Opinion
6:20-CV-07006 EAW
2021-09-28
YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF GREATER ROCHESTER, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF MILO, Town of Milo Zoning Board of Appeals, Town of Milo Zoning Board of Appeals Members Phil Riehl, Terry Jensen, Ben Sward, Jake Reddout, P. Earle Gleason, Donald Will, Jared Webster, and Town of Milo Code Enforcement Officer Anthony Zladzic, in their official capacities, Defendants.
James P. Nonkes, Joseph D. Picciotti, Harris Beach PLLC, Pittsford, NY, for Plaintiff. Kevin George Cope, Webster Szanyi, LLP, Buffalo, NY, for Defendants.
James P. Nonkes, Joseph D. Picciotti, Harris Beach PLLC, Pittsford, NY, for Plaintiff.
Kevin George Cope, Webster Szanyi, LLP, Buffalo, NY, for Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, Chief Judge
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Young Men's Christian Association of Greater Rochester ("Plaintiff" or "YMCA") brings the instant lawsuit against defendants the Town of Milo (the "Town"), the Town of Milo Zoning Board of Appeals (the "ZBA"), Town of Milo ZBA members Phil Riehl, Terry Jensen, Ben Sward, Jake Reddout, P. Earle Gleason, Donald Will, Jared Webster, and Town of Milo Code Enforcement Officer Anthony Zladzic (the "CEO") (collectively, "Defendants"), challenging the ZBA's Resolution and Decision dated April 28, 2020, and alleging violation of its rights pursuant to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, et seq. (Dkt. 1-1 at 4-21). Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. 7).
While Plaintiff's complaint names the Code Enforcement Officer as "Anthony Zladzic" (Dkt. 1-1 at 4), Defendants refer to him in their motion papers as "Anthony Validzic" (Dkt. 7-2).
For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ motion is denied. In addition, the Court directs the parties to each file written memoranda within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Decision and Order, explaining why Plaintiff's first and second causes of action should not be dismissed without prejudice and remanded to state court, with Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim stayed pending a resolution of the state claims.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's complaint. (Dkt. 1-1 at 4-21 (the "complaint")). As is required at this stage of the proceedings, the Court treats Plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations as true.
The YMCA
The YMCA is a non-for-profit, Christian charitable organization established in the Rochester, New York region over 164 years ago, and its mission is "to place Christia[n] principles into practice through its programs for the community to build a healthy spirit, mind, and body for all." (Complaint at ¶¶ 1, 14). The YMCA has owned and operated Camp Cory (the "camp") since at least 1921, and the camp is comprised of approximately 27.7 acres of land located on East Lake Road in the Town of Milo, New York. (Id. at ¶ 15). The camp borders Keuka Lake and is located in the Lakefront Residential Zoning District. (Id. ).
Since its inception, the camp has conducted activities and programs on camp property, including day camping and overnight camping between May and September each year, as well as various other forms of camping and programs when day and overnight camping are not taking place. (Id. at ¶ 16). The YMCA has also historically rented or permitted the camp's facilities to be used by community organizations for short-term uses that further the YMCA's charitable and religious mission, including hosting weekend retreats for Girl Scout troops, elementary and high school classes, family groups, religious groups, groups of special needs children, and events for YMCA members. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-18). Plaintiff alleges that these retreats and rentals are "accessory uses that are customarily incidental to Camp Cory's primary use as a summer day and overnight youth camp," and that these retreats and rentals constitute less than 10 percent of the camp's revenue. (Id. at ¶ 19).
The Town of Milo Zoning Law
Section 350-18 of the Town of Milo Zoning Law (the "Zoning Law") permits three principal uses in the Lakefront Residential Zoning District: (1) dwelling, single-unit; (2) farm operation, excluding livestock; and (3) park. (Id. at ¶ 20). Section 250-18(D) also permits special uses in the Lakefront Residential Zoning District, including "camp, child overnight" and "camp, summer day." (Id. ). Zoning Law Section 350-18(c)(1) allows property owners the right to conduct "accessory uses," which are "incidental to a permitted use." (Id. at ¶ 21). Section 350-177 of the Zoning Law states that "[a]ny use authorized by a special use shall be deemed a permitted use" and therefore "the Zoning Law provides that property owners operating pursuant to a special use permit are authorized to conduct accessory uses." (Id. ). Further, "accessory uses are provided to property owners elsewhere in a Zoning Law provision that governs all uses, with no exclusion for special uses." (Id. at ¶ 22). The Zoning Law was enacted on November 1, 1974, and thereafter it was repealed and Local Law No. 1, 2016 was enacted with new zoning provisions. (Id. at ¶ 23).
