Young v. Duncan

163 Citing cases

  1. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate

    309 Mass. 571 (Mass. 1941)   Cited 46 times
    Establishing that chapter 152 § 66 "must be interpreted as creating a cause of action in an employee sustaining an injury ‘in the course of his employment’ that is a ‘direct result’ of such employment though not a ‘direct result of any negligence on the part of the employer’ "

    Yet it was said of that act in Keaney's Case, 217 Mass. 5, 7 — involving the employee of a farmer — that the act "was not intended to confer its advantages upon farm laborers, or to impose its burdens upon farmers." See also Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 349. It might reasonably be thought that the statement of general purpose would be made more nearly accurate and less likely to mislead by excluding from such statement domestic servants and farm laborers than by impliedly including them therein under the same conditions as other employees.

  2. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate

    309 Mass. 562 (Mass. 1941)   Cited 11 times

    Nevertheless the law has been held constitutional. Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 351. Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487, 497-498.

  3. Loring v. Young

    239 Mass. 349 (Mass. 1921)   Cited 25 times
    In Loring v. Young, 239 Mass. 349, 368, the court said: "These proceedings of the convention were public, they challenged the attention of a considerable portion of the people, and they were reported to a greater or less extent in the daily press.

    When called to decide the same matter coming before them as a court, the Justices are bound most sedulously to guard against any influence flowing from their previous consideration in their advisory capacity. Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 351, and cases there collected. Perkins v. Westwood, 226 Mass. 268, 272, and cases collected.

  4. Middleton v. Texas Power Light Co.

    249 U.S. 152 (1919)   Cited 143 times
    Concluding that Texas Employer's Liability Act's exclusion from mandatory insurance coverage for injuries sustained by, inter alia, farm laborers did not violate the federal equal protection guarantee

    The same result has been reached by the state courts generally. Opinion of Justices, 209 Mass. 607, 610; Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 349; Hunter v. Colfax Coal Co., 175 Iowa 245, 287; Sayles v. Foley, 38 R.I. 484, 490-492. Similar reasoning may be applied to cotton gin laborers in Texas; indeed, it was applied to them by the supreme court of that State, as we have seen.

  5. Bagnel v. Springfield Sand Tile Co.

    144 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1944)   Cited 19 times
    Construing a New York statute

    It is to be noted that with reference to such waiver the first sentence of § 24 has two distinct provisions: (1) an employee who contracts to work for an insured person shall be held to have waived his rights of action at common law to recover damages for personal injuries "if he shall not have given his employer, at the time of his contract of hire, written notice that he claimed such right"; (2) "if the contract of hire was made before the employer became an insured person" an employee is held to have made such waiver "if the employee shall not have given the said notice within thirty days of notice of such insurance" [italics ours]. In Young v. Duncan, 1914, 218 Mass. 346, 106 N.E. 1, the court attached significance to the differences in phraseology of these two provisions. It was dealing with the first situation, namely, where at the time of the contract of hire the employer was already insured under the Massachusetts act.

  6. Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc.

    381 Mass. 507 (Mass. 1980)   Cited 208 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that where a man was seriously injured while working, and his wife and children rushed to the hospital and found him there with permanent and serious injuries, the wife and children's shock followed closely on the heels of the negligent act

    St. 1911, c. 751, Part I, § 5 (employees). See Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 349 (1914). The act created incentives to induce both the employer and employee to avail themselves of its benefits.

  7. Opinion of the Justices of Supreme Judicial Court

    315 A.2d 847 (Me. 1974)   Cited 2 times
    Upholding workers' compensation law

    Greem v. Cohen, 298 Mass. 439, 443, 11 N.E.2d 492, 494. See also Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 349, 106 N.E. 1. With respect to the enforcement of an employee's common law rights when reserved by him, we find nothing in the bill that excludes trial by jury on any issue involved, including the issue whether the employer was insured. See Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 348, 106 N.E. 1; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 235, 37 S.Ct. 260, 61 L.Ed. 685.

  8. Greem v. Cohen

    298 Mass. 439 (Mass. 1937)   Cited 15 times

    The workmen's compensation act was passed in response to strong public sentiment that the remedies afforded by actions of tort at common law and under the employers' liability act were inadequate. Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 349. While the workmen's compensation act did not compel employers to come under the new scheme of compensation, it manifested the purpose in its first section, now G.L. (Ter.

  9. Sakamoto v. Kemmerer Coal Co.

    255 P. 356 (Wyo. 1927)   Cited 16 times

    "The act is to be interpreted in the light of its purpose and, so far as reasonably may be, to promote the accomplishment of its beneficent design." Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 348; 106 N.E. 1, 3. "The statute was the expression of what was regarded by the legislature as a wise public policy concerning injured employes.

  10. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate

    251 Mass. 569 (Mass. 1925)   Cited 137 times
    Upholding constitutionality of statutory prohibition on cancellation

    Commonwealth v. Libbey, 216 Mass. 356, 358. Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 353. Bogni v. Perotti, 224 Mass. 152, 157.