Opinion
C093821 C094543
07-22-2022
In re A.C. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. R.C., Defendant and Appellant. YOLO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JV20193242, JV20193243
HULL, ACTING P. J.
Appellant R.C., mother of minors A.C. and Z.C., has appealed from several orders of the juvenile court, which on this court's own motion, were consolidated for all purposes except that they retain their respective case numbers. In case No. C093821, mother appeals from the juvenile court's March 17, 2021, orders entered at the 12-month review hearing with respect to minor A.C. Mother contends the juvenile court's finding that reasonable services were provided is unsupported by the record. We shall reject this contention and affirm the orders.
In case No. C094543, mother filed a notice of appeal from the July 21, 2021, denial of her petition for modification with respect to both minors, and another notice of appeal from the juvenile court's August 16, 2021, orders entered at A.C.'s selection and implementation hearing. Mother has failed to raise any issue with respect to the section 388 petition and, accordingly, we dismiss that appeal. In her appeal from the section 366.26 orders, mother again raises the issue of the juvenile court's finding that reasonable services were provided, re-raising the contention we rejected in connection with her earlier extraordinary writ petition filed after the 18-month review hearing. We, once again, reject this contention and affirm the juvenile court's orders.
Facts and History of the Proceedings Portions of the factual and procedural background are taken from our unpublished opinions previously filed in mother's previous appeals, In re A.C. et al. (Mar. 25, 2021, C092444) and In re A.C. et al. (May 24, 2021, C093009), the opinions and supporting records of which are included in the instant record on appeal. Because appellant failed to raise any issue relating to the July 21, 2021, denial of her petition for modification with respect to both minors and limited her argument to those affecting minor A.C. only, we provide background information about minor Z.C. and sibling A.W. only as contextually relevant.
The Petition and Detention
On October 21, 2019, the Yolo County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 (statutory section references that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated) petition alleging A.W. (then age 17), A.C. (then age 14), and Z.C. (then age 8) had suffered or were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm caused by mother's physical abuse of the minors. (§ 300, subd. (a).) On October 16, 2019, over a dispute about the television, mother had hit A.W. across the face with a hanger (ultimately breaking it on her), thrown a cup at her, and then climbed on top of her and punched her repeatedly on the head. Two doctors diagnosed A.W. with "post-concussive syndrome" as a result of the beating, which had resulted in significant bruising on A.W.'s face, ear, and to the back of her neck. A.C. and Z.C. witnessed this incident. All minors individually feared returning to mother's home and reported that "mother routinely hits them with a whip, a hanger, a brush, or her closed fists." A.W. feared mother would kill her. Mother also withheld food as a punishment. Mother's short temper and threats of physical punishment as well as physical punishment put the minors at risk of injury. The petition was amended after the minors' detention to include allegations of mother's failure to protect A.C. and Z.C. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).)
A.W. worried mother truly wanted to hurt her and might kill her given mother's reported dreams wherein she did just that. She reported that mother coerced her siblings to lie about their physical abuse and cover up their bruises. A.C. and Z.C. confirmed witnessing the altercation between A.W. and mother. Both minors confirmed mother physically hit them, relaying specific instances of abuse involving fists or a whip. Marks were observed on Z.C.'s back. Mother told Z.C. to hide signs of his abuse, which he did with clothes. Maternal grandparents were aware of the abuse and tried unsuccessfully to intervene.
Mother denied hitting the minors with a closed fist, a hanger, a whip, or a brush and admitted only to spanking the minors and taking away A.W.'s phone. She also admitted her children were scared of her, but denied that any of the injuries observed on the minors were because of her, instead providing ambiguous explanations that the injuries occurred at school or during sports. Mother also denied she intended to threaten A.W. by telling her about her dream.
The minors were detained at the hearing on October 22, 2019. All minors reported being afraid of mother at their first visitation and displayed signs of fear through facial expressions and body language. The juvenile court ordered mother receive three hours a week of supervised therapeutic visits to begin after the minors were enrolled in therapy and after mother enrolled in anger management and/or individual counseling. The court awarded the Agency authority to accelerate visitation as appropriate.
Jurisdiction and Disposition
The December 19, 2019, jurisdiction and disposition report described an additional incident wherein mother hit A.W. in the face with a pan. The social worker spoke with Z.C., who confirmed his previous statements of mother's physical abuse, which he said occurred "a lot," but clarified that he had only heard his mother's confrontation with A.W. A.C. disclosed mother had been physically abusing her for a number of years (using a hanger, whip, and spatula), that mother threatened to "hit our heads in the wall and she pulls our hair," and that A.C. did not think she would be safe living with mother. She also disclosed receiving a text from her mother before the interview that stated, "don't lie for [A.W.]"
A police report documented that mother had admitted striking A.W. with a hanger on one occasion and threatening all three minors with a hanger and whip. Mother also reportedly admitted to open-hand spanking A.C. and Z.C. on their bottoms. Regarding the precipitating incident, mother claimed she had only slapped A.W. on the back.
