claim that jail staff create false observation records. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged these policies.
2. Episodic Acts and Omissions
In the section titled “Plaintiffs failed to plead facts sufficient to state an episodic act claim,” of the County's Motion to Dismiss, the County's argument is limited to a single paragraph arguing that Plaintiffs have failed to plead an underlying constitutional violation. Def.'s Mot. at 18-19. The County argues that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege that any County employee violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Id. at 18. Plaintiffs allege that Evans's right to be protected from a known risk of suicide under the Fourteenth Amendment was violated. The Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees' right to medical care and to protection from known suicidal tendencies. Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Sanchez v. Oliver, 995 F.3d 461, 466, 473 (5th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted); Edmiston v. Borrego, 75 F.4th 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted).
The County argues that the Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged that the County or any of its employees had any actual knowledge that Evans was suicidal. Def.'s Reply at 2-3. Plaintiffs allege that County employees were clearly aware of Evans's suicidal tendencies because they placed him on suicide watch. Clearly, County employees were aware of a known risk of suicide, or they would not have placed Evans on suicide watch. Plaintiffs have also alleged that Evans's risk of suicide was substantial. See Pls.' Compl. at ¶ 10 (Evans told Waco Police officers that he would kill himself), ¶ 11 (Evans indicated that he had previously attempted suicide and was currently depressed on his jail intake screening form).
The County also makes a conclusory assertion that Plaintiffs failed to allege that no official responded with deliberate indifference. Plaintiffs have alleged that an officer gave Evans a blanket and placed him in a cell with obvious tie-off points. Plaintiffs have also clearly alleged that County jailers knew that suicidal detainees would attempt suicide in the exact manner that Evans did. Id. at ¶ 46. Plaintiffs have clearly alleged deliberate indifference in their Complaint.
McLennan County also argues that “Plaintiffs can identify no precedent indicating that, under these alleged circumstances, Evans was required by the Constitution to be under a more frequent and/or continuous watch, directly or with cameras, and to have been denied regular clothes and bedding.” Def.'s Mot. at 17. This is clearly incorrect. In Sanchez v. Oliver, the Fifth Circuit noted that it has “held in the past that giving obvious ligatures to a detainee who is known to be at risk of suicide constitutes deliberate indifference.” 995 F.3d 461, 473 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing to Converse v. City of Kemah, Tex., 961 F.3d 771, 778-79 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding deliberate indifference where some steps were taken to prevent suicide including placing the detainee in a cell with video monitoring, but the detainee was left in a cell with obvious tie-off points)).
3. Moving Force
The County argues that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead a claim that any of the alleged policies were the proximate cause of Evans's rights. Def.'s Mot. at 19-20. Plaintiffs argue that they have adequately pleaded that the County's policies individually or working together were the moving forces behind Evans's suicide. Pls.' Resp. at 22. Here, Plaintiffs have alleged several policies which interacted to form the conditions in which Evans's suicide was possible. Supra 6-10. Plaintiffs have made sufficient allegations that these policies were the moving force behind Evans's suicide. Sanchez, 956 F.3d at 795-96. Accordingly, the County's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' claims should be denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that McLennan County's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6) be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
V. OBJECTIONS
The parties may wish to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Parties filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which they object. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and recommendations in the Report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Except upon grounds of plain error, failing to object shall further bar the party from appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas, 474 U.S. at 150-53; Douglass, 79 F.3d at 1415.