Here, even if Nicholson's claims against all named defendants were founded on the same nucleus of facts, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the severance after granting the interlocutory, no-evidence summary judgment in favor of Appellees. See, e.g., Young v. Heins, No. 01-15-00500-CV, 2017 WL 2376828, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 1, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Dorsey, 480 S.W.3d at 15; Banks v. River Oaks Steak House, No. 2-03-363-CV, 2004 WL 1858216, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 19, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.); Arredondo, 79 S.W.3d at 665. We overrule issue two.
Young also asserted against the individual members of the Board of Trustees ("trustees") third-party claims, which were severed into a separate case. See Paul T. Young v. William Heins, Leah Vidrine, Emily Lueck, and Wayde Shipman, No. 13-CV-0293-A (56th Dist. Ct., Harris Cty., Tex., June 18, 2015), aff'd, No. 01-15-00500-CV, 2017 WL 2376828 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 1, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). In January 2012, Michael Treece, the Association's attorney, sent to Young a letter ordering him to "completely re-roof his home."
Young also asserted against the individual members of the Board of Trustees ("trustees") third-party claims, which were severed into a separate case. See Paul T. Young v. William Heins, Leah Vidrine, Emily Lueck, and Wayde Shipman, No. 13-CV-0293-A (56th Dist. Ct., Harris Cty., Tex.), aff'd, Paul T. Young v. William Heins, Leah Vidrine, Emily Lueck, and Wayde Shipman, No. 01-15-00500-CV 2017 WL 2376828 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 1, 2017, no pet. h.). In January 2012, Michael Treece, the Association's attorney, sent to Young a letter ordering him to "completely re-roof his home."