Opinion
CIVIL ACTION: NO. 03-1733
May 26, 2004
ORDER
AND NOW, this 26th day of May 2004, upon consideration of defendant's motion for summary judgment (doc. no 23) and plaintiff's response thereto (doc. no. 26), it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
A court may grant summary judgment only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is "material" only if its existence or non-existence would affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). An issue of fact is "genuine" only when there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving party regarding the existence of that fact. Id. In determining whether there exist genuine issues of material fact, all inferences must be drawn, and all doubts must be resolved, in favor of the non-moving party. Coregis Ins. Co. v. Baratta Fenerty, Ltd., 264 F.3d 302, 305-06 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
Although the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, in a case such as this, where the non-moving party is the plaintiff, and therefore, bears the burden of proof at trial, that party must present affirmative evidence sufficient to establish the existence of each element of his case. Id. at 306 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). Accordingly, a plaintiff cannot rely on unsupported assertions, speculation, or conclusory allegations to avoid the entry of summary judgment, see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, but rather, she "must go beyond the pleadings and provide some evidence that would show that there exists a genuine issue for trial." Jones v. United Parcel Service., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000).
Here, plaintiffs have provided insufficient evidence to present a genuine issue of material fact on count 14 of the second amended complaint. Count 14 alleges violations "of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), including but not limited to . . . withholding severance and/or other and additional benefits." Second Amend. Comp., at ¶ 96.
ERISA recognizes two types of benefit plans: pension plans and welfare plans. Deibler v. Local Union 23, 973 F.2d 206, 209 (3d Cir. 1992). A benefit plan that provides disability benefits is considered a welfare plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). Welfare benefit plans do not vest automatically, see Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6. F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 1993), and the burden is on the plaintiff to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that the employer intended the benefits to be vested, Howe v. Varity Corp., 896 F.2d 1107, 1109 (8th Cir. 1990); see also In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits ERISA Litig., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8549, at *72 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 24, 1994).
Here, the only benefit plan that Ms. Yi has proffered evidence of her participation in, while employed with defendant, is a "Short Term Disability Plan." See Plain. Mem., at Exhibit R. However, Ms. Yi has provided no evidence that any benefits provided in the plan were vested. She argues only that she "may" have been under a plan and that she "may" have become eligible to receive benefits from a plan.Id. at 51. These statements are purely speculative and do not constitute evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
On the other hand, defendant has provided an affidavit from Frank Cummings, director of employee benefits for Abington Memorial Hospital, averring that plaintiff was not a vested member in any ERISA plan at the hospital and that there is no outstanding compensation or benefits which are owed to plaintiff. Moreover, even if Ms. Yi could demonstrate that plan benefits had vested, she has failed to provide any evidence, aside from the naked allegations in her complaint, that any benefits were withheld.
In view of plaintiff's failure to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was vested in a benefit plan, and that if vested, she was denied any benefits by the defendant, the Court shall grant defendant's motion for summary judgment as to this claim.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that the counts 1, 4-13, and 15-16 are REMANDED to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
Having granted defendant summary judgment on plaintiff's ERISA claim, the remaining claims in this action are state law claims. The supplemental jurisdiction statute provides that "the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim" if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Declining the exercise of jurisdiction is within the discretion of the district court even if the case is at the summary judgment stage. Annulli v. Panikkar, 200 F.3d 189, 202 (3d Cir. 1999). While a court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the federal claims have been dismissed, see Fralin v. County of Bucks, 296 F. Supp.2d 609, 617 (E.D. Pa. 2003), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "pendent jurisdiction should be declined where the federal claims are no longer viable, absent `extraordinary circumstances.'" Shaffer v. Albert Gallatin Area School Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff argues that this Court should retain jurisdiction and that defendant's contrary view on the matter is "unfair and disingenuous" because it is defendant who removed this case to federal court in the first place. To the extent that defendant's position offends the notions of fairness, convenience, judicial economy, and comity, the scales are balanced by the fact that plaintiff, having originally chosen the state as the forum for this litigation, now protests having the case heard in her forum of first choice.
Finding no extraordinary circumstances in this case, the Court shall remand the state law claims to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988) (suggesting that remand may be appropriate when the district court declines to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims in a case previously removed to the federal court).