At a later subsequent interview with the social worker, however, mother denied any abusive behavior, downplayed the incident and claimed the previous social worker had "made it bigger than it really is." She accused A.W. of making up the allegations for personal reasons. Mother initially denied hitting with a fist, brush, or hanger, but later admitted using a hanger for discipline approximately two times per month, although she denied leaving marks. She also admitted hitting A.W. on the back with an open fist but denied ever withholding food from the minors. When confronted with the minors' statements, mother agreed it was a problem that the minors feared her. She agreed to obtain mental health services and parent education, the first of which she was already receiving.
Mother met with the social worker again on November 8, 2019, arguing Z.C. and A.C. should be immediately returned because there was no proof supporting the allegations. When confronted with that proof (including her own previous admissions), mother protested that "she did not leave any marks nor injuries." At an interview a month later, mother denied ever hitting the minors with a hanger (claiming she only threatened to do so) and denied having earlier admitted to it.
The social worker worked diligently to secure therapists for the children and initiate therapy so that the clinicians would be enabled to make recommendations regarding the ordered therapeutic visitation. This process was difficult and complicated by Z.C.'s escalating behaviors, necessitating Z.C.'s enrollment in WRAP services. A.C. was receiving counseling, although her therapist was recently switched because of a conflict. Mother consistently requested visits with the minors and wrote letters to them. A.C. refused mother's letters but Z.C. accepted his letter and wrote back.
The Agency referred mother for counseling, anger management, and parenting classes, which mother had started. According to the head of mother's anger management program, Bobby Stewart, mother denied abusing her children and portrayed herself as a victim. "[M]other appears to have deep denial about her anger issues, struggles with managing anger and has not admitted any behaviors or issues where she has struggled with managing her anger or frustration." Mother had refused to discuss with the social worker the prior reports that she had been subject to psychiatric holds under section 5150 in 2008 and 2012, or reports of being seen in the emergency room due to ingesting large amounts of soap, and denied that she had any current mental health problems or had undergone any previous mental health hospitalizations. Mother reported she was engaged in weekly therapy with Melissa King, MFTI. The Agency further recommended that mother undergo a psychological assessment given her "denial and current decision-making."
Although it was initially reported she was in therapy with Melissa King, MFTI, the record reflects mother's therapist's name is Vanessa Areiza King, MFTI.
At the January 13, 2020, contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing, mother waived her right to testify and present evidence, electing to submit on the petition. The court sustained the petition under both section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). The court awarded full legal custody of A.W. to her biological father and dismissed the case as to A.W. only. The court declared A.C. and Z.C. dependents, ordered them removed from parental custody, and ordered reunification services for mother.
Mother's case plan directed her to obtain a psychological assessment to determine which mental health services would be best. The plan also directed mother to participate in transparent individual counseling to identify what may be impairing her ability to safely parent. This included that mother "develop an understanding of what constitutes physical and emotional abuse, identify how her past behaviors have impacted her children's physical and emotional health and safety, and coping skills to effectively manage frustration and anger in a healthy, nonthreatening, [and] positive manner." Mother was directed to openly and honestly participate in an anger management/domestic violence program for the same reason. Finally, mother was directed to participate in parent education classes to obtain the skills necessary to parent without being physically and emotionally abusive. The visitation order remained the same, although it was clarified that visitation would take place only after A.C.'s therapist has cleared it.
The Six-Month Review
The Agency submitted a six-month review report (filed April 30, 2020) and supplemental report (filed June 25, 2020), which recommended against the return of the minors and for an additional six months of reunification services.
The Agency reported mother was on pretrial release pending three charges of infliction of corporal injury on a child (Pen. Code, § 273d, subd. (a)) and three charges of abusing or endangering the health of a child (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)). Her probation officer was satisfied with her performance on release, but relayed mother's lack of interest in that officer's discussion encouraging mother to take responsibility for her actions, as opposed to merely participating in her court mandated CPS services.
Mother completed her parent education classes, but instructor Nancy Chavez opined that mother should engage in more classes to further her understanding of "the importance of listening to her children and practicing safe discipline techniques." Chavez recommended mother "engage in counseling services to increase her insight on the impact of her abuse on her children, take responsibilit[y] for her actions and work through her own possible mental health issues."
Similarly, mother's first anger management instructor, Bobbie Stewart, reported that mother made minimal progress and needed to continue taking classes "to work on accountability, taking responsibility, gain insight as to her issues and why her children were removed from her care." While mother attended classes, she attended with limited participation, continued to deny she physically abused her children, and accused her daughter of lying. Stewart also worried about whether mother suffered from mental health issues that needed to be addressed. Ultimately, mother failed to successfully complete the program, despite having attended 42 sessions, because she refused to accept responsibility for her actions requiring her treatment and failed to meaningfully participate in groups.
