Iowa recognizes the following four theories of invasion of privacy: "Intrusion upon plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs[;] [p]ublic disclosure of embarrassing facts about the plaintiff[;] [p]ublicity which places plaintiff in a false light in the public eye[; and] [a]ppropriation, for defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness." Yoder v. Smith, 112 N.W.2d 862, 863-64 (Iowa 1962) (quoting PROSSER, LAW OF TORT 637-39 (2d ed. 1955)). These four theories have been adopted by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
15 A.L.R.2d 108, 158, 106 A.L.R. 1453, 91 A.L.R. 1495), it has been held to cover communications to the debtor's employer disclosing the fact of the debt, even if disputed, and requesting the aid of the employer. (See Harrison v. Humble Oil Refining Co. (D.S.C. 1967) 264 F. Supp. 89; Yoder v. Smith (1962) 253 Iowa 505 [ 112 N.W.2d 862]; Gouldman-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst (1957) 213 Ga. 682 [ 100 S.E.2d 881]; Hawley v. Professional Credit Bureau (1956) 345 Mich. 500 [ 76 N.W.2d 835]; Lucas v. Moskins Stores, Inc. (Ky.App. 1953) 262 S.W.2d 679; Voneye v. Turner (Ky.App. 1951) 240 S.W.2d 588; Patton v. Jacobs (1948) 118 Ind. App. 358 [ 78 N.E.2d 789]; Lewis v. Physicians Dentists Credit Bureau, Inc. (1947) 27 Wn.2d 267 [ 177 P.2d 896]. See also Annot. 14 A.L.R.2d 750, 770; 77 C.J.S., Right of Privacy, § 2, p. 401; Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed.) 834-835.
We have also cited with approval Professor Prosser's characterization of the kinds of actionable invasion which may occur. Yoder v. Smith, 253 Iowa 505, 112 N.W.2d 862 (1962). The questions here are (1) whether an invasion of privacy action can be based on oral statements, (2) whether the confidentiality provisions of § 598.
The Court has little difficulty predicting that the Iowa Supreme Court would recognize a cause of action for appropriation of name and likeness, as alleged in the Estates' Count I. As far back as 1962, the Iowa Supreme Court identified "[a]ppropriation, for defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness" as one of four torts recognized by Dean Prosser under the umbrella term "right to privacy." Yoder v. Smith, 253 Iowa 505, 112 N.W.2d 862, 863-64 (1962). The viability of name and likeness claims was not at issue in Yoder v. Smith, but the Iowa Supreme Court clearly viewed Dean Prosser favorably.
"Thus it is not an invasion of the right of privacy . . . to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff's private life to a single person or even to a small group of persons." Id. § 652D cmt. a; see also Yoder v. Smith, 112 N.W.2d 862, 864 (Iowa 1962) (holding that, when the defendant sent letters to the plaintiff's employer that included false statements pertaining to the plaintiff's debts, the plaintiff did not have an invasion of privacy claim because the communication was not to the general public); 62A Am. Jur. 2d Privacy § 141 (2013) ("[I]n actions for false-light invasion of privacy, the requirement of 'publicity' consists of communication to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge."). 2.
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public, as stated in § 652E.Winegard, 260 N.W.2d at 822 (also stating that these four forms of invasion of privacy were cited in Yoder v. Smith, 253 Iowa 505, 508, 112 N.W.2d 862, 863-64 (Iowa 1962)). The court in Winegard clarified the requirements of each of these forms of the tort.
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public, as stated in § 652E.Winegard, 260 N.W.2d at 822 (citing Yoder v. Smith, 253 Iowa 505, 508, 112 N.W.2d 862, 863-64 (1962)). The court in Winegard clarified the requirements of each of these forms of the tort.
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public, as stated in § 652E.Winegard, 260 N.W.2d at 822 (also stating that these four forms of invasion of privacy were cited in Yoder v. Smith, 253 Iowa 505, 508, 112 N.W.2d 862, 863-64 (Iowa 1962)). The court in Winegard clarified the requirements of each of these forms of the tort.
Courts in other jurisdictions also have decided that the disclosure of personal information, in certain situations, serves a legitimate business interest which outweighs a plaintiff's privacy right. See, e.g., Harrison v. Humble Oil Refining Co., 264 F. Supp. 89, 92 (D.S.C. 1967) (creditor may disclose the existence of an outstanding debt to the debtor's employer; this reasonable method of persuading payment does not constitute an actionable intrusion on the debtor's privacy); Yoder v. Smith, 253 Iowa 505, 510 (1962) (same); Household Fin. Corp. v. Bridge, 252 Md. 531, 543-544 (1968) (same). In response to question 2, we conclude that no conditional privilege for legitimate business communications exists under the Massachusetts right of privacy statute.
Numerous jurisdictions have judicially recognized the right. See Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So.2d 474 (1964); Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945); Olan Mills, Inc. of Texas v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22 (1962); Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal.2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952); Korn v. Rennison, 21 Conn. Sup. 400, 156 A.2d 476 (1959); Guthridge v. Pen-Mod, Inc., 239 A.2d 709 (Del.Sup. 1967); Jacova v. Southern Radio and Television Co., 83 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1955); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 58 (1905); Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 50 Haw. 374, 441 P.2d 141 (1968); Carlson v. Dell Publishing Co., 65 Ill. App.2d 209, 213 N.E.2d 39 (1965); Peterson v. Idaho First National Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961); Yoder v. Smith, 253 Iowa 505, 112 N.W.2d 862 (1962); Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532 (1918); Wheeler v. P. Sorensen Manufacturing Co., 415 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. 1967); Pallas v. Crowley, Milner Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.W.2d 911 (1948); Deaton v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 326 So.2d 471 (Miss. 1976); Biederman's of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959); Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964); Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., 97 N.J. Super. 327, 235 A.2d 62 (1967); Montgomery Ward v. Larragoite, 81 N.M. 383, 467 P.2d 399 (1970); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., et al., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1937); Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956); Tollefson v. Price, 247 Or. 398, 430 P.2d 990 (1967); Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959); Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956); Truxes v. Kenco Enterprises, Inc., 80 S.D. 104, 119 N.W.2d 914 (1963); Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973); Roach