While the YMCA's operation of the camp property pre-dates the Zoning Law, the camp is located in a district that explicitly provides for such camps pursuant to special use permits, and it is therefore "a pre-existing conforming use under Zoning Law Section 350-35(D)." (Id. ). It has never been a pre-existing nonconforming use. (Id. at ¶ 24). The special use permit for the original camp property was granted several decades ago and remains in effect. (Id. at ¶ 26).
Expansion of the Camp
In 2018, the YMCA completed an expansion of the then-existing camp property after receiving two adjacent properties from community members and completing the construction of new buildings, including a 40-by-80 foot barn with space for activities, restrooms, camp offices, and an infirmary. (Id. at ¶ 27). The new building, called the "Barn Building," doubled the day camp capacity for the camp, allowing the YMCA to serve more camping participants and better serve the community. (Id. ).
On May 8, 2018, the Town of Milo Planning Board (the "Planning Board") passed Resolution No. 2018-004, which granted the YMCA a special use permit (the "2018 special use permit") approving the expansion of the camp property. (Id. at ¶ 28). Plaintiff refers to the original camp and the expansion pursuant to the 2018 special use permit as the "Site." (Id .). The 2018 special use permit "expand[s] the current uses of the child overnight camp and summer day camp," allowed the YMCA to construct the Barn Building and other structures, and to use the Site for child overnight and summer day camp uses, along with accessory uses thereto. (Id. ). Plaintiff alleges that the Planning Board specifically found that the 2018 special use permit complied with the comprehensive plan of the Town, because it "promote[s] the retention and expansion of community recreational and cultural resources, health services and other organizations that enhance the quality of life and economic prosperity of the community." (Id. at ¶ 29). The special use permit listed 27 conditions for camp use from the Department of Health, but none of the conditions provided that the YMCA would no longer be authorized to engage in the accessory uses it had engaged in previously at the camp property and that are provided by the Zoning Law. (Id. at ¶¶ 30, 31). On June 24, 2019, the CEO contacted Michael P. Stevens, YMCA's Chief Strategy Officer, stating that the 2018 special use permit limits the YMCA's use of the camp solely to children's summer camp uses. (Id. at ¶ 33).
The Notice of Violation and Appeal
On September 13, 2019, the YMCA hosted a meeting of the Arts Center of Yates County in the Barn Building at the camp, which included the auction of low-cost items of art as a fundraiser for the Arts Center, which is a local, non-profit community organization whose mission it is to "enrich the lives of Yates County residents, artists and visitors by providing opportunities to actively participate in the arts." (Id. at ¶ 34). It is not a commercial business, does not operate to make a profit from its activities, and is the type of community organization "that advances the purpose of the YMCA and enhances the quality of life of the Town[.]" (Id. at ¶ 35). Plaintiff alleges that the meeting and associated fundraiser "are the very same types of accessory uses the YMCA has undertaken at Camp Cory over the last 90 plus years without incident and without any opposition[.]" (Id. ).
On September 17, 2019, the CEO issued a Notice of Violation pertaining to the September 13, 2019 Arts Center meeting held at the camp, stating that it violated the 2018 special use permit. (Id. at ¶ 36). Thereafter, on October 1, 2019, the Town Supervisor, Leslie Church, sent a letter to the YMCA explaining that the special use permit allows "camp, summer day & camp, child overnight" uses only, the legally permissible uses of the camp are limited by the New York State Department of Health, and that "art sales, rehearsal dinners, and weekend spa and wellness activities" are not permitted. (Id. at ¶ 37).