Mother's second anger management instructor, Myrna Brady, confirmed mother's enrollment and participation in anger management classes consisting of an online assessment and workbook exercises. She also reported that mother did not provide her court documents or mother's case plan. Repeated efforts to obtain a release of information to provide Brady with the relevant information were unsuccessful.
Mother reported engaging in counseling since October 25, 2019, with Vanessa King, MFTI, but the social worker's numerous attempts to contact King to obtain information were unsuccessful until June 2020. King then reported that mother was learning new skills through therapy, but continued to deny physically abusing her children.
At a February 26, 2020, meeting with mother to discuss her case plan, reunification timeline, and services, etc., mother stated she would not complete her psychological evaluation with the referred provider, although she could not say why. Mother refused assistance in locating another provider and acknowledged receipt of the requirements for any psychologist and examination.
Thereafter, mother hired psychologist Amy Kline in March to conduct the assessment, but despite repeated requests of mother and Kline, the social worker was not able to obtain a release of information so that Kline would have the Agency information relevant to the court ordered examination. Kline also displayed questionable professionalism and impartiality because Kline had met with mother five times prior to contacting the Agency and made statements indicating a bias in mother's favor in communications with the social worker. Due to these concerns, Agency counsel contacted mother's counsel to warn that Kline's work as then being conducted would not comply with the case plan. Counsel provided contact information for two different providers for mother to choose from to complete her court ordered assessment. Rather than heeding the Agency's warning, mother submitted a May 23, 2020, evaluation from Kline that was prepared without the benefit of any information from the Agency and that did not discuss the minors' reported abuse by mother, nor mother's ongoing denial of those reports. According to this report, mother suffered from anxiety and dependent personality disorder with avoidant personality traits and obsessive compulsive personality features. The Agency told mother and her counsel that Kline's report failed to satisfy the case plan and directed mother participate in the court ordered evaluation with one of two proffered providers.
According to the Agency, A.C. was thriving in her placement and doing well in school. She began weekly therapy in December 2019, wherein she worked on processing her trauma as well as learning self-awareness and relaxation techniques. A.C. was reported to be very engaged in therapy and both A.C. and her therapist agreed she should continue her treatment. A.C. had made progress in therapy but "still ha[d] a lot of work to do." A.C. felt happy, stable, and comfortable at her placement. Notably, A.C. exhibited distress following a court appointed special advocate (CASA) visit wherein her CASA worker repeatedly told her that mother loved her, resulting in reassignment of that worker.
Mother visited Z.C. but had had no visits with A.C., as A.C. had declined to visit. A.C. had not expressed to her therapist any desire to visit mother and knew to contact the social worker should she want to visit. Shortly before the Agency's June 29, 2020 addendum, A.C. did express to the social worker that she would like to have a face-to-face meeting with mother to express to mother how mother's actions have affected, and continue to affect, her. The social worker coordinated with both A.C.'s and mother's therapists regarding such a meeting where both therapists would be present, and mother's therapist indicated premeeting coaching with mother would be required so that mother would be able to "stay in her space, stay present and absorb what her child is going to say to her." A.C.'s therapist was concerned that the meeting may not go as well as A.C. thought it would and that A.C. was concerned about signing a release so information could be shared with mother's therapist because she worried such information might be disclosed to mother, but there is no indication this concern prevented the meeting. The face-to-face meeting had not taken place by the time of the August 3, 2020, six-month review hearing.
At the hearing, the Agency presented the testimony of Christiana Ebere, the social worker, that the Agency recommended six more months of reunification services. Ebere confirmed checking with A.C. monthly regarding visits with her mother, but that A.C. had refused to visit. Ebere testified that mother engaged in a pattern of participating in services but failed to fully disclose the reason for the services, thus precluding a focus on the issues that mother needed to address in order to be successful with her services. Ebere also had difficulty communicating with mother, who refused to speak over the phone without recording the conversations and demanded that communication be in e-mail. However, mother's e-mail communication was one-sided, with mother contacting Ebere when she wanted something, but failing to respond to or even acknowledge Ebere's e-mails.
Ebere reiterated mother's failures to comply with the case plan requirements as previously described in the reports, including her failure to obtain a qualifying psychological evaluation, her failure to acknowledge that she had abused the minors, her failure to take responsibility for her actions in anger management resulting in her discharge from her first anger management program, and her failure to provide her successive anger management provider information concerning the need for services and cooperate in obtaining releases so that such information could be shared. Mother's parenting class provider was concerned that mother may be suffering from untreated mental health issues.
No further testimony was presented. Mother's counsel argued for therapeutic visits to immediately commence with A.C. so that she could be transitioned home as soon as possible. Counsel continued that mother had diligently complied with her case plan by completing the psychological evaluation, anger management, and parenting classes.
The Agency argued it was unquestionable that there would be a meaningful risk to the minors if returned to mother, that mother had not meaningfully participated in services, and that mother should be ordered to participate in a psychological evaluation with Dr. Wilkenfield. The Agency continued that the minors consistently maintained that mother abused them, and mother persisted in saying the children are lying. The Agency recommended six more months of services.
