Young v. GSL Enterprises, Inc.

5 Citing cases

  1. Taggart v. Costabile

    131 A.D.3d 243 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)   Cited 186 times
    Holding that "notwithstanding case law to the contrary, extreme and outrageous conduct is not an essential element of a cause of action to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress."

    ; Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 152 N.E.2d 249). However, case law from this Court, and the First Department, has nevertheless included language indicating or implying that extreme and outrageous conduct is an essential element of a cause of action to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress ( see Rodgers v. City of New York, 106 A.D.3d 1068, 1070, 966 N.Y.S.2d 466; Ural v. Encompass Ins. Co. of Am., 97 A.D.3d 562, 565–566, 948 N.Y.S.2d 621; McGovern v. Nassau County Dept. of Social Servs., 60 A.D.3d 1016, 1018, 876 N.Y.S.2d 141; Tartaro v. Allstate Indem. Co., 56 A.D.3d 758, 759, 868 N.Y.S.2d 281; Chime v. Sicuranza, 221 A.D.2d 401, 403, 633 N.Y.S.2d 536; Burrell v. International Assn. of Firefighters, 216 A.D.2d 346, 628 N.Y.S.2d 355; see also Sheila C. v. Povich, 11 A.D.3d 120, 130–131, 781 N.Y.S.2d 342; Acquista v. New York Life Ins. Co., 285 A.D.2d 73, 83, 730 N.Y.S.2d 272; Dillon v. City of New York, 261 A.D.2d 34, 41, 704 N.Y.S.2d 1; Young v. GSL Enters., 237 A.D.2d 119, 119, 654 N.Y.S.2d 24; Naturman v. Crain Communications, 216 A.D.2d 150, 150, 628 N.Y.S.2d 281; Callas v. Eisenberg, 192 A.D.2d 349, 350, 595 N.Y.S.2d 775; Stanley v. Smith, 183 A.D.2d 675, 675, 584 N.Y.S.2d 60). Review of these cases reveals that none provides any rationale for the conclusion that extreme and outrageous conduct is an essential element of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress ( see Rodgers v. City of New York, 106 A.D.3d at 1070, 966 N.Y.S.2d 466; Ural v. Encompass Ins. Co. of Am., 97 A.D.3d at 565–566, 948 N.Y.S.2d 621; McGovern v. Nassau County Dept. of Social Servs., 60 A.D.3d at 1018, 876 N.Y.S.2d 141; Tartaro v. Allstate Indem. Co., 56 A.D.3d at 759, 868 N.Y.S.2d 281; Chime v. Sicuranza, 221 A.D.2d at 403, 633 N.Y.S.2d 536; Burrell v. International Assn. of Firefighters, 216 A.D.2d 346, 628 N.Y.S.2d 355; see also Sheila C. v. Povich, 11 A.D.3d at 130–131, 781 N.Y.S.2d 342; Acquista v. New York Life Ins. Co., 285 A.D.2d at 83, 730 N.Y.S.2d 272; Dillon v. City of New Y

  2. Dawkins v. Williams

    413 F. Supp. 2d 161 (N.D.N.Y. 2006)   Cited 24 times
    Holding that the state police officers were not responsible for the bail decisions made in relation to plaintiff's detention

    Such extreme and outrageous conduct must be clearly alleged for the pleadings to survive dismissal.Dillon v. City of New York, 704 N.Y.S.2d 1, 7-8 (1st Dep't 1999) (emphasis added) (citing, inter alia,Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 303 (1983); Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121-122 (1993) (Kaye, C.J.); Young v. GSL Enter., 654 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1st Dep't 1997); Trachtman v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 673 N.Y.S.2d 726 (2d Dep't 1998)). Furthermore,

  3. Dillon v. City of New York

    261 A.D.2d 34 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 885 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "[d]efamation has long been recognized to arise from the making of a false statement which tends to expose the plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or induce an evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive him of their friendly intercourse in society."

    A cause of action for either intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress must be supported by allegations of conduct by a defendant "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community" (Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 303 [citation omitted]; see also,Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121-122). We have applied the same standard to both the intentional and negligence theories of emotional distress (Young v. GSL Enterprises, 237 A.D.2d 119;Naturman v. Crain Communications, Inc., 216 A.D.2d 150). Such extreme and outrageous conduct must be clearly alleged for the pleadings to survive dismissal (Trachtman v. Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 251 A.D.2d 322).

  4. A.M.P. v. Benjamin

    2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 34596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)

    (Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 303, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 [1983] [citation omitted]; see also Howell v New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121-122, 612 N.E.2d 699, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350 [1993]). The courts apply the same standard to both the intentional and negligence theories of emotional distress (Young v GSL Enters., 237 A.D.2d 119, 654 N.Y.S.2d 24 [1997]; Naturman v Crain Communications, 216 A.D.2d 150, 628 N.Y.S.2d 281 [1995]). Such extreme and outrageous conduct must be clearly alleged for the pleadings to survive dismissal (Trachtman v Empire Blue Cross &Blue Shield, 251 A.D.2d 322, 673 N.Y.S.2d 726 [1998]).

  5. Gist v. State

    # 2015-040-008 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Feb. 24, 2015)

    33. In pressing that argument, however, the STATE is ignoring Claimant's burden to demonstrate that the STATE's conduct was shocking and outrageous [see Wilson v City of New York, 294 AD2d 290, 294 (1st Dept 2002); Young v GSL Enterprises, Inc., 237 AD2d 119 (1st Dept 1997); Rocco v Town of Smithtown, 229 AD2d 1034, 1035 (4th Dept 1997), appeal dismissed 88 NY2d 1065 (1996)]. (id. at ΒΆΒΆ 32, 33)