Count II alleges that the Keasts breached their duties of reasonable care as landowners. The Keasts' duty as landowners must be analyzed according to the law governing landlord-tenant relations. See Young v. Libby, 1999 ME 139, ¶ 12, 737 A.2d 1071, 1074 (applying landlord-tenant law in determining whether landlord breached a duty to tenant's child); Golf Club Co. v. Rothstein, 102 S.E.2d 654, 656 (Ga.Ct.App. 1958) (members of tenant's family stand in tenant's shoes for determining if landlord breached a duty). Count II survives pursuant to the analysis relating to Count I, but the counts state essentially the same cause of action.

"The party seeking a judgment after an adverse verdict has the burden of showing that the jury verdict was "'clearly and manifestly wrong.'" Harvey, 3 Maine Civil Practice § 50:4, at 124 (3d ed. 2011) (quoting Young v. Libby, 1999 ME 139, ¶ 7, 737 A.2d 1071. Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate "if the court determines that, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, a jury could not reasonably find for that party on an issue that under the substantive law is an essential element of the claim."