Thereafter, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that returning the minors to "mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to their safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being." The court reasoned that mother had made minimal progress even though she was taking classes because she failed to take responsibility for her actions and continued asserting that the minors (who feared her) were lying. The court ordered mother to comply with her case plan, including the execution of all necessary releases of information and that mother participate in the psychological evaluation with Dr. Wilkenfield. The court further found the Agency had complied with the case plan and made reasonable efforts to return the minors, but that mother had "only made minimal progress towards alleviating and mitigating the causes necessitating placement." The court adopted the Agency's recommended findings and orders and set the case for 12-month review on December 22, 2020. The order also provided that visitation would be at the discretion of A.C. and Z.C. Mother appealed in case No. C092444.
September 2020 Section 388 Petition
On September 28, 2020, during the pendency of her appeal in case No. C092444, mother filed a section 388 petition for modification seeking to modify the court's previous order that visitation would be at the discretion of A.C. and Z.C. Mother requested therapeutic visits with A.C. and a minimum of three hours of supervised visitation per week with Z.C.
On October 26, 2020, the court held the hearing on the petition. Minors' counsel said that the visitation order needed rewording, but that the order had been positive in allowing the children to determine whether they are ready to visit with their mother. The minors' counsel stressed that A.C. had articulately expressed that she was neither ready, nor willing, to visit with mother and that the mere thought of visiting mother inspired fear and anxiety. Accordingly, the minors' counsel requested the court make a finding of detriment that could be reviewed again in December during the 12-month review. A.C.'s CASA worker reiterated A.C.'s "great anxiety concerning her mother" that had resulted in recurring nightmares over her mother and being returned to mother. A.C. was feeling overwhelmed and traumatized by "her entire life with her mother." The CASA worker did not think it would be in A.C.'s best interests to have visits at this juncture, stating A.C. "needs to reconcile her own life before she is willing to accept her mom back in her life."
The Agency's attorney concurred, requesting a detriment finding for A.C. based upon harm to her emotional well-being. A.C.'s trauma and anxiety had increased to the point that the mere mention of possible visits with mother caused problems. A.C.'s social worker had actively encouraged A.C. to visit multiple times a month but even that encouragement had proven to be too much. The Agency recommended A.C. and mother needed to continue and progress in therapy before any visitation would be possible.
Having heard this input from the other parties, mother's attorney argued that she was seeking to change the improper order that had put visitation at the discretion of the minors. She went on, "[v]isitation has to be either detrimental or a minimum ordered," counsel did not believe there was adequate evidence to make a determination that visitation with A.C. would be detrimental, and argued mother's progress in services was irrelevant to visitation. Counsel further argued that case law supported the use of joint therapy for children reluctant to visit and that without such efforts, the court should not make a detriment finding. Accordingly, mother requested therapeutic visits. In response, minors' attorney emphasized her belief that the testimony presented established A.C.'s fear and anxiety inspired by the mere thought of visitation and that the court should make a finding of detriment and pause visitation until the upcoming hearing in December. The court then determined that it would be detrimental to A.C. to have visits with mother at this time. Mother appealed this order in case No. C093009.
We concurred in case No. C092444 that the juvenile court's six-month review hearing order had erroneously ordered visitation expressly subject to the wishes of the minors but because the visitation order had already been modified, affirmed the juvenile court's orders as to minor A.C. Mother's petition for review by the California Supreme Court was denied. We also subsequently affirmed the juvenile court's section 388 order in case No. C093009 finding visitation would be detrimental to A.C. and mother's petition for review by the California Supreme Court was denied.
The 12-Month Review
The social worker's December 2020, 12-month review report and January 2021 addendum recommended terminating mother's reunification services. Mother continued to refuse to speak with the social worker by phone, and would communicate only by e-mail, though she did not respond consistently by e-mail either. She had yet to participate in the psychological evaluation that had been ordered by the court at the August 3, 2020 review hearing. The purpose of the evaluation had been to tailor services to mother's needs. The Agency had made the referral and followed up with mother on numerous occasions, but mother did not return the provider's calls. Mother finally informed the Agency that she had scheduled her psychological evaluation for January 7, 2021, but that evaluation had to be rescheduled because mother reported she had been in contact with someone who had COVID-19. The evaluation was rescheduled for February 2, 2021.
Mother had continued in counseling with Vanessa King, who reported mother has social anxiety disorder. Mother had admitted to using spanking as a form of punishment but had still not taken responsibility for the physical abuse. She was reported to have been reflecting on how her anxiety impacts others, such as the words she uses and her "behaviors," discussing communication and parenting skills, and working on positive self-talk and regulation skills. Specifically, King highlighted that mother had "a better understanding of how her inconsistency in following through with consequences lead to escalating behavior," of "how it is critical for her to regulate her emotions by walking away to de-escalate tense situations," and of "the negative impact words like name-calling can have on children."