Plaintiff alleges that the Town's attempt to deprive it of its ability to exercise accessory uses at the camp "contradicts the clear provisions of the 2018 Special Use Permit, the express provisions of the Zoning Law, and well-established case law in New York, all of which establish the YMCA's right to use Camp Cory for private and public events that are customarily incidental and subordinate to its operation as a day camp and children's overnight summer camp," and that the 2018 special use permit cannot be read as eliminating the statutory and common law right to engage in accessory uses at the camp. (Id. at ¶¶ 38-39). Plaintiff further alleges that the Department of Health regulations do not limit its ability to engage in accessory uses or dictate how a parcel of land can lawfully be used, but only how a camp must be operated once a camp facility is located on that parcel of land. (Id. at ¶¶ 40-43).
The YMCA appealed the Notice of Violation by submitting the "Application for an Appeal of Code Enforcement Officer's Decision" form, along with a letter and supporting exhibits, dated November 12, 2019. (Id. at ¶ 44). Thereafter, on December 13, 2019 the CEO submitted to the ZBA a letter entitled "Uniform Code Compliance Review for the Barn Building at the Farm Village based on occupancies other than an A-3 Assembly," which did not address the issues or merits of the YMCA's appeal of the Notice of Violation, but rather "focused on a mistaken belief that the YMCA sought to change the use of Camp Cory authorized under the 2018 Special Use Permit and the original Special Use Permit," and also listed potential New York State Uniform Fire Prevention and Building Code violations, which the ZBA does not have jurisdiction to review. (Id. at ¶¶ 46-48, 51). Plaintiff alleges that the submission also treated the Barn Building as an independent structure not associated with the camp. (Id. at ¶ 49). In furtherance of the CEO's position and in opposition to the YMCA's appeal of the Notice of Violation, Edward J. Brockman, Esq., submitted a memorandum dated January 12, 2020. (Id. at ¶ 52). On January 21, 2020, the CEO submitted another memorandum, along with exhibits and separate legal memorandum to the ZBA, but neither the YMCA nor its counsel was copied on the second submission. (Id. at ¶ 53). The YMCA did not receive a copy of this second submission until January 25, 2020, only one business day before the hearing on its appeal. (Id. ). The YMCA responded to the CEO's second submission by letter dated January 27, 2020, and the ZBA held a public hearing on the YMCA's appeal on January 28, 2020. (Id. at ¶¶ 54-55).
On April 28, 2020, the ZBA adopted a Resolution and Decision affirming the Notice of Violation, and the Resolution and Decision was filed on April 29, 2020. (Id. at ¶¶ 56, 61). The Resolution and Decision found that the YMCA's use of the camp property is limited to "camp, summer day" and "camp, child overnight," by both the Zoning Law and the 2018 special use permit. (Id. at ¶ 57). The ZBA also determined that because the YMCA did not specifically list the accessory uses customarily incidental to the operation of a summer camp on its 2018 special use permit application, the YMCA was foreclosed from those uses altogether. (Id. at ¶ 58). The ZBA also noted that it accepted a reduced amount of parking spaces under the Zoning Law based on the summer camp use and that other uses—such as food and drink consumption—require more parking spaces, and there was inadequate parking on site for any uses other than for summer camp. (Id. at ¶ 59). The ZBA further noted that the YMCA's use of its property for permissible accessory uses constituted illegal, independent commercial use of the property because the events did not directly serve children under 16 or 18 years of age. (Id. at ¶ 60). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants "have made clear that they will continue to deprive the YMCA of its right to engage in any customary, incidental uses, including those related directly to camping programming," and that "this past summer, due to the COVID crisis community organizations approached the YMCA about having it provide childcare services on the Camp Cory property" (to take place at the same site and time of year as camping would have normally taken place, but was not authorized during the COVID-19 pandemic), but that "[d]espite the need for such programming for the children of essential workers, the Town stood by the invalid determination made in [the] ZBA's decision, finding the YMCA was not authorized to provide such a service as an accessory use." (Id. at ¶ 62).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed its complaint on October 30, 2020, in New York Supreme Court, County of Yates. (Dkt. 1-1 at 4-21; Dkt. 1 at ¶ 1). The complaint includes three causes of action: (1) Article 78, challenging the ZBA's April 28, 2020 Resolution and Decision as arbitrary and capricious; (2) declaratory judgment pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3001 (" CPLR 3001"), also based on the April 28, 2020 Resolution and Decision; and (3) violation of RLUIPA, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-(a)(1). (Dkt. 1-1 at 16-20). Defendants were served with the summonses and complaint on November 2, 2020. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 1). Thereafter, Defendants removed the action to this Court on November 24, 2020, contending that jurisdiction was proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides that district courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, as the complaint contains a cause of action for violation of RLUIPA, and that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. (Id. at ¶¶ 2-4). On December 3, 2020, the parties filed, and the Court entered, a stipulation extending Defendants’ time to answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiff's complaint until January 7, 2021, and further stipulating that Defendants file an administrative record with the Court by December 29, 2020. (Dkt. 2; Dkt. 3).
