The quoted Rule is followed by our Courts. This Court in Young v. Littles Unknown Heirs, 232 S.W.2d 614 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1950), held that a deed which purported to convey the land itself was not a mere quitclaim deed. We hold that the Chancellor's authorization to plaintiff to give a quitclaim deed to Richard Koella is not a sale that would trigger the right of first refusal, and the Deed, as authorized by the Chancellor, does not purport to convey the land but merely any interest plaintiff may have in the property.
The case of Davidson v. Foley, 414 S.W.2d 123 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1966), is instructive on this issue, because in that case this Court ruled that the defendant had established adverse possession to the property in dispute, and "it necessarily follows" that the deed which the plaintiffs were claiming title under was champertous and void as to the parcel adversely held. See Young v. Little's Unknown Heirs, 232 S.W.2d 614 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1949). The evidence in this case establishes that defendant had notice of the adverse claim and the Trial Court having found that plaintiffs adversely possessed the land, the finding that defendants' deed was champertous would necessarily follow.
See Youngv. Little's Unknown Heirs, 34 Tenn. App. 39, 54, 232 S.W.2d 614, 621 (1949); Lee v. Harrison, 32 Tenn. 603, 613, 270 S.W.2d 173, 177 (1954); Burnett v. Williams, No. 01A01-9605-CH-00222, 1997 WL 13758, *3 (Tenn.App. Jan. 16, 1997); but see Bass v. Wilkins, Madison Equity No. 1, 1989 WL 11736 (Tenn.App. Feb. 15, 1989). Because the plaintiffs have failed to meet the procedural requirements, we do not reach the issue of whether proper notice was given or whether plaintiffs should be credited for the amount of taxes paid by Bank.
McAMIS, J. This appeal is from the action of the Chancellor in sustaining the petition of A.F. Littleton filed after the remand of these consolidated cases on the former appeal. 34 Tenn. App. 39, 232 S.W.2d 614. The present appeal is by what is referred to in Judge Howard's opinion on the former appeal as the Zeh Group or Grace Zeh and Associates. A number of the questions made by the assignments of error are concluded by the findings and adjudications made by the Chancellor and affirmed on the former appeal. These include an adjudication that the deed from appellants to C.K. Young and wife was not a quitclaim deed but purported to be a conveyance of the entire fee-simple title to property valued at $4,000.
Furthermore, under the proof, the complainants did not acquire title to the strip of land in controversy as the land was adversely held by the defendant under fence prior to and on the date complainants obtained their deed. Under our authorities, this made complainants' deed champertous and void as to the inclosed strip. Code Secs. 7823, 7824, 7827; Jones v. Mosley, 29 Tenn. App. 559, 198 S.W.2d 652; Young v. Little's Unknown Heirs, 34 Tenn. App. 39, 232 S.W.2d 614. In sustaining that portion of the complainants' bill directing the defendant to remove the fence and gate which he had previously erected across the easement, we find that the able opinion of the Special Chancellor fully sets forth the facts and the proper legal conclusions.