By the time of the hearing, A.C. was 16 years old. She had been living in her concurrent home since November 2019 and was very bonded with the family. A.C.'s biological father had not been offered services. She had been visiting with him weekly but reported she was hesitant about overnight visits. A.C. enjoyed the visits and wanted to get to know him better. Nonetheless, her preference was to remain in her concurrent placement.
A.C. was continuing to receive counseling. On November 30, 2020, A.C. had called the social worker stating she wanted to report abuse and incidents that had gone on in mother's home that she had not previously shared with anyone. A.C. disclosed various incidents, beginning as early as when she was five years old, of mother punching her (including in the face), pulling her hair, hitting her and her siblings with hangers, metal spatulas, belts, and whips that left marks and bruises, withholding food, and forcing her to eat spilled yogurt off the floor by shoving her face in it. Mother would force the siblings to hit each other with the "white hanger" when they got into trouble and if they did not hit each other hard enough, mother would threaten to hit them herself. A.C. was remorseful for having complied but had also felt mother would hit her siblings much harder if she did not comply. Mother's hitting was "normal" and happened "almost every single day." Mother would act like nothing had happened after these instances of abuse. She instructed A.C. and her siblings not to tell anyone what went on in the home and to lie about how they sustained their injuries. A.C. feared for Z.C.'s safety if he were returned to mother's care and worried about mother's manipulative behaviors toward her, her siblings, and mother's past boyfriends (whom A.C. reported mother also yelled at and hit). A.C. reported she has nightmares about mother, and recounted a specific nightmare wherein mother was hitting her and "standing up" (speaking up and challenging mother). A.C. woke from this nightmare hyperventilating. A.C. told the social worker she still wonders if she would be able to stand up to mother "in real life."
The contested hearing was continued to March 2021.
Mother's court ordered psychological evaluation was finally completed on February 9, 2021. Dr. Wilkenfield reported mother denied any wrongdoing and having ever hit any of her children with a closed fist or any implement, and admitted only to threatening to hit A.W. with a hanger during a single incident and threatening to spank A.C. and Z.C. at different times. He noted she reflected poor insight into the effects of her ongoing denial of responsibility on her children's emotional functioning and how they feel about her. Mother was diagnosed with disruptive, impulse-control and conduct disorder, personality disorder with borderline and narcissistic personality traits, and negativistic personality features. Dr. Wilkenfield concluded that, since mother continues to deny the abuse despite all the services in which she has participated, there is little reason to believe her children would be at any less risk than at the beginning of the case and there were no additional services he would recommend that would alleviate the risk factors.
The contested 12-month review hearing took place on March 12 and 17, 2021. Mother's therapist testified in accordance with her previous report and added that mother was not willing to talk about certain issues related to the abuse and continued to state that the minors were lying.
The social worker testified she did not recommend any sort of conjoint counseling between A.C. and mother at that time. A.C. knew that mother continued to deny the abuse and stated she does not trust mother-that mother is manipulative. A.C. was not comfortable around mother and appeared to be anxious even when just the topic of mother was raised. When asked about visits with mother, A.C. would be visibly shaking, rubbing her palm on her pants, and unable to make eye contact. A.C. would always decline to visit and had been "relieved" she would not be made to visit with mother after the section 388 hearing when the court made the finding that visitation was detrimental.
A.C. also testified at the hearing. She testified she had read each of the social worker's reports and had never seen any statement attributed to her that she did not actually make. She also testified that the Agency offered her visitation with mother but she did not accept because when she is around mother, she gets scared. She was relieved when the court suspended visitation and noted that when she was asked about visiting, she would get frustrated and scared. She did not want future visitation and was scared for her brother, Z.C., should he be returned to mother's custody. She did not believe mother was trying her best to be a better parent (noting she does not return e-mails and calls), nor did she believe mother loved her. She noted the first time she had heard mother say she loved her was "last December." Z.C. was afraid to testify.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that mother and the minors had been provided reasonable reunification services. It found mother had been offered myriad opportunities that she rejected or tried to control and, even though she completed services, she learned nothing. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that return of A.C. to mother would create a substantial risk of detriment and ordered mother's reunification services be terminated. The court granted A.C.'s biological father's request to be elevated to a presumed father, found placement with him would be detrimental, but ordered he be provided reunification services. The reunification case plan was to be submitted by March 29, 2021, and an 18-month review hearing was set for April 19, 2021.
Mother appealed.
Eighteen-Month Review Hearing
Mother was not feeling well and did not attend the April 19, 2021 hearing. Father's counsel reported father and A.C. had a "heart-to-heart" and had discussed A.C.'s wishes. He realized A.C. was "desperate" for these dependency proceedings to end. He had decided not to request a contested hearing, to submit to the Agency's recommendation for guardianship for A.C. with her current caregivers and continue to visit and build his relationship with A.C. and provide for her to be in his home in the future in any way she would like.
The juvenile court found both father and A.C. were involved in the case plan development and that the Agency had complied with the case plan by making reasonable efforts to return the minor to a safe home. Father's reunification services were terminated, and the juvenile court set a section 366.26 hearing for August 16, 2021.
