" In the prevailing opinion in Young v. Martinich, 279 Mich. 267, wherein verdict directed against plaintiff on the ground of contributory negligence was affirmed, the facts are quite similar to those in the case at bar, especially in that plaintiff Young knew, as did plaintiff in the instant case, that defendant's automobile was approaching. The opinion states that Young, when "walking his usual gait," was struck by defendant's car "just as he was about to step on the `tree lawn' on the north side of the street;" and the headnote reads;

" Also, see Young v. Martinich, 279 Mich. 267, and Davidson v. City of Detroit, 307 Mich. 420. We conclude that plaintiff Carre W. Morrison was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

Molda v. Clark, 236 Mich. 277, 210 N.W. 203; Molby v. Detroit United Ry., 221 Mich. 419, 191 N.W. 29; Russo v. Grand Rapids, 255 Mich. 474, 238 N.W. 273. (c) Plaintiff's testimony that she looked when she was at the east side of the forty-foot concrete highway, waited for a northbound car to pass, and then walked eastward across the highway, does not relieve her from the imputation of negligence in walking across the entire width of the highway without again looking for approaching traffic. Richardson v. Williamson, 249 Mich. 350, 228 N.W. 766; Jones v. Armstrong, 231 Mich. 637, 204 N.W. 702; Young v. Martinich, 279 Mich. 267, 271 N.W. 753; Haley v. Grosse Ile Rapid Transit Co., 290 Mich. 373, 287 N.W. 536; Lodato v. Camel, 284 Mich. 217, 278 N.W. 825; Lemieux v. Ondersma, 291 Mich. 469, 289 N.W. 218; Halzle v. Hargreaves, 233 Mich. 234, 206 N.W. 356. R.C. Brinkman for J.A. Wentz.

At the continuous rate of eight miles per hour she would have traveled slightly over 41 feet, and this is without any allowance for the time needed for acceleration, an inevitable process which consumes time that might mean the saving of life. Under the circumstances, where outlook was limited, as plaintiff here says, to the narrow range of 150 feet, and she proceeded at a very low rate of speed, her failure to get the warning of danger or the assurance of safety that a second glance would afford constituted such a disregard for her own protection as to justify the action of the trial court in directing a verdict against her. Circumstances may require more than one satisfying look before entering an intersection to fulfill the duty of observation. Thomas v. Railroad Co., 267 Mich. 396; Young v. Martinich, 279 Mich. 267; Wells v. Oliver, 283 Mich. 168; Block v. Peterson, supra; Carey v. DeRose, 286 Mich. 321; Ehrke v. Danek, 288 Mich. 498. "Visibility at an intersection is a factor," it is said, "and more care is required under some circumstances than others." Rathburn v. Riedel, 291 Mich. 652. Plaintiff relies on Reichle v. Railway, 203 Mich. 276, where it was held that the question of self-protection was for the jury.

" See, also, Halzle v. Hargreaves, 233 Mich. 234; Richardson v. Williams, 249 Mich. 350; Kerr v. Hayes, 250 Mich. 19; McKelvey v. Hill, 259 Mich. 16; Brodie v. City of Detroit, 275 Mich. 626; Young v. Martinich, 279 Mich. 267; DeCoopman v. Hammond, 279 Mich. 619; Wells v. Oliver, 283 Mich. 168; Slingerland v. Snell, 283 Mich. 524. Had Mrs. Carey looked while crossing the intersection it is manifest that she would have seen the approaching car in ample time to have avoided the collision. If defendant's negligence and Mrs. Carey's want of reasonable care occasioned the collision, then, under the law of imputed negligence, there can be no recovery in behalf of decedent's estate.

Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Halzle v. Hargreaves, 233 Mich. 234; Richardson v. Williams, 249 Mich. 350; Kerr v. Hayes, 250 Mich. 19; McKelvey v. Hill, 259 Mich. 16; Brodie v. City of Detroit, 275 Mich. 626; Young v. Martinich, 279 Mich. 267; DeCoopman v. Hammond, 279 Mich. 619. The judgment is affirmed, with costs to defendants.

The court was not in error in holding Mr. Wells guilty of contributory negligence. The rule of law applicable to the case has been stated in Halzle v. Hargreaves, 233 Mich. 234; Richardson v. Williams, 249 Mich. 350; Kerr v. Hayes, 250 Mich. 19; McKelvey v. Hill, 259 Mich. 16; Brodie v. City of Detroit, 275 Mich. 626; Young v. Martinich, 279 Mich. 267; DeCoopman v. Hammond, 279 Mich. 619. Peculiar and distracting circumstances set forth in Scurlock v. Peglow, 263 Mich. 658, distinguish that case.

Even if defendant was exceeding the speed limit, such fact does not excuse plaintiff's want of reasonable care. DeCoopman v. Hammond, 279 Mich. 619; Young v. Martinich, 279 Mich. 267. The judgment is reversed, without a new trial and, with costs to defendant.