The Notice of Removal states that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims "because those claims form part of the same case or controversy as Plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 4). The Court presumes that the reference to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a typographical error, and it should reference RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
On December 29, 2020, Defendants filed the administrative record on review, which is comprised of the documents that were before the Town and the ZBA relating to the ZBA's decision to uphold the Notice of Violation. (Dkt. 4; Dkt. 4-1). On January 7, 2021, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. (Dkt. 7). Plaintiff filed response papers on February 4, 2021 (Dkt. 9), and Defendants replied on February 11, 2021 (Dkt. 10).
DISCUSSION
I. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Defendants raise several arguments as to why Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed. Defendants first raise timeliness issues relating to Plaintiff's claims, including that Plaintiff did not exhaust its administrative remedies because it failed to appeal or contest the CEO's interpretation of the 2018 special use permit when the CEO advised Plaintiff on May 17, 2018 and June 24, 2019 that it was not permitted to conduct commercial activity on the property. (Dkt. 7-2 at 6). Defendants also argue that the action is untimely because Plaintiff was required to file suit within 30 days of the ZBA's decision on April 28, 2020. (Id. ). Next, Defendants argue that the ZBA's decision is rational and supported by substantial evidence in the record; namely, that the ZBA properly determined that the Zoning Law does not permit Plaintiff to engage in accessory use pursuant to a special use permit, and therefore the ZBA's decision should be upheld. (Id. at 6-7). Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to allege a claim pursuant to RLUIPA because Plaintiff is seeking to protect the land at issue, rather than religious exercise occurring on the land. (Id. at 7).
A. Standard
"In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may consider the facts alleged in the [pleading], documents attached to the [pleading] as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the [pleading]." DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C. , 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010). A court should consider the motion by "accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the [claimant]." Trs. of Upstate N.Y. Eng'rs Pension Fund v. Ivy Asset Mgmt. , 843 F.3d 561, 566 (2d Cir. 2016). To withstand dismissal, a claimant must set forth "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the [claimant] pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Turkmen v. Ashcroft , 589 F.3d 542, 546 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ).
"While a [pleading] attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a [claimant]’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotations and citations omitted). "To state a plausible claim, the [pleading]’s ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ " Nielsen v. AECOM Tech. Corp. , 762 F.3d 214, 218 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).
B. Plaintiff's First and Second Causes of Action
Defendants move for dismissal of Plaintiff's first cause of action brought pursuant to Article 78 and second cause of action for a declaratory judgment pursuant to CPLR 3001 on the basis that the ZBA's determination was rational and based on substantial evidence and is entitled to "great deference," the Zoning Law does not permit uses accessory to special uses, and even if it did permit accessory uses, commercial uses are not accessory uses. (Dkt. 7-2 at 16-26). In response, Plaintiff contends that it has sufficiently alleged an Article 78 challenge to the ZBA decision, the Zoning Law does permit accessory uses for a special use permit, the ZBA's misinterpretation and misapplication of the Zoning Law is not entitled to deference, and the art auction was an accessory use. (Dkt. 9 at 16-27).