Mother filed a notice of intent in case No. C093965. (§ 366.26, subd. (l); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.)
Section 388 Petition for Modification
On July 13, 2021, mother filed a section 388 petition relating to both A.C. and Z.C. seeking reinstatement of reunification services, commencement of visitation, and placement of the minors with the maternal grandparents. The juvenile court denied her petition without a hearing. Mother appealed.
Section 366.26 Hearing
The section 366.26 hearing for A.C. took place on August 16, 2021. The Agency recommended "another planned permanent living arrangement" without termination of parental rights. Mother requested a contested hearing for the purpose of seeking reunification services and visitation but did not contest the recommendation not to terminate her parental rights. The juvenile court denied mother's request to set the matter for a contested hearing as she had no standing to seek reunification services at the section 366.26 hearing. The juvenile court ordered A.C. to remain in her placement with a permanent plan for independent living, arranged for ongoing visitation for A.C. with father and her siblings, and found that visitation with mother was detrimental to the minor's physical and emotional well-being and ordered it terminated.
Mother appealed.
Discussion
I
Reasonable Services Finding at the 12-month Review
Mother contends the juvenile court's finding, made at the 12-month review hearing for minor A.C., that reasonable services were provided is not supported by the evidence because the Agency did not facilitate conjoint therapy and visitation between A.C. and mother. We reject this contention.
"At each review hearing, if the child is not returned to his or her parent, the juvenile court is required to determine whether 'reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent . . . in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and the continued custody of the child have been provided or offered to the parent . . . .' (§§ 366.21, subds. (e)(8) & (f)(1)(A), 366.22, subd. (a).) The 'adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness of the [Agency's] efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each case.' [Citation.] To support a finding that reasonable services were offered or provided to the parent, 'the record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult . . . .'" (In re M.F. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1, 13-14.) The services provided do not have to be the best services that could have been provided, rather they must have been reasonable under the circumstances. (See Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969, citing In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) We review the juvenile court's determination that reasonable services were provided for substantial evidence. (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 414.)
In mother's previous appeal from the six-month review hearing (case No. C092444), mother argued the Agency failed to provide reasonable services because A.C. had (in June 2020) expressed a desire to meet with mother face-to-face to tell mother how mother's abuse had impacted her and that meeting had not occurred. We concluded: "Mother complains that this session had not occurred as of the August 3, 2020 six-month status hearing. However, we do not find the delay in setting up this meeting unreasonable. On the contrary, mother's own therapist requested time to prepare mother for this difficult meeting. Given mother's continuing denial that she had physically abused her children, it is manifestly reasonable that mother required coaching before meeting with A.C. to discuss that abuse and its impact on A.C."
Thereafter, A.C. changed her mind and withdrew her request for the face-to-face meeting. The social worker followed up with A.C.'s therapist and the therapist indicated that A.C. was not prepared or ready to have that meeting. The social worker asked A.C. if she would continue to think about it and let the social worker know when she felt ready, and thereafter checked in with the minor, but the minor told her she no longer wished to move forward with the meeting. The social worker also communicated with A.C.'s therapist, leaving the door open for if and when A.C. was ready to have a meeting with mother.
Mother now boldly states that family therapy was "an absolutely essential, if not the most critical, component of mother's case plan." Citing In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972, mother argues conjoint therapy was critical to visitation because it was unlikely A.C. would ever consent to visitation without it. She quotes Alvin R.'s statement that "[w]here the minor is reluctant to visit, and family therapy is needed to promote visitation, such therapy may be critical to reunification. [Citations.]" (Alvin R., at p. 972.) She then follows with criticism of the Agency's efforts in facilitating conjoint therapy and not more convincingly encouraging A.C. to participate in it.
In Alvin R., upon which mother relies, the social worker failed to make timely efforts to enroll the minor in counseling, which was to be (according to the case plan) a precursor to conjoint counseling and, thereafter, failed to follow court orders to arrange for family therapy. (Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at pp. 972-973.) Alvin R., and its reasoning, is inapposite here.
First, we note that the lack of visitation between A.C. and mother was no longer simply a result of A.C.'s reluctance to visit. Unlike Alvin R., the juvenile court here found visitation with mother would be detrimental to the minor. Second, unlike the father in Alvin R., who had fully complied with his case plan and whose therapist had indicated was ready to begin conjoint counseling, mother had not completed or benefitted from the services she had been provided. She had made minimal progress in anger management, failing to successfully complete that program. She failed to timely obtain her psychological assessment to determine necessary services; refused to communicate with the social worker; failed to be transparent in individual counseling as evidenced by her continued denial of her abuse and by her refusal to discuss certain topics with her therapist; and failed to "develop an understanding of what constitutes physical and emotional abuse, identify how her past behaviors have impacted her children's physical and emotional health and safety" as required by her case plan. Instead, she continued to deny the abuse she inflicted upon her children; continued to maintain that others, including the minors, were lying about the abuse. Additionally, Alvin R. did not involve a minor, like A.C. here, whose therapist had said the minor is not ready for conjoint or family counseling or an instance wherein the court has found visitation to be detrimental to the minor.
