The evidence supports a finding that the shootings were not done justifiably but rather with malice or an evil design. Compare Yopp v. State, 79 Ga. App. 584 ( 54 S.E.2d 505) (1949). There was no error in denying the motion for new trial.
These courts have concluded that when an animal protection statute requires that the prohibited act be done willfully, wantonly, or with intent to ill use the animal or subject it to unnecessary pain and suffering, then there must be proof that the act complained of was intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary, or that the accused was actuated by a malevolent purpose or reckless disregard of the consequences. See People v. Olary, 10 Mich. App. 640, 160 N.W.2d 348, affirmed, 382 Mich. 559, 170 N.W.2d 842 (1969); State v. Brookshire, 355 S.W.2d 333 (Mo.App. 1962); Yopp v. State, 79 Ga. App. 584, 54 S.E.2d 505 (1949). Unlike cruelty to children, cruelty to animals was not an offense at common law. It has only been since the early part of the twentieth century that most jurisdictions began enacting statutes for the protection of animals without regard to ownership.