Although neither party has raised the issue, the Court first considers whether it may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims brought pursuant to Article 78 and for a declaratory judgment. "[I]t is generally inappropriate for a federal district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over an Article 78 claim." Burdick v. Bath Cent. Sch. Dist. , No. 6:19-CV-06426 EAW, 2020 WL 1435112, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2020) ; see also Bartolini v. Cassels, No. 17-CV-5671 (NSR)(PED), 2018 WL 3023161, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2018) ("District Courts in this Circuit have consistently declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Article 78 claims.") (collecting cases), aff'd , 801 F. App'x 10 (2d Cir. 2020) ; Nitti v. Cnty. of Tioga , No. 3:14-CV-0954 (GTS/DEP), 2015 WL 5708637, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2015) ("Courts have found that compelling reasons to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction exist in the very nature of an Article 78 proceeding." (quotations and alteration omitted)); E. End Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Southampton , No. CV 13-4810(AKT), 2014 WL 4826226, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2014) ("The Court agrees with the essentially unanimous position of the New York federal district courts that the very nature of an Article 78 proceeding presents such compelling reasons" to decline exercising supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff's Article 78 claim (internal quotation and citations omitted)); Beckwith v. Erie Cnty. Water Auth. , 413 F. Supp. 2d 214, 226-27 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) ("[T]his court has no original or supplemental subject matter jurisdiction over [an] Article 78 proceeding as neither federal nor New York state law empower the federal courts to consider such claims, and, under New York law, authority to grant relief pursuant to an Article 78 proceeding is exclusively vested in New York Supreme Court.").
Although the YMCA brings its second cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3001, that statute simply provides that the supreme court may render a declaratory judgment on a claim, and therefore it is dependent on Plaintiff's Article 78 claim and does not represent a separate substantive cause of action, at least not in a federal proceeding. See Buck v. Libous , No. 302CV1142FJSDEP, 2005 WL 1460408, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. June 20, 2005) ("§ 3001 does not apply to federal court proceedings" (citation omitted)); see also Gustavia Home, LLC v. Rutty , No. 16-cv-2823 (BMC), 2018 WL 2198742, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 14, 2018) ("[F]or several reasons, this Court cannot grant relief under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3001, the provision in New York State's civil procedure code that permits a state trial court to ‘render a declaratory judgment having the effect of a final judgment.’ Federal courts apply federal procedural rules, not state rules."), aff'd , 785 F. App'x 11 (2d Cir. 2019).
Given this case law, the Court declines to resolve whether Plaintiff has adequately pleaded an Article 78 claim. Rather, the Court denies without prejudice Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff's first and second causes of action, and instead directs the parties to each file written memoranda within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Decision and Order, explaining why Plaintiff's first and second causes of action should not be dismissed without prejudice and remanded to state court, with Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim stayed pending a resolution of the state law claims. See E. End Eruv Ass'n, Inc. , 2014 WL 4826226, at *21 (dismissing Article 78 claim without prejudice and staying remaining claims until Article 78 proceeding resolved by state court).
C. Exhaustion and Timeliness of Plaintiff's RLUIPA Claim
The Court next turns to Defendants’ arguments relating to the exhaustion and timeliness of Plaintiff's claims. Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by appealing communications it received on May 17, 2018 and June 24, 2019, wherein the CEO notified Plaintiff that the 2018 special use permit allowed it to use the newly-acquired property only as a summer day camp and a child overnight camp. (Dkt. 7-2 at 13). Defendants further argue that Plaintiff's claims are untimely because it filed this action on October 30, 2020, more than 30 days after the ZBA's Resolution and Decision affirming the Notice of Violation. (Id. at 15). As explained above, the Court has directed the parties to submit further briefing as to whether the Court may properly consider Plaintiff's state law claims in the first instance, and therefore declines to reach the issue of whether those claims were property exhausted or timely.
Applying Defendants’ statute of limitations argument to Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim, the Court notes that Defendants point only to the 30-day statute of limitations for appealing a decision by the ZBA, which is provided by New York Town Law § 267-c. (See Dkt. 7-2 at 15). However, RLUIPA claims carry a four-year statute of limitations. See Congregation Adas Yereim v. City of New York , 673 F. Supp. 2d 94, 107 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) ("It is undisputed that the four-year catch-all federal statute of limitations, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a), governs claims brought under RLUIPA."). Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim was filed within four years and therefore appears to be timely. As to Defendants’ exhaustion argument, at least some courts have found that, in the non-prisoner context, "exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required for RLUIPA claims." Murphy v. Zoning Comm'n of Town of New Milford , 223 F. Supp. 2d 377, 382 & n.3 (D. Conn. 2002) ("The Supreme Court's reasoning in Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982), as to why exhaustion is not a prerequisite to a § 1983 claim, is equally applicable to claims under RLUIPA."). However, a RLUIPA claim must be ripe for review. See OT, LLC v. Harford Cnty., Md. , No. GLR-17-2812, 2019 WL 4598009, at *8 (D. Md. Sept. 23, 2019) ("while exhaustion is not required before pursuing a RLUIPA claim, ... there must be some degree of finality before a RLUIPA claim is ripe for review" (quotations and citation omitted)); see also Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm'n , 402 F.3d 342, 348 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that "the Supreme Court has developed specific ripeness requirements applicable to land use disputes," including that the plaintiff "was required to obtain a final, definitive position as to how it could use the property from the entity charged with implementing the zoning regulations"). Here, Plaintiff appealed the Notice of Violation to the ZBA where, according to the complaint, both parties made written submissions and participated in a hearing prior to the ZBA's issuance of its Resolution and Decision. (Complaint at ¶¶ 44-56). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim is ripe for review.