Regarding mother's criticism of the Agency's efforts, we emphasize that the social worker was not, nor should she, be charged with "reassuring [A.C.] that a meeting with mother would be beneficial to [A.C.]'s healing," as mother now suggests. To the contrary, the minor's therapist told the social worker that A.C. was not ready or prepared for such a meeting. While mother now postulates that, contrary to the minor's own therapist's conclusions, a face-to-face meeting, and conjoint therapy, was appropriate and could have resolved A.C.'s refusal to visit mother, there is no competent evidence to support this postulation. In fact, the evidence tends to the contrary. By all accounts, the minor did not want to meet with mother, nor was she ready to meet with her. And there is no evidence mother was prepared for such a meeting either.
Mother also argues the services provided were not reasonable because the Agency did not come up with another way, such as a letter or video, for A.C. to express her feelings to mother. With no basis in the record, mother assumes that "[A.C.]'s [former] stated desire-'to express how her actions have affected her and continue to affect her' . . . -was of paramount importance if there was to be any realistic chance [A.C.] would desire to begin visitation and, therefore, reunification." This, of course, is speculation by mother. No one rendered such an opinion in the juvenile court; not the minor's therapist, a CASA worker, the minor's counsel, nor the minor, herself. The social worker is not charged with second-guessing the minor's therapist as to what will or will not assist the minor in moving forward with addressing the trauma inflicted upon her by mother. In any event, had A.C., at age 15, or her therapist believed it would be beneficial, A.C. could have prepared such a letter or video and requested it be delivered.
Mother also argues that she was prevented from progressing in her own case plan because the social worker did not convince A.C. to attend conjoint therapy. She claims that "[r]egardless of [her] efforts, she could not progress without family therapy with [A.C.]" She further argues she could not show she had benefitted from the services without being able to interact with the minor and demonstrate her learned skills and that she was denied "the opportunity to acknowledge her wrongdoing to [A.C.]" because she was not permitted to meet with the minor. But mother had not sufficiently progressed in those portions of her case plan necessary to proceed with conjoint therapy. She had not acknowledged that she had physically abused the minors, that they did not lie about the abuse, and that she understood that they were traumatized by the abuse they had suffered. Instead, at the time of the hearing and after a year of services, mother continued to reflect poor insight into the effects of her ongoing denial of responsibility on her children's emotional functioning and how they feel about her. She had been given more than adequate opportunity to take responsibility for her abuse, yet she repeatedly denied it to everyone else and continued to do so up to the time of the review hearing, denying it to her therapist, the social worker, and Dr. Wilkenfield at the court ordered psychological evaluation. She continued to maintain others were lying and misrepresenting facts. Mother's therapist had indicated she must be prepared to hear what A.C. had to say and there was no evidence she was so prepared. Moreover, the failure of the minor to reach a point where she was ready for conjoint therapy was not the result of lack of services. A.C. was promptly referred for counseling and continued in counseling throughout this case.
Finally, we reject mother's argument that she is entitled to six additional months of reunification services as a result of the juvenile court's August 3, 2020, six-month review hearing visitation order, which had, for "nearly three months," improperly left visitation in A.C.'s discretion. Even assuming mother should be credited additional time commensurate with the period of time the improper order was in effect, she was already provided that additional time. The 12-month reunification period, calculated from the time A.C. entered foster care (§ 361.49) ended on December 13, 2020. The 12-month review hearing did not conclude until March 17, 2021-three months beyond the end of the 12-month reunification period. Thus, she already received additional time and she is not, contrary to her contention, entitled to any extension of services as a result of the October 26, 2020, court ordered no visitation order, which this court has previously affirmed.
In conclusion, we agree that visitation can be a critical component of a reunification plan. (See Serena M. v. Superior Court (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 659, 673.) But" '[w]hile visitation is a key element of reunification, the [juvenile] court must focus on the best interests of the children "and on the elimination of conditions which led to the juvenile court's finding that the child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, harm. . . ."' [Citation.] To that end, subdivision (a)(1)(B) of section 362.1 mandates that '[n]o visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child.' Thus, '[I]f visitation is not consistent with the well-being of the child, the juvenile court has the discretion to deny such contact. . . . "[W]ell-being" includes the minor's emotional and physical health.' [Citation.] In effect, the juvenile court may[, as it did here,] deny visitation by finding that forced contact with a parent is harmful to the child. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
Despite the reasonable services provided by the Agency in this case, neither mother nor A.C. ever progressed enough to require modification of that no visitation order, or even conjoint therapy. Neither therapist indicated her client was ready to meet with the other, let alone participate in conjoint counseling. Mother continued to deny responsibility for the longstanding and severe abuse she inflicted and A.C., aware of mother's denial, continued to shake in fear at just the thought of meeting with mother.
