While a landowner's liability for the condition of real estate generally ceases when possession and control is transferred (see, Romel v. Reale, 155 A.D.2d 747), it is settled that liability will remain with the vendor where the vendee has knowledge of the dangerous condition at the time of the conveyance but has not yet had a sufficient opportunity at the time of the accident to remedy the defect (see, Young v. Hanson, 179 A.D.2d 978, 979). We find that a triable issue of fact was raised concerning plaintiff's knowledge of the potentially dangerous condition of the lack of flooring in the attic directly in front of the staircase.

Heavy rain was falling and, as he stood briefly on the wet grass—which he described as very slippery—he fell down the slope. As a general rule, “a landowner's liability for the condition of real property ceases when possession and control thereof is transferred” (Young v. Hanson, 179 A.D.2d 978, 978–979, 579 N.Y.S.2d 221 [1992] ; see Bittrolff v. Ho's Dev. Corp., 77 N.Y.2d 896, 898, 568 N.Y.S.2d 902, 571 N.E.2d 72 [1991] ; Romel v. Reale, 155 A.D.2d 747, 748, 547 N.Y.S.2d 691 [1989] ). As noted in our previous decision, there is an exception in certain limited circumstances when a former landowner “ affirmatively created the dangerous condition” (Marrero v. Marsico, 218 A.D.2d 226, 229, 639 N.Y.S.2d 183 [1996] ; see 102 A.D.3d at 993, 958 N.Y.S.2d 232 ).

It is our contention that regardless of whether the state of Mississippi has identified the lands or made the proper selection which was approved by the Secretary of Interior, or other competent federal authority, or whether it has received a patent to the land, makes no difference, for the reason that this record nowhere shows any evidence of that fact, and the only attempt was to show that it is now subject to overflow. Conners v. Meservey, 76 Iowa 691, 39 N.W. 388; Young v. Hanson, 95 Iowa 717, 64 N.W. 654; Martin v. Marks, 97 U.S. 345, 24 L.Ed. 940; Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U.S. 488, 30 L.Ed. 1039; Irwin v. San Francisco Savings Union, 136 U.S. 578, 34 L.Ed. 540; Funston v. Metcalf, 40 Miss. 504; Dowd v. Louisville, N.O. T. Ry. Co., 68 Miss. 159. Your Honors will observe that by section 3 of this McLaurin Act, the Act does not apply to the countries within the Third Congressional district, naming them and including the county of Issaquena, in which the land in question in this case is located.

case at bar there was never even a pretended cancellation made but simply the word "error" written across the entry when in the land office officials at Jackson had exercised the smallest degree of inquiry as they were required to do before allowing another entry upon the land in question they would have ascertained the fact that suit No. 3066 on the docket of the chancery court was then pending wherein Brannon was contesting his rights to the land with the heirs of one of the three parties, who the Tract Book showed had obtained title from the United States Government. So, we submit that the entry of July 5, 1853, was never cancelled and so far as the records that were on file in the Jackson, Mississippi, land office (and under the Federal statute, the records of the office prevailed until changed or corrected in the manner prescribed by statute) so said entry existed until that office was closed some three years ago and its records removed to the General Land Office at Washington. Young v. Hanson, 95 Ia. 717, 64 N.W. 654; Peyton v. Desmond, 129 Fed. 1, 63 C.C.A. 651; Risdon v. Davenport, 4 S.D. 555, 57 N.W. 482; Louis v. Shaw, 57 Fed. 516; Durango v. Evans, 80 Fed. 425, 25 C.C.A. 523; United States v. Detroit Timber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 50 L.Ed. 499; Guaranty Savings Bank v. Bladow, 176 U.S. 448, 44 L.Ed. 540; Parsons v. Venzke, 164 U.S. 89, 41 L.Ed. 360; Puget v. Brown, 7 C.C.A. 643; Martinson v. Marzolf, 15 N.D. 471, 108 N.W. 801; Harmon v. Clifton, 51 Ia. 36, 50 N.W. 541; Wilhite v. Barr, 67 Mo. 284; Duluth R.R. Co. v. Roy, 173 U.S. 587, 43 L.Ed. 820; Starke v. Mather, Walk. 181 (Miss.), affirmed 7 L.Ed. 67; Ard v. Brandon, 156 U.S. 527, 39 L.Ed. 524; Germania Iron Co. v. James, 32 C.C.A. 348; Lindsey v. Hawes, 2 Black 554, 17 L.Ed., 265.

Plaintiff expressly disavows seeking to hold the vendor liable based on its employment relationship with Miller. She argues instead that this is a premises liability case that involves the narrow exception allowingliability to be imposed on a previous owner “where a dangerous condition existed at the time of the conveyance and the new owner has not had a reasonable time to discover ... and to remedy the condition” ( Smith v. Northern Lights Land Co., LLC, 80 A.D.3d 964, 965, 916 N.Y.S.2d 255 [2011] [internal quotationmarks and citations omitted]; accord Young v. Hanson, 179 A.D.2d 978, 978–979, 579 N.Y.S.2d 221 [1992] ). According to plaintiff, the dangerous condition here was Miller's employment, and she contends that there are issues of fact as to whether the vendee had sufficient time to discover and remedy that condition.

