The appellant concedes that the law recognizes an exception to the general rule forbidding testimony of other criminal activities, so that in prosecution for sex crimes evidence of other sex activities of the same nature committed with and upon the same person is competent. The following citations support that proposition: Roberson's New Kentucky Criminal Law, Section 1802; Browning v. Commonwealth, Ky., 351 S.W.2d 499; Young v. Commonwealth, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 949; and Keith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 251 S.W.2d 850. The appellant contends that the exception which permits evidence in certain sex offenses is inapplicable here for two reasons.

We disagree. Since appellant was being tried for attempted sodomy, this evidence was admissible to show the intent of the appellant in this case. Young v. Commonwealth, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 949 (1960); and Russell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 482 S.W.2d 584 (1972). However, in any future trial, the admonition to the jury should not indicate that the testimony is admissible to show lustful inclination.

The testimony of the witness was admissible, not to show lustful inclination, but to show motive, common pattern scheme or plan, or common modus operandi. Young v. Commonwealth, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 949 (1960). Pendleton was not denied due process of law or his right to a fair trial by the evidence of prior acts of assault.

Following this argument, McDonald attacks the ruling of the trial court in admitting into evidence the prior conviction of sexual offenses on his stepdaughter. McDonald concedes that evidence of prior sexual conduct to show the lustful disposition of a defendant toward the victim is admissible based on our opinion in Rigsby v. Commonwealth, Ky., 495 S.W.2d 795 (1973); Russell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 482 S.W.2d 584 (1972); Messmear v. Commonwealth, Ky., 472. S.W.2d 682 (1971); and Young v. Commonwealth, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 949 (1960). He argues that a conviction for such acts must not be shown, and it is improper to show that he was imprisoned as a result of the convictions.

Watkins concedes the existence of the ordinary rule that in a prosecution for a sex crime evidence of prior acts of the same nature committed upon the same person is competent. See Young v. Commonwealth, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 949; Russell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 482 S.W.2d 584. He argues, however, that the rule should not apply in the instant situation, where the prior act was charged by a separate count in the same indictment with the count being tried, and the trial court had ruled that the two counts could not be tried together. The order of the trial court requiring the Commonwealth to elect which offense to prosecute was not on the basis of prejudice; it was rested on RCr 9.14, which deals with an improper joinder of offenses in an indictment.

The testimony was followed by an admonition to consider it only as showing design, disposition or intent, if in fact it did so. Russell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 482 S.W.2d 584 (1972); Messmear v. Commonwealth, Ky., 472 S.W.2d 682 (1971); Young v. Commonwealth, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 949 (1960). A whispered conversation between the murdered man and the witness, Lyons, concerning the violent intentions of appellants, was not improperly admitted.

As an exception to this general rule, we hold that in sex crimes evidence of prior acts of the same nature committed upon the same person is competent for the purpose of showing corroboration and to show design, disposition, or intent on the part of the accused. Young v. Commonwealth, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 949 (1960). In those cases where a defendant is charged with indecent or immoral practices with a child under the age of fifteen years, evidence of separate and distinct prior acts of a similar or identical nature, not too remote in time, committed upon children other than those charged in the indictment is admissible for the purposes of showing disposition and intent as to the act charged, lustful inclination, motive, a common pattern, scheme, or plan.

Although such a motion was filed and one of the grounds was "the court should have declared a mistrial during the proceedings", this still did not specify the alleged error. It is fundamental that we will not review a case for an alleged error of this nature that is never called to the trial court's attention for a ruling. See Collins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 297 S.W.2d 54; Young v. Commonwealth, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 949; York v. Commonwealth, Ky., 395 S.W.2d 781. The alleged error is not before us for review. The other contention of appellant is that the trial court erred in failing to advise the wife of appellant, who appeared as a prosecution witness, that she could refuse to testify against him. KRS 421.210(1) provides (among other things) that neither spouse may be compelled to testify for or against the other.

In these circumstances the alleged error, if any, is waived. Young v. Commonwealth, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 949. The alleged misconduct of the trial judge here did not approach the "palpable error" status so as to obviate the necessity for objection.

No objection was interposed to these remarks, no motion was made to discharge the jury and to continue the case nor were they presented as a basis for a new trial. See RCr 9.22 and 10.12; Young v. Commonwealth, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 949 and Watkins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 287 S.W.2d 416, 58 A.L.R.2d 804. Nevertheless, appellant urges that these remarks contained several statements which were so inaccurate and prejudicial that they prevented him from obtaining a fair trial. Because appellant's contention raises the constitutional question of whether the conviction is void we have carefully considered the remarks in light of the entire record and have concluded that, although they are in part erroneous, they did not deprive him of a fair trial.