Although efforts were unsuccessful, the evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that reasonable services were provided.
II
Reasonable Services Finding at the 18-month Review
Appealability
Appellant contends that she may raise issues arising from the 18-month review hearing because she filed a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, which was denied summarily on the merits. (Joyce G. v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1501 (Joyce G.).) We take judicial notice of the court file in that proceeding-case No. C093965. (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (d).) Appellant is correct that she may re-raise the issue she raised in her petition for extraordinary writ, although her reasoning is in error. She may re-raise the issue not, as appellant contends, because it was not decided on the merits, but because her petition was summarily denied. (Joyce G., at pp. 1513-1514 [petition can be considered on its merits and still summarily denied].)
"Subsequent appellate review of findings subsumed in an order setting a section 366.26 hearing is dependent upon an antecedent petition for writ review of those findings having been 'summarily denied. . . .'" (Joyce G., supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1513; § 366.26, subd. (l).) Appellant's writ petition raised the issue of substantial evidence to support the finding that reasonable services were provided. The petition was summarily denied on the merits. When "the denial is summary, the petitioner retains his or her appellate remedy (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(1)(C)) but is limited to the same issue on the same record (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(1)(B)) and thus is destined on appeal to receive the same result." (Joyce G., supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1514.) Thus, while appellant may again argue the evidence did not support the juvenile court's finding at the 18-month review hearing that reasonable services were provided, we again reject her contention.
Merits
In challenging the juvenile court's 18-month review orders, appellant again complains that the Agency did not make reasonable efforts to facilitate conjoint therapy and visitation between mother and A.C. Making the same challenge she made to the juvenile court's 12-month review order, appellant contends the Agency's failure to provide a face-to-face meeting between she and A.C. is fatal to a reasonable services finding.
The 18-month review hearing, however, was held only a month after the 12-month review hearing at which the court found the services provided to mother reasonable and terminated her services. The issues at the 18-month review hearing related only to A.C.'s father and, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court found his services had been reasonable, ordered them terminated, and set the section 366.26 hearing. No additional evidence or argument was presented with respect to the reasonableness of mother's services, which had already been found reasonable and terminated. The finding and order about which she complains was not entered at the 18-month review hearing.
Even assuming, without deciding, that the lack of juvenile court orders entered at the 18-month review hearing relating to mother does not preclude the challenge she now makes to that order, we have already considered and rejected her argument as set forth in the previous section of this discussion. Thus, we once again, for these reasons, reject her challenge to the 18-month review orders.
III
Section 388 Petition for Modification
Mother also filed a notice of appeal from the juvenile court's July 21, 2021, order denying her section 388 petition relating to both A.C. and Z.C., which sought reinstatement of reunification services, commencement of visitation, and placement of the minors with the maternal grandparents. The juvenile court denied her request for a hearing on the matter, stating the request did not state new evidence or change of circumstance and that the proposed order does not promote the minor's best interests. Mother has made no challenge in her appellate briefing to that order. Accordingly, we dismiss her appeal from the July 21, 2021, order denying her petition.
IV
Termination of Visitation
Finally, mother contends we must reverse or modify the juvenile court's orders, entered at the section 366.26 hearing regarding A.C. terminating visitation between mother and A.C. She concedes the juvenile court was authorized to order no visitation between she and A.C. but claims the court was not authorized to "terminate" visitation. (See In re D.B. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1095.)
Mother states she has found no authority permitting the court to "terminate" visitation at the section 366.26 hearing, although she concedes she has found at least one published opinion affirming such an order. The basis of her claim that the "termination" of visitation is unauthorized is her citation to Black's Law Dictionary's definition of "terminate" as "To put an end to; to bring to an end." (Black's Law Dict. (8th ed. 2004) p. 1511, col. 1.) She asserts that this definition renders a "termination" as a permanent, unchangeable condition and, because her parental rights have not been terminated, she is still permitted to seek visitation in the future.
We find no reversible error in the juvenile court's use of the judicial council form JV-320 that provides a box for a finding and order that "Visitation between child and (names): The mother, [R.C.] is detrimental to the child's physical or emotional well-being and is terminated." We reject, outright, mother's contention that the use of the word "terminated" commands a permanent condition. As mother well knows from her own section 388 petition seeking reinstatement of reunification services, which had been terminated, "terminated" does not necessarily establish an immutable condition. Nor does the definition from Black's Law upon which she relies support her contention.
Having failed to show error or any prejudice arising from the juvenile court's use of the judicial council form language, we find this contention is frivolous. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)
V
Remaining Contentions
Mother's remaining contentions are conditioned upon our acceptance of previously discussed contentions, which we have rejected. We, therefore, need not address them here.
Disposition
The appeal taken from the juvenile court's July 21, 2021, order is dismissed. The juvenile court's March 17, 2021, and August 16, 2021, orders are affirmed.
We concur: DUARTE, J., EARL, J.