"As a general rule, liability for dangerous conditions on land does not extend to a prior owner of the premises. A narrow exception exists, however, and liability may be imposed where a dangerous condition existed at the time of the conveyance and the new owner has not had a reasonable time to discover the condition, if it was unknown, and to remedy the condition once it is known" ( Bittrolffv Ho's Dev. Corp., 77 NY2d 896, 898 [citation omitted]; see Slomin v Skaarland Constr. Corp., 207 AD2d 639, 641-642; Young v Hanson, 179 AD2d 978, 978-979). While this exception has been found under certain circumstances to apply to a managing agent of a property ( see Armstrong v Ogden Allied Facility Mgt. Corp., 281 AD2d 317, 318), we find on the present circumstances that it does not apply here.

Notably, "liability will remain with the vendor where the vendee has knowledge of the dangerous condition at the time of the conveyance but has not yet had a sufficient opportunity at the time of the accident to remedy the defect" ( Slomin v. Skaarland Constr. Corp., supra, at 641-642), there being no basis to hold the vendee liable "for a known defect until a reasonable time to cure the defect has elapsed ( see, Farragher v. City of New York, 26 A.D.2d 494, 496, affd 21 N.Y.2d 756). Other examples of where the vendor will still be liable are where ""there is an undisclosed condition, and the vendee has no knowledge of this condition, or where the vendor actively conceals it, the liability remains with the vendor until the vendee has had a reasonable time to discover and remedy [the condition]'" ( Young v. Hanson, 179 A.D.2d 978, 979, quoting Farragher v. City of New York, supra, at 496). None of these exceptions have been established in the instant case. It is undisputed that defendant transferred equitable title to Edwards and Price by virtue of the 1989 purchase agreement, almost four years before the accident.

Appeal from Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Arber, J.). With respect to appellant former owner of the premises, questions of fact exist as to whether it created or negligently permitted the dangerous condition that allegedly caused plaintiff's injury, and, if so, whether defendant current owner had either actual or constructive notice of the condition before the accident ( see, Young v. Hanson, 179 A.D.2d 978). With respect to appellant managing agent, since the branch of the motion seeking summary judgment in its favor was unopposed and the IAS Court's decision states no reasons for denying such relief and plaintiff on appeal herself offers no reasons for denying such relief, there is no necessity for a remand to the IAS Court for an explanation of its decision and instead we grant the relief that the IAS Court should have granted. Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Ellerin, Williams, Tom and Colabella, JJ.

lity for a defective condition generally does not extend to a prior owner of the premises ( see, e.g., James v. Stark, 183 A.D.2d 873; Banks v. Banks, 121 A.D.2d 421), an exception exists "where a dangerous condition existed at the time of the conveyance [by the former owner] and the new owner has not had a reasonable time to discover the condition, if it was unknown, and to remedy the condition once it is known" ( Bittrolff v. Ho's Dev. Corp., 77 N.Y.2d 896, 898; see, Mullen v Zoebe, Inc., 205 A.D.2d 597; Farragher v. City of New York, 26 A.D.2d 494, affd 21 N.Y.2d 756). Under the circumstances of this case, and in view of the limited disclosure conducted, questions exist with regard to whether the alleged defective condition was present at the time of the conveyance and, if so, whether the new owners of the premises had a reasonable opportunity prior to the accident to remedy that condition ( see, Slomin v. Skaarland Constr. Corp., 207 A.D.2d 639; Brown v. O'Connor, 193 A.D.2d 1088; Young v. Hanson, 179 A.D.2d 978). Accordingly, resolution of these issues must await further discovery or a trial.

Initially, we reject defendants' contention that they cannot be held liable simply because they no longer own the property. While it is true that in general a landowner's liability to third persons for the condition of real property ceases upon transfer of possession and control (see, Young v. Hanson, 179 A.D.2d 978; Restatement [Second] of Torts § 372), that general rule is subject to exception in cases where the former owner has "created or negligently permitted to remain on the land a structure or other artificial condition which involves an unreasonable risk of harm to others outside of the land, because of its plan, construction, location, disrepair or otherwise" (Restatement [Second] of Torts § 373 [1]; cf., Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 59 N.Y.2d 239, 246; New York Tel. Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 99 A.D.2d 185, 189-190). Because it is obvious that an improperly designed and installed septic system can present an unreasonable risk of harm to others, especially where the water source for the properties in the immediate area are private wells which draw from subterranean streams or percolating water, there can be little doubt that to the extent plaintiffs can prove that defendants' actions relative to the septic system were negligent or satisfied the requisite elements of a nuisance, they c