Even if Plaintiffs’ RLUIPA claim was subject to the 30-day statute of limitations provided in Town Law § 267-c, pursuant to Executive Orders issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the appeal of any such claim to state court would have been tolled until December 3, 2020. (See Dkt. 9-2).
Murphy cites to the Supreme Court's decision in Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985), which has since been overruled in Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pa. , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 204 L.Ed.2d 558 (2019). "Before the Supreme Court's recent decision in Knick ..., the law in the Second Circuit provided that a takings claim was not ripe unless the property owner could show that (1) the state regulatory entity has rendered a final decision on the matter, and (2) the plaintiff has sought just compensation by means of an available state procedure. Knick eliminated the state-exhaustion requirement as an unjustifiable burden on takings plaintiffs.... But Knick leaves undisturbed the first prong, that a state regulatory agency must render a final decision on a matter before a taking claim can proceed." Sagaponack Realty, LLC v. Vill. of Sagaponack , 778 F. App'x 63, 64 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, the first prong of the ripeness inquiry cited by Murphy remains undisturbed following Knick .
Even if Plaintiff was required to exhaust its administrative remedies, the Court does not find persuasive Defendants’ arguments that, at least for the RLUIPA claim, Plaintiff was required to appeal the two notifications it received on May 17, 2018 and June 24, 2019, which simply advised Plaintiff that the 2018 special use permit allowed it to use its newly-acquired property as a summer day camp and a child overnight camp. (See Dkt. 7-2 at 13). The May 17, 2018 communication is not even mentioned in the complaint, and the June 24, 2019 letter, as it is described in the complaint, does not specifically prohibit accessory uses. (See Complaint at ¶ 33). Rather, Plaintiff's complaint alleges the violation of its rights stemming from the September 2019 Notice of Violation—once Defendants took concrete action against it by issuing the violation and the resulting appeal of that violation (id. at ¶¶ 36-37, 44-61, 67-91)—and not from the 2018 and 2019 communications. It is undisputed that Plaintiff appealed the Notice of Violation to the ZBA on November 12, 2019. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss on this basis is denied. Having found that Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim was ripe and timely filed, the Court turns to Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff has failed to plead a RLUIPA violation.
D. Plaintiff's RLUIPA Claim
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim because it has not "establish[ed] [that] the proposed use was for a religious purpose." (Dkt. 7-2 at 27). Defendants further argue that Plaintiff has been permitted and continues to use the original camp property for accessory uses, and even if the Court concluded that Plaintiff was using the newly-acquired property for a religious purpose, the ZBA was furthering a compelling government interest and using the least restrictive means to do so. (Id. at 28-29).
RLUIPA provides that "[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution ... is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). To state a claim for violation of RLUIPA, Plaintiff must allege that the regulation at issue "(1) imposes a substantial burden (2) on the ‘religious exercise’ (3) of a person, institution, or assembly." Bikur Cholim, Inc. v. Vill. of Suffern , 664 F. Supp. 2d 267, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ; see also Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck , 379 F. Supp. 2d 550, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("To establish a prima facie case under RLUIPA, [plaintiff] must allege facts sufficient to show that defendants’ conduct in denying the Application: (1) imposes a substantial burden; (2) on the "religious exercise;" (3) of a person, institution or assembly."). "Religious exercise" under RLUIPA is defined broadly, and "[i]f the improvement or building is to be used for religious education or practice, land use regulations related to it could affect the land users’ religious exercise." Bikur Cholim, Inc. , 664 F. Supp. 2d at 275-76.
In support of their argument that Plaintiff has failed to establish that the proposed use was for a religious purpose, Defendants cite to the Second Circuit's decision in Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck , 504 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2007) where, following a bench trial, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the village violated RLUIPA. The language cited by Defendants concerns the Second Circuit's earlier ruling in the case, see id. at 347-48 ("[c]ommenting at an earlier stage in this litigation on how to apply this standard, we expressed doubt as to whether RLUIPA immunized all conceivable improvements proposed by religious schools...."), wherein it vacated the district court's granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on its RLUIPA claim, holding that "the court's judgment depended on findings of fact upon which a factfinder could reasonably disagree," see Westchester Day School v. Vill. of Mamaroneck , 386 F.3d 183, 185 (2d Cir. 2004). Plaintiff's case is presently before the Court at the pleading stage—not following a trial, or even at summary judgment—and at this juncture, Plaintiff is not required to "establish" anything. Rather, Plaintiff is required to plausibly plead a violation of RLUIPA. Viewing the case history for Westchester Day School in context—i.e. , that the Second Circuit initially vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff and remanded the case for further proceedings—supports allowing Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim to proceed.
Accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has alleged a violation of the statute. Plaintiff alleges that it is a Christian charitable organization, and its mission is "to place Christia[n] principles into practice through its programs for the community to build a healthy spirit, mind, and body for all." (Complaint at ¶ 14). Plaintiff further alleges that:
[b]y imposing and implementing the Town's Zoning Law in the manner described above, and by the conduct described above, Respondents-Defendants have imposed a substantial burden on the religious exercise of the YMCA, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-(a)(1). This includes, but is not limited to, the refusal by Respondents-Defendants to: (1) allow the YMCA to use its Camp Cory property for accessory uses customary and incidental to the operation of a summer day and overnight camp; (2) allow the YMCA to use its Camp Cory property to hold community events that further the YMCA's mission of "plac[ing] Christian principles into practice through its programs"; (3) to otherwise use the Camp Cory property for the benefit of the YMCA's membership; and (4) to perform community outreach in furtherance of its religious purpose.
(Id. at ¶ 85; see also id. at ¶ 25 ("The programs offered by the YMCA at Camp Cory further the YMCA's mission to place Christian principles into practice to build a healthy spirit, mind, and body for all.")). The complaint further details how Plaintiff has since its inception 90 years ago conducted activities and programs on its property and permitted community organizations to rent the property for short-term uses, which further its charitable and religious mission when day and night camping are not in session (id. at ¶¶ 16-19), and that Defendants’ actions—including that it will not permit Plaintiff to hold events furthering its Christian mission on the property—impose a substantial burden on it.
Defendants’ remaining arguments, including that Plaintiff can use the original camp property for accessory uses and the ZBA was furthering a compelling government interest by restricting Plaintiff's use of the new property, are not appropriate for the Court to resolve at this juncture. See Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr., N.Y. v. Incorp. Vill. of Old Westbury , No. 09 CV 5195(DRH)(ETB), 2012 WL 1392365, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2012) ("At the pleadings stage, a plaintiff need only allege a prima facie violation; an analysis of whether the government has shown a compelling government interest or the use of least restrictive means is more appropriately addressed in connection with summary judgment."); Bikur Cholim, Inc. , 664 F. Supp. 2d at 277 ("In addition, defendant argues that it has a compelling interest in enforcing its zoning regulations and in prohibiting transient uses such as private plaintiffs’, it has used the least restrictive means of enforcing such regulations. This defense to a RLUIPA claim is not before the Court as the Court determines whether private plaintiffs have pleaded a prima facie case."). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss on this basis is denied.
In sum, Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to state a plausible RLUIPA claim. Whether Plaintiff will be able to offer evidence supporting a "religious purpose" remains to be seen, but its allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim is denied. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 7) is denied. In particular, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim and denies without prejudice Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff's state law claims. In addition, the Court directs the parties to each file written memoranda within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Decision and Order, explaining why Plaintiff's first and second causes of action should not be dismissed without prejudice and remanded to state court, with Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim stayed pending a resolution of the state law claims.